Special Issue
Plurinationality, Federalism and Sovereignty in Spain: at the Crossroads
Contributions Igor Calzada; Rafael Castelló; Germà Bel; Toni Rodon and Marc Sanjaume-Calvet; Mariano M. Zamorano; Luis Moreno

Special Issue
Cultural changes at university institutions: agentification and quality management
Contributions Martí Parellada and Montserrat Álvarez; Manuel Pereira-Puga; Javier Paricio; Juan Arturo Rubio; Cristina Sin, Orlanda Tavares and Alberto Amaral; Antonio Ariño; Andrea Moreno and Tatiana Sapena

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Debats was launched in 1982 as the journal of the Institution of Alfonso The Magnanimous (IAM) and shortly afterwards, of the Valencia Institute of Research and Investigation (IVEI). Its mission, then as now, is to foