Between history, myth, and the present: an asymmetric transaction

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ABSTRACT
The period known as the Spanish political transition—whose duration is still subject to debate—has been interpreted in many ways, though the dominant and official narrative is the version that portrays it as ‘exemplary’. This paper critically reviews the process that led to the relative stabilisation of a new parliamentary monarchy together with its gradual integration into the European project. We highlight the context, uncertainties, and splitting crossroads that appeared in different periods of the transition. This paper upholds the idea that the transition was an asymmetric compromise that avoided a democratic rupture with Franco’s dictatorship and its legacy. We recognise the liberties and rights that were won, but likewise, we emphasise the costs entailed in this process. In particular, the transition had a high political cost in that it fostered an elitist political culture that, in spite of several waves of protests, was not challenged by a social majority until the emergence of the most recent surge of protest as an outcome of the 15 May 2011 movement. Since then, the unfolding crisis of the regime—which is related to the crisis also currently affecting the EU in the aftermath of the financial and real estate crisis of 2008—as well as the internal national-territorial division in Spain, has once again put the issue of the Spanish transition, and the possible need for a ‘second transition’ or new constituent processes, under the spotlight of debate.

Keywords: reform, rupture, social movements, political culture, consensus.

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DISPUTED NARRATIVES: PAST AND PRESENT
Starting on an international scale in 2008, the unfolding systemic crisis manifesting within the European Union (EU), especially in southern European countries, seems to be leading not only to a crisis of the already eroded welfare state, but may also be causing the EU’s entry into a post-democratic phase. In this context, it is no accident that most now perceive the end of the social pact between elites and citizens which seemed assured by the state model; this has also created a legitimacy crisis for political representation systems as well as for the majority of regimes formed since the end of the Second World War.

Unlike the 1945 defeat of Nazism and fascism, or Portugal’s break with fascism in April 1974, Spain’s late incorporation into these [new social] models started without first breaking from the Franco dictatorship and at a time when a long wave of neoliberal rule had just begun. This combination of factors—the late implementation of a welfare state alongside a
low-intensity democracy—can help us to understand how the effects of the 2008 real estate–financial crisis more acutely manifested themselves in Spain as a country located on the periphery of the EU, and also helped to expose the weaknesses of the type of regime formed in 1978, especially so after the May 2010 shift in Rodríguez Zapatero’s government’s financial policy.

Therefore, it should come of no surprise that the frustration of shattered expectations then spreading through Spanish society soon came to be expressed as a new cycle of protests and in the re-politicisation of Spanish society, starting on 15 May 2011 with the so-called 15-M Movement. Since then, interest has grown in investigating the roots of the Spanish sociopolitical and national–territorial crisis, which is now particularly serious in Catalonia. To do so, it is vital to return to the origins of the current Spanish regime and, therefore, to question the mythology of the transition and its dominant narrative that has long prevailed.

This story, which varies depending on its authors and its successive political contexts, claims that the reformist sector of the Franco regime, with King Juan Carlos I and Adolfo Suárez at the head, paved this path towards democracy. Additionally, it states that the opposing movements were very weak (hence the hackneyed phrase ‘Franco died in bed’) or that, had their power been recognised, it could have provoked political destabilisation or a military coup. According to apologists, it was fortunate that the main anti-Franco opposition leaders were adapting to the conditions being put in place to finally enable the start of the agreed processes of reform.

The television series *The Transition* directed by Victoria Prego, which has become well known since its broadcast on the Spanish state television channel RTVE in 1995, is very representative of that story. In it, Alfonso Ortí presents a very astute critical summary of the transition’s new “sovereign design” for the Crown and the formation of a “new dominant historical ‘juancarlistic’ block”—after making the appropriate pacts with the elites”, all while “in the far background, the grey masses of civil society patiently await their democratic emancipation” (Ortí, 1995, p. 83).

Alternative interpretations of this narrative, which tend to highlight the positive and essential role played by the opposition social movements have emerged, and continue to surface even now. However, the majority still end by legitimising the results achieved with the consensus of the transition, and insist that no other options had been possible.

These narratives have seeped into the consciousness of the majority of the population, and have been reflected in public opinion polls which give a very positive assessment of the model transition, especially in those carried out in the 1990s. However, even before the emergence of the 15-M Movement, in the heat of the “battle for the past” and for “historical memory”, some contrasting visions and more plural viewpoints were audible and these provided “a more controversial and less idealised panorama in which the process had been increasingly improvised and in which each of the great stereotypes of the Transition are questioned” (Castellanos, 2008, p. 170).

Since 2011, this tendency to reconsider the past has been reinforced with new contributions and debates centred around that period and which take an increasingly critical view of the conventional discourses that are still dominant in the public and private media. Suffice to mention the example of the newspaper *El País*, which played a dominant role in the press at the time; it published some critical views during that period (Juliá, 2017, p. 497–537), some even by its then director, Juan Luis Cebrián, but today these seem obstinate in their defence of the dominant narrative of the transition. The most recent retort to that official report, although obviously without the same impact on public opinion, was found at the *Congreso las otras protagonistas de la Transición: la izquierda radical y los movimientos sociales* (‘The other protagonists of the transition: the radical left and social movements’) conference which was held on 24–26 February 2017 in Madrid. This brought together a new generation of researchers and a wide range of testimonies from the political and social activists who ‘lived dangerously’ through those years but who had had ‘high hopes’.
CONTEXT AND UNCERTAINTY

I will begin with a reminder that any reconstruction of the past must consider the lessons, based on political transition studies, that political scientists have drawn from different schools of thought. One of these lessons is the need for more prudence regarding theoretical conclusions and the tendency to generalise based on them. A theory of transitions is impossible and an exportable model does not exist because they both have special characteristics in practically every sense. However, both politicians and political scientists have succumbed to both these temptations by trying to create rules based only on the consequences of a given critical conjuncture in a certain context and with very specific actors, which led to one possible outcome from among many. This was the case, for example, with the experiences in Eastern Europe and Latin America.

At most, some categories, parallels, and possible differences, but little else, can be selected from each political experience. This is precisely because these experiences are a process of change, agreement is not the norm and uncertainty regarding the possible application of any preconceived plan dominates them. Therefore, the outcome of these processes depends on collective human action and the practical steps that are also eventually taken as a function of the changing relationship between conflict and/or negotiation established between the different social, political, and cultural actors present.

This is, undoubtedly, also what occurred in the Spanish case. Trying to faithfully reinterpret [the Spanish narrative] while also being faithful to the different variables ‘at play’ (which, of course, become visible ex post facto) leads us to two commonly criticised classic fallacies which have also trapped many academics: *retrospective determinism* (stating that what happened had to occur and there was no other possible alternative) and *presentism* (analysing the past in terms of the interests of the elite holding power in each subsequent historical moment).

Likewise, I also consider that neither the presumed lucidity of some leaders (whether of the dictatorship or the opposition) nor political development or economic and social modernisation theories, help us to understand the final events (Saz, 2011). At most, these evolutionary or elitist versions of history can only serve to help us understand the progressive erosion of the regime’s social base and its attempts at liberalisation which were finally frustrated by mobilisation—as was the case with Arias Navarro’s government and its ‘Spirit of 12 February’ [in reference to reform]—as well as the inevitable self-reform of certain characters in the dictatorship.

However it does not, of course, help us to draw conclusions about the inevitability of the final course of the process or the type of political system that would finally be constituted. This is because, understanding this [narrative] in a context of political and social instability requires us to recognise the conflictive dynamic established between, on the one hand, an anti-Francoist movement throughout whole Spanish state, and, on the other, a tense and pragmatic response [to this movement] by a political power that did not want to be displaced by force or by [politics]. In short, we must introduce factors such as the successive national and international events resulting from the confrontation between the movement and the power bloc, as well as realignments of the bourgeois factions and the proto-parties of the right and moderate left that emerged during the initial years of the transition.

It is also important to remember that once the autarkic phase that followed the 1959 Stabilisation Plan (along with the corresponding wave of migration abroad and the growing role of tourism and foreign investment) had been overcome, the Spanish economy and society were already in a process of very diverse change.¹ Thus, a type of capitalism was being formed, which the Franco regime served with remarkable “class efficiency” (González de Albarracín, 1987). The work of Jesús Albarracín (1987) remains an excellent reference for a retrospective view of the characteristics of Spanish capitalism in that period, as well as for information about the formation of the labour movement linked to industrialisation. Also see the more recent and exhaustive work by Enrique González de Andrés (2014), on the controversy of the theses defended by the Communist Party of Spain (the PCE: *Partido Comunista de España*).
Andrés, 2014), favouring massive worker overexploitation with hardly any resistance because of the foreign capital then coming into the country (Muñoz, Roldán, and Serrano, 1980). Moreover, [the regime’s] growing economic, geopolitical, and military links to western capitalism forced its most outspoken representatives (including the leaders of the German Social Democracy) to show a growing interest in avoiding any tendency that might lead to [Spain’s] destabilisation as the end of the dictatorship came into sight.

This concern was justified, a fortiori, because from 1971-1973 the international capitalist economy was reaching the end of its post-World War II expansionary phase, and the effects of this [slowdown] were already being felt in the Spanish economy. Therefore, it was important to stop the growing uprising of the worker’s movements which were leading the struggle against the dictatorship and that were also threatening to go beyond democratic aspirations by questioning the poorly named ‘income policy’—that is, wage control—that made employers especially fearful of democratic change. This was because, in effect, with few exceptions, business was one of the sectors that remained loyal to the Franco regime until the end, much more than other sectors, like the Church, that had supported it since its genesis [...]. In fact, business owners will see in the end of the political regime from a position of extreme weakness (Domènech, 2012, p. 227–229).

Western capitalism’s geostrategic interest in intervening before the inevitable end of the Franco regime grew even more after the impact of an unforeseen event (in terms of its timing and form): the Portuguese revolution of April 1974, which was initiated by a group of captains who rebelled against the Caetano dictatorship and its colonial wars. From then on, the lessons the leaders of the great Western powers and NATO drew from this process are fundamental to understanding both their interference, which became increasingly active and which aimed to thwart this process in Portugal—which they achieved in November 1975—and their concern about avoiding a ‘contagion effect’ in [Spain].

In the Spanish case, the active role these great powers played is clear because it even led them to choose to directly support the candidate designated by Franco as his successor, Juan Carlos, rather than his father, Juan de Borbón. The biggest loser in this interventionism were the Saharawi people, whose territory was ceded to Morocco under pressure from the United States of America with the complicit support of the forthcoming king of Spain when he signed the agreement on 14 November 1975, just six days before [Franco’s] death (Garcés, 1996; Wise, 2008).

**POLITICAL TIME AND POINTS OF DIVISION**

Going directly to the heart of the matter, without a doubt we must first establish a clear conclusion: there was no radical break with the previous regime, but rather, a process of agreed reform (not an agreed break) of the old legal establishment—through the approval, by referendum, of the Law for Political Reform in December of 1976—into the new laws established with the 1978 Constitution, from the time of the semi-foundational elections of June of 1977.

We could describe that period as a process of stepping towards democratisation, following a growing tension between those at the top and those at the bottom, in which top-down control ended up predominating. It had been preceded by successive moments of tension, such as the disappearance of Carrero Blanco, a key figure in favour of a type of Francoism without Franco, during an attack in December 1973, and the executions of members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA; Basque Homeland and Liberty) and the Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota (FRAP; the Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front) in September 1975. In addition,
now Franco was dead, timid and contradictory tests of liberalisation\(^3\) were starting to collide with a social and popular pressure which tended to overflow and which manifested itself most strongly in the Basque Country and Navarre after the general strike in December 1974 (González de Andrés, 2017, p. 155–217).

1976 began with mobilisations in January in Madrid, general strikes in Baix Llobregat and Sabadell, and especially, the ‘days of struggle’ in Vitoria in March, labelled as “the most extensive episode in the largest wave of [anti-]Franco-regime strikes” (Rodríguez, 2015, p. 155–217).\(^4\) The latter constituted a key dividing point, because they started to create an “alternative model of transition” in which “the fundamental demand was a democratic break with the continuity of the regime” (Gallego, 2008, p. 360–361). There was another division point later during the ‘Seven Days in January’ in 1977 (portrayed in a film of the same name, by Juan Antonio Bardem) that culminated in the Atocha massacre and the subsequent outpour of mourning, which demonstrated both the indignation of Madrid’s population, as well as the force of the PCE. That week was probably the most critical moment of the violent dimension of the conflictive process experienced between the last quarter of 1975 and the end of 1982 in which, according to a well-documented study by Sophie Baby, there were 3,200 violent events (Baby, 2012, p. 426); a fact that also reveals the myth of its peaceful nature, because “political violence constituted a massive phenomenon during the Transition” (Baby, 2012, p. 49).

Therefore, Spain was faced with a cycle of struggles which were clearly revealing the rise and politicisation of the protests, as well as the growing uncertainty about what episode might come next and, with it, the most immediate future, one way or another, of the various ongoing projects. Given this situation, we could describe the process that began after the disappearance of the dictator as a race in which the undeniable rise of a range of opposition movements—especially strong in areas where workers were more concentrated—offered the reasonable expectation of a progressive maturation of the conditions required to cause the immediate fall of the dictatorship. We refer not only to the labour movement, the main protagonist, but also to a very powerful grassroots movement in big cities, which was articulated in the struggle for national rights in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, as well as other movements that would also break through with greater or lesser force during this period.\(^5\)

Suárez’s political reform project arose from the anticipation of this hypothesis of rupture, which may well also have resulted from the confluence of a general political strike by the then-forming sociopolitical bloc. Thanks to a referendum emerging in a landscape in which this political opportunity had the potential to magnify the resistance of the bunker\(^6\), this project eventually gained significant social support because an

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\(^{3}\) In this case I have used political terminology, although it would be more appropriate to talk about a ‘soft dictatorship’.

\(^{4}\) Concern about the increasingly conflictive dynamics generated during the first months of 1977 is evident in internal reports from the time written by the English diplomatic services, stating that they saw “in the democratisation of the country [...] the only solution to avoid a possible ‘loss of control’ would be to ‘force a radical change with unpredictable consequences’” (Balfour and Martín, 2011, p. 62).

\(^{5}\) A lot of work with differing points of view in some aspects has already been published about this rise in social movements, particularly with regard to the labour movement. I refer to, for example, Molinero and Ysás (1998), Durán (2000), Sartorius and Sabio (2007), Babiano (2007), Domènech (2012), and González de Andrés (2017). On the real fear that was felt by the leaders of the dictatorship and which helped mature this hypothesis of rupture, see Ysás (2004). Regarding the neighbourhood movement, Quirosa-Cheyrouze and Fernández (2011) offer balanced and complementary references of interest, and also about the same movement, but with special attention to women’s role in it, see Radcliff (2011). On the feminist movement, see Montero (2009), and about the ecological movement, see Fernández (1999). For a balanced view from within these and other movements, and which covers a longer period than the one we examine here, consult AA. VV. (2004).

\(^{6}\) As Durán (2000, p. 328–329) observes, “Faced with the firm, cohesive, and disciplined attitude with which the governmental authorities [presented themselves] during labour conflicts, abandonment of functions with respect to the actions of so-called ultra-right-wing groups seemed to prevail, when they were not even accused of encouraging them. At least that was how it was perceived by broad sectors and national entities”.

opposition starting to become less belligerent towards it offered it as a ‘lesser evil’. From February 1977, when it can be argued that a new phase was opening in which the confrontation between the regime and social movements tended to be displaced more and more by a dynamic of negotiation between the reformist and the opposition elite, with the latter’s tendency to curb popular mobilisation.

Thus, once the pitfall of the PCE legalisation was overcome on 9 April 1977, three basic agreements were established between the reforming elite, the internal de facto powers (the military hierarchy), and external powers (especially the USA), and the moderate counter-elite: a consensus on (1) the past (that implied not only forgiving, but also forgetting); (2) the present (the rules of the game, including the electoral system, which they agreed upon in order to guarantee governance during the transition); and (3) the future (which called for the main non-elected institutions such as the Monarchy and the unity of Spain to be considered untouchable). It was considered irrelevant that some nationalist sectors, such as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV; the Basque Nationalist Party), were temporarily omitted on the promise that they would be subsequently incorporated. With regard to Catalonia, the Tarradellas operation was a good result for Suárez’s reformism because it helped to prevent the expectations of change generated by the left’s electoral majority and seen in June 1977, from exceeding the limits set by that consensus.

At its meeting on 14 April 1977 the secretary general of the Central Committee, Santiago Carrillo, tried to present the legalisation of the PCE as a symbol of rupture. Contrary to this assessment, and as later verified, it was the acceptance of the conditions imposed by Suárez (respect for the Monarchy, Spanish unity, and the red and yellow Spanish flag) and the required silences (not asking for political responsibility for the dictatorship’s crimes) that helped achieve that recognition which, given his hegemonic role in the opposition, contributed to facilitating the dashing of hopes for a rupture. This also required forgetting about republican parties and a radical left that continued in illegality until the end of 1977.

In the following sections I will focus on succinctly commenting on three key issues that characterised the ‘consensus of the transition’ and that continue to serve as key pillars of the so-called regime of ’78 and the power bloc that sustained it.

The Amnesty Law, law to complete the transition
In reality, the Amnesty Law 46/1977 of 15 October 1977 was an attempt to complete the partial amnesty measures that had been in place since the summer of 1976 and that had already allowed the freedom or the return from exile of a significant number of anti-Franco fighters. However, many were excluded, among them prisoners —and those deported or missing— from ETA and some from the Movement for Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Islands (MPAIAC in its Spanish initialism) and the FRAP who had been condemned for murder, as well as many workers who had been dismissed for political reasons, including members of the Unión Militar Democrática (UMD; the Democratic Military Union), and prisoners that were victims of the Ley de Peligrosidad y Rehabilitación Social (the Hazardous [persons] and Social Rehabilitation Law). The response to this pressure for their release (according to the Kingdom’s prosecutor, there were a total 153 [prisoners]) led to the approval of a law that (in Article

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7 An electoral system based on a pre-constitutional decree (approved on 18 March 1977) and still in force. For a reminder of its functionality in the promotion of bipartisanship and overrepresentation of less populated areas, see Montero and Lago (2005).

8 For more on this law (which affected a wide variety of cases including ones of homosexuality, abortions, prostitution, or even simple begging), and the movement that was generated against it in this period, especially by the Coordinadora de Presos En Lucha (COPEL; the Coordinator of Prisoners in Struggle), see Wilhelmi (2012). All the sectors affected by this law were excluded from the Amnesty Law.
amnestied “all acts of political intentionality, whatever their result, implicated as crimes and faults that were carried out prior to 15 December 1976”, the date of Suárez’s referendum on the Law for the Political Reform. However, the Unión de Centro Democrático [party] (UCD; the Union of the Democratic Centre) took advantage of this forced concession to introduce, with the support of most other political groups, including the PSOE and PCE, a second article to the law that (in its section e), agreed amnesty for “crimes and faults that may have been committed by the authorities, officials, and law enforcement officers, motivated by, or on the occasion of, the investigation and prosecution of the acts included in this Act”, and (in section f) “the crimes committed by officials and agents of public law and order against the exercise of the rights of the people”.

Thus, a great paradox was created, in that both the crimes committed by those who had fought for democratic freedoms as well as those of the repression that Franco had exercised during the Spanish Civil War and under his forty-year dictatorship, were pardoned. After Nazism and fascism, this attempt to present the Spanish transition as exemplary, despite it being the very opposite, this was unprecedented in Europe, as Jon Elster recalls in his comparative study when he concludes the following: “The Spanish case is unique within the transitions to democracy due to the fact that there was a deliberate and consensual decision to avoid transitional justice” (Elster, 2006, p. 80).

[The authorities] then wanted to turn that law into a reference point for other political transitions but, as we have seen in countries like Chile and Argentina, similar laws were unable to resist the struggle to recover the memory and achievements made in the field of international law and the necessary recognition of the non-applicability of statutory limitations on crimes against humanity. Instead, the petition for the repeal of the Spanish Amnesty Law, expressed in January 2009 by the Human Rights Committee, and again in November by the Committee against Torture, and finally in December by the Working Group on Forced Disappearances—all UN-dependent agencies—continues to face resistance not only from a broad sector of the [Spanish] judiciary, but also from the majority of the right-wing political, economic, and media powers, and even from a not inconsiderable sector of the official left. Not even the so-called Law of Historical Memory of 2007, created by the government of Rodríguez Zapatero, questioned the impunity of the Franco regime, and so we are currently seeing how many of those who extolled it must now recognise its enormous deficits.

Despite its huge cost, many sectors still insist that approval of the 1977 [Amnesty] law was necessary and even, inevitable. Nearly 80 years since the triumph of [the Franco] dictatorship, and with growing support for the Argentine anti-Francoist movement from an increasing number of municipalities and social organisations, it seems that perhaps now the burden of all the victims of what has been defined by historiography as ‘planned genocide’ (Espinosa, 2002) can finally be definitively paid off.

The Moncloa pacts

Another fundamental point of inflection were the Moncloa Pacts which were signed by the main parties in October 1977. They not only became a substantial brake on the radical demands of the labour movement (whose main unions, despite not formally signing them, accepted these agreements and thus, yielded to an non-living wage income policy within a framework changing international-scale economic cycles), but they were also a symbolic and pioneering instrument of what the constitutional consensus would later come to mean.

In these covenants, the fight against inflation was proposed by setting limits on wage growth, which were fixed according to the inflation programmed for 1978, a series of economic measures aimed at reducing the most pressing fundamental economic imbalances, a short-term legislative calendar and a series of counterparts that were never fulfilled, but that served to make the workers swallow the pill (Albarracín, 1987, p. 45).
Even so, to large employers who were in the process of organising themselves into the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE; the Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organisations) the content of these pacts seemed insufficient in some aspects and excessive in others. From then on, [the CEOE] would become a powerful group who could put pressure on the government and trade unions with a view to changing the relationship between these forces in order to reorganise the labour market, predominantly based on neoliberal criteria (González, 2011). Despite the competitive dynamic that existed between them, the leaderships of the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO; Workers’ Commissions) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT; the General Union of Workers) [trade unions] would later be integrated into new neocorporatist dynamics (Oliet, 2004) that would characterise a long period lasting nearly up until the outbreak of the great recession of 2008 and the swing towards austere measures initiated by the government of Rodríguez Zapatero in May 2010.

The growing contrast between the convergent dynamics that remained even before the Moncloa Pacts and the fragmentation and demobilisation of the working class that started to be observed thereafter would become more and more evident (Bilbao, 1993) and went on to extend into other social sectors. This is because, from then on, the hegemonic left-wing parties used consensus discourse as a means to exclude and silence every expression of dissent from social movement sectors and the radical left and thus, it was accused of playing the game on the far right in its attempt to destabilise these opposing forces. This attitude became even more belligerent as the process of elaborating the constitutional text progressed and reached its climax with the referendum for its approval.11

The Constitution

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 was the result of a constituent process that was not initially foreseen at the time of elections of June 1977; it had been overseen and conditioned by previous agreements and, therefore, its origin lacked legitimacy. It was also being elaborated at a time of transition from post-war social constitutionalism (of which the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 was the most advanced product) to a forming political system that was going in the opposite direction throughout Europe. Together with its development through the autonomous statutes and jurisprudence of the [Spanish] Constitutional Court, the Constitution—which was written in recognition of basic freedoms and rights, but which also enshrined some especially restrictive peculiarities—laid the foundations of a new block of constitutionality.

Thus, a parliamentary monarchical regime was formed, with some limitations pre-installed into the Constitution that, over the years and especially since 2008, have come to be perceived as brakes on a process of real democratisation. In addition to accepting the monarchy imposed by Franco—which, as we have been able to verify at critical moments, is not restricted to functions of mere arbitration and is not politically and legally responsible for its actions—it is important to remember that Article 2 of the Constitution, despite the final admission of the term nationalities (“The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that form it and the solidarity between them all”) was adapted from the demands made

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9 I limit myself only to mentioning Josep Fontana’s (2007) Vidal Beneyto’s (2007) documentation of that period. However, the response in terms of workers’ strikes did not occur until the end of 1980, with the signing of the Statute of Workers (Sartorius and Sabio, 2007).

10 One of the finest critical analyses of the discourses of change in the transition can be found in Imbert (1990); a less critical approach can be read in Aguila and Montoro (1984) and Oñate (1998).

11 Only in the Basque Country; it is well known that the Constitution significantly rejected in this referendum.

12 Summarised by Javier Pérez Royo in his definition of the [Spanish] Constitution as “monarchical, bipartisan and antifederal” (Pérez Royo, 2015).
by the vociferators of the military hierarchy. This explains why most parliamentary parties strongly rejected amendments such as title VIII-bis proposed by parliament member Francisco Letamendia, which would have established a procedure for exercising the right of self-determination sometime in the future.  

Even so, they had to accept additional and transitory provisions that recognised the historic rights of the Basque Country and Navarre (as well as of the Canary Islands because of their periphery location), and agree upon a title VIII that established different access routes to autonomy. However, these provisions would later be exceeded by Andalusia after its referendum on 28 February 1980. However, Article 145.1 categorically established that “in no case shall the federation of Autonomous Communities be admitted”, while Article 155 allowed the government, “with the approval by the absolute majority of the Senate”, to intervene in an Autonomous Community to compel its authorities to comply with its constitutional obligations or “for the protection of the aforementioned general interest”.

Article 8 (which includes the defence of “territorial integrity and constitutional order” as functions of the Army) is also atypical in liberal–democratic constitutionalism, both for its content and for its location (preliminary title). Because it was a provincially-established majority system, the Senate appears to function as a brake on Congress (itself chosen by a still-surviving electoral system which is predestined to favour pre-constitutional bipartisanship), while a Constitutional Court was established which, as we have recurrently seen (although with some exceptions), functions as a third legislative chamber.

To all this, we must also add the concessions granted to the Catholic Church (although Article 16 declares that “no confession will have a state character”, it then adds “the public authorities will take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and they will maintain the consequent relationship of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions”) and to religious education (Article 27.3 says “The public authorities guarantee parents’ right for their children receive a religious and moral education in accordance with their own convictions”). With regard to rights, it establishes a distinction whose practical scope we are now checking with special care: under title I, the differentiation between “fundamental rights” and “guiding principles of social and economic policy” means that “a policy aimed at full employment” (Article 40) is simply wishful, as is the “right to health protection” (Article 43) and the “right to enjoy decent and adequate housing” (Article 47), among others, because they are not considered subject to claims in ordinary courts. To all the above, one can also add the requirements of the constructive-censure motion (that is, the obligation to submit an alternative candidacy to preside over the government) and, above all, requirements to proceed with the reform and/or constitutional revision that characterises it as an especially rigid Constitution.

As previously mentioned, there are other articles that connect with post-war social constitutionalism, characterised by the aspiration to promote a policy of wealth redistribution and even of public interventions in companies in the name of the general interest. But it was precisely this legacy that has been increasingly collapsed, especially from 1986 onwards, as this block of constitutionality has been inserted into the constitutional framework of what is now the EU. All this has occurred in the context of the long wave of neoliberalism initiated in the mid-1970s and the new lex mercatoria (‘merchant law’) that has been consolidated on a global scale. Thus, until the arrival of a new historical phase in 2008, we were in the ‘derived oligarchy of Western constitutionalism’, which itself was starting to find itself in conflict with the previous post-war social constitutionalism (Pastor, 2013).

13 On the debate about the right to self-determination, see Letamendia (2003); also, in relation to the evolution of the debates about the question of nationality since then and up until the current conflict about the Catalan referendum, see Pastor (2014a, p. 125–209).

14 For example, Article 9.2 and Article 128.
Achieving this has required fighting for a series of freedoms, rights, and elected institutions by the universal suffrage that the Franco regime had denied. But this has brought with it so much inheritance and so many restrictions (in substance and in form), that structural costs were very soon generated (Águila and Montoro, 1984), and one of the effects of this was the greater or lesser degree of political frustration (the famous ‘disenchantment’ was already abound at the end of 1978) present in even the most moderate sectors involved in the most intense mobilisation and protest cycle of the anti-Franco struggle (Juliá, 2017, p. 511–532).

Only after the failure of the ‘hard blow’ of 23 February 1981 (a failed coup d’état, often referred to as 23-F), and under its ‘soft effects’, did a second phase of the transition began. This stage saw barely-restrained attempts to shut down autonomic processes (through the Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico [LOAPA; the Organic Law of Harmonisation of the Autonomic Process]) while the UCD crisis deepened and resulted in PSOE’s rise to government in October 1982. After Spain joined the European Community in January 1986 and with its definitive entry into NATO in March of the same year (after a tense showdown with a broad popular movement in a referendum), one could say that the political elites were renewed (always within the framework of the agreed-upon reform) while integration of the regime into the Western strategy became relatively stable.

**AGREEMENT VERSUS DISAGREEMENT**

As a provisional conclusion to the arguments set out in the previous section, I argue that the radical left had sufficient reason (because there was still insufficient strength to force a rupture) to argue that there was no basis for a sharp turn toward the acceptance of the Constitution’s fundamental content—and its inherent opaque forms—of a sacralised power-bloc consensus. This consensus, the result of a conflicting and unplanned process, later came to present itself (in a self-interested and exaggerated way), as the only possible outcome in the face of the threat of a return to a civil war. It became the final contingent result in an explanatory theory and paradigm to be respected even today, which would impose itself as an insurmountable wall against any proposal, not only of a new constituent process, but also of mere constitutional reforms on key issues. This includes recognition of the plurinational reality of the Spanish State, questioning the monarchical institution and privileges of the church, and judicial investigation into the crimes of Francoism and enforced disappearances.

The recovery of the political initiative among large bourgeois fractions—which eventually recognised Suárez and not Fraga as its main political representative—and the insufficiency of social movements to precipitate a test of forces with the regime, led to an unstable equilibrium for a short period of time, which was were both balanced by a sector of the radical left Marxist matrix (Pastor, 2014b). This (and the simultaneous threats by the reformist sector of a coup by the majority of the population and the opposition itself) forced [the dictatorship] to the negotiating table with the precondition of a rapid popular demobilisation. Acceptance of this condition by the opposition undoubtedly contributed to the inclusion of the difficult-to-overcome limitations, that movements were highlighting before the culmination of the reformist project. The argument that a alignment of forces prevented the rupture is a fallacy, a conjuncture of an organic crisis in the dictatorship and the rise of a social

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15 This is what Doménech defines as the “effect of converting consequences into causes […]. Thus, what were the consequences of a determined way to end the process of political change, such as reinforcing a monarchy with problems of legitimacy beyond the Franco regime, moderation as a key vector of the final period of political change, self-containment of the social subjects, or the central role granted to political leaders over collective organisations, became the explanatory axes of political change” (Doménech, 2004, p. 59).

16 Therefore, this balance combines interacting factors, and consequently, cannot be reduced to the caricature it is often presented as, even by some with critical views of the transition such as Monedero (2011), Rodríguez (2015), and Wilhelmi (2016), when it is argued that the radical left in general limited itself to blaming the failure of the betrayal on the PCE and the PSOE.
Between history, myth, and the present: an asymmetric transaction

It is true that at the beginning of 1976 there was a correlation of weaknesses (in recurrent reference to the expression used by Manuel Vázquez Montalbán), but the perspective most feared from above was that their strength would decrease while the bottom’s would increase if it intensified and extended mass mobilisation. This began to happen in the months that followed, and it was no coincidence that the fear of being overwhelmed by these mobilising forces grouped in the Junta Democrática de España (JDE; the Democratic Junta of Spain) and the Plataforma de Organizaciones Democráticas (POD; the Platform of Democratic Organisations) led them to join forces after the previously-mentioned events in Vitoria to start negotiating with the reformist sector of the regime that Adolfo Suárez would end up representing from July of that same year.\(^17\) The libertarian current present during these years in many struggles broadly occupied the same critical line, although it was more fragmented. One of its most influential expressions in the field of political analysis from 1974 to 1978 was the magazine Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, in whose editorials and articles emerged an increasingly critical view of the evolution of the process studied here (AA. VV., 2011).\(^18\)

Many transitologists argue that these types of covenant processes are related to what happens when the pacific regimes we have been witnessing, most of them after the Spanish transition, start to change. But the problem is that this tendency to establish a normative theory is based on a markedly ideological and [self-]interested starting point: the mythification of the Spanish case to which we referred at the beginning of this article. This is intended to hide the specificity and limits of a process that did not involve the effective dismantling of the dictatorship, thus underestimating the fragility of what was achieved and the high price that had to be paid for it.

After all, in reality it was a simple asymmetric transaction—based on an “ideological illusion of equality” (Águila, 1992, p. 67-68)—that allowed the maintenance of an important part of the old elite and the previous coercive apparatus, in addition to guaranteeing that triple consensus that even today, more than three decades later, is still considered unquestionable. In short, the leading groups of the main left parties did little to improve the relationship of forces in the decisive years and, but a lot to achieve concessions on issues that were far from secondary—using the terminology used by Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio for this same matter: mere “claudications” (ap. García-Santesmases, 1993, p. 186-188). In this sense, we maintain that it was a transaction (i.e., an “agreement reached between people who initially held different positions, each conceding at least something”, according to the definition of the Dictionary of the use of Spanish, by María Moliner) and that it was asymmetrical because the concessions of the opposition were much higher than those of the other party, the regime’s reformers.

One of its most serious consequences would be precisely the rapid process of transformation the main opposition parties had to undergo to adapt to the limits of change marked by the de facto powers. They had to do this in order to appear to be an alternative to government in a context where by the end of 1980, the UCD was already declining and the Alianza Popular (AP; People’s Alliance) was still very weak and conditioned by its higher connection with the dictatorship. Therefore, as soon as they achieved an institutional weight, the main parties on the left had a premature identity crisis: in the case of the PSOE, the symbolic abandonment of Marxism in 1979 led to social liberalism from the

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\(^{17}\) José Vidal Beneyto, one of the JDE’s spokespersons, recalls that “despite the resignation of La Platajunta (the new name for the aforementioned unification), for a whole year from the moment of its constitution, democratic combativeness against any type of organised mass public actions was very high and only decreased after the 1977 elections. Ending it required its official and imperative closure, in the Moncloa Pacts” (Vidal, 2007, p. 123).

\(^{18}\) José Manuel Naredo and Joan Martínez Alier were the most representative analysts of that current within the magazine.
government in the following decade; while once the PCE’s dream of obtaining electoral results similar to Berlinguer’s party was frustrated—even though they had officially abandoned ‘Leninism’ (Andrade, 2012)—they suffered a deep crisis from which they did not emerge until their active (although late) participation in the campaign for the departure of NATO in 1986.

In contrast, the main parties of the radical left had not yet reached parliamentary representation, despite the prominent role they had played in previous years, and in some cases—such as the Partido del Trabajo (PT; the Labour Party) and the Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (ORT; the Revolutionary Workers Organisation)—they would undergo a process of self-dissolution (once their fusion into one organisation for electoral purposes had failed) and in others—the Movimiento Comunista (MC; the Communist Movement), the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR; the Revolutionary Communist League)—they would realign themselves within the old parties (especially with the new social movements), but after October 1982, renounce their participation in the general and regional elections.

In turn, after the rapid growth of the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT; the National Confederation of Labour) from 1977 to 1979, the libertarian left would enter a process of bureaucratisation and internal confrontation, mainly between supporters of a more open anarcho-syndicalist orientation, on the one hand, and defenders of an ideologically more purist anarchist conception, on the other (Wilhelmi, 2012). However, many of those who participated in that experience would play a prominent role in the development of new social and countercultural movements (Carmona, 2012).

The shift away from the horizon of radical change thus gave way to the demoralisation and progressive co-optation of cadres arising from these different organisations, but also increasingly ones from the PCE, PSOE, or a new culture of resistance from the new foci of conflicts that would appear. On this new path, mobilisation to win the referendum on NATO appeared as the “last battle of the Transition”, in which the surviving radical left played a prominent role (Prat, 2009). After that struggle, the left went through a new stage of crossing the wilderness, while, as previously indicated, the victory of the ‘yes’ vote, achieved only a few months after Spain’s definitive entry into the European Community, became the true end of the transition, with one notable exception: the so-called Basque conflict (and the continuance of ETA in an increasingly militaristic dynamic) remained unresolved as a permanent reminder of deficit of legitimacy of both the transition and the 1978 Constitution in that community, which not even the broad consensus around the Gernika Statute was able to forget. In this specific framework, an Abertzale (Basque nationalist) left was consolidated with an undeniable social and political weight, which would be reflected in the successive subsequent electoral processes, including at the state level (Letamendia, 1995). In addition, although in a different context, it is worth mentioning the remarkable development of a left-wing nationalist movement in Galicia that started from a Marxist reference point: the Unión do Povo Galego (UPG; the Galician People’s Union), which was later the main promoter of the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG; Galician Nationalist Bloc; Lois, 2015).

19 The weight of the radical left in worker’s and grassroots movements was not negligible, even though they later wanted to be presented as marginal. In an interview published in 1977, Felipe González came to attribute to them “a capacity for mobilisation, of attraction, much greater than they could have in France and even in Italy, and this is probably going to change the political spectrum” (González, 1977, p. 18).

20 For documented studies of the evolution of the radical left, see Roca (1994), Laiz (1995), and more recently, Pérez Serrano (2015) and Wilhelmi (2016), as well as the communications presented in the previously mentioned conference, Las otras protagonistas de la Transición: la izquierda radical y los movimientos sociales.

21 According to data provided by a former leader of the CNT, during those years, this organisation went from 3,000 affiliates in 1975 to 300,000 in 1977 (Elizalde, 1981).

22 Although the development of a counterculture opposed to the transition and to the mythologised Movida was not only attributable to libertarian currents; Labrador (2017) provides an interesting and rich journey on this subject.
FROM STABILITY TO REGIME CRISIS

Beyond the discussion on whether rupture was possible or not, from among the definitions from different perspectives, and as an asymmetric transaction, it is easier to criticise the identification of the majority of the left with a hegemonic discourse based on the aforementioned triple consensus. This identification clearly contributed to the fact that in the decades to come an anti-Francoist and participatory political culture did not take root in Spanish society. Some sociologists who are uncritical of the transition even considered this a virtue, wanting to convert the official opinion of the triumphant elites into the only acceptable public and, above all, high-profile discourse, and thus putting the ‘cleaning effect’ into operation:

the construction of the public and political memory of the Transition in a certain direction allowed us to restore legitimacies and certify attitudes about a large part of our political, economic, and cultural leaders who had been born into or collaborated with the Franco regime (Domènech, 2007, p. 154–155).

Thus, the false equivalence of the two sides of the Civil War23 became an excuse for encouraging moral relativism and for refusing to vindicate the antifascism of the peoples of the Spanish state. Moreover, this was followed by the rapid transformation of secrecy and opacity into the normal conduct of political parties, which, together with electoral competitive dynamics and financial and real-estate euphoria, would create the ideal framework to reinforce their internal conversion into oligarchies and their subordination-identification to the dominant bloc, all of which facilitated a process in which corruption would became systemic in the subsequent decades. In this context, it was not surprising that anti-politicism resurfaced in broad layers of the population, despite the effort made to favour the recovery of politics in the most intense years of the popular anti-Franco mobilisation.

On this basis, a potentially participatory political culture would go through a process of mutation into one in which the “programmed disenchantment”, as Alfonso Ortí put it (1989, p. 77), or the formation of a “cynical democracy” in Botella’s terms (1992, p. 130), would later bring the bitterest fruits of what has been defined as citizen disaffection towards politics: “The virtues of the Transition have turned into vices of democracy” (Colomer, 1990, p. 306). Thus, a “Transition culture” was built that, as has been perceived by at least one of the new [political] generations, ended up becoming “a monitored culture that protects”, which “hides, prevents, or denounces everything that is problematic” to the prevailing political and socioeconomic system (Fernández-Savater, 2009).

However, there were new processes of radicalisation in the successive cycles of protest about NATO, with its subsequent prolongation among the youth movement by refusal to carry out military service (1985–1986); the three general strikes against the Government of Felipe González (1988–1993); and the rise of Izquierda Unida (the United Left) based around the rejection of the Iraq war (2003–2004), although none of these were sufficient to force a change in political culture. Subsequently, as already stated at the beginning, a new sociopolitical cycle, starting from 15 May 2011, has brought about a process of re-politicisation of the citizenship in the context of a socioeconomic, political, and state-wide crisis, which even affects the monarchy. This is derived from the national-territorial fracture around the Catalan question from July 2010 when the new Statute of Autonomy was approved by a majority in the Constitutional Court.

Indeed, since the emergence of 15-M with slogans as expressive as “We are not the merchandise of politicians and bankers”, “They call it a democracy but it isn’t”, and “They do not represent us”, we have...

23 As Gregorio Morán emphasises: “The first equality that established the transition to democracy in Spain was that we are all equal before the past. A guarantee to maintain inequality in the future. We constitute ourselves as a Kingdom of forgetfulness” (Morán, 1991, p. 108).

24 This thesis would later be further developed in a broader sense of culture in Martínez (2012). Another question to consider is that this transition culture was questioned during the years analysed here; in fact, it was, above all, the defeat of the movement by its departure from NATO in 1986 and when it became hegemonic (that caused this doubt) although this was preceded by the initial moment of disenchantment, already mentioned above.
seen how this political culture of cynical democrats has been put into question. In this new framework, debates have been reopened around the triple consensus of the transition about the bankruptcy of the bipartisanship and the consequent governance crisis, as well as the practically irreversible crisis affecting the autonomous state, in the midst of continued neoliberal austerity policies and a long series of judicial proceedings for corruption scandals reaching into all the parties of the regime. However, there does not seem to be a solution, even with constitutional reform.

This confluence of factors explains that, despite exhaustion of the cycle of protests initiated by 15-M and the limits of the political forces reached, somehow it put discussion about the need for a second transition (perhaps even beyond that) at the centre of the current agenda in politics, albeit with very different and opposing proposals regarding whether they should be reformist and/or authoritarian or open to constituent processes or not. Obviously, now, as then but in a different context, it will be the evolution of the relationship of forces, not only electoral ones, between the different social and political formations in conflict, which will finally decide in favour or against whom the balance is tilted in the coming years. In any case, to better address these debates, a critical review of the mythologised transition is essential in order to contribute to greater democratisation at all levels of Spanish society.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES


BIOPGRAPHICAL NOTES

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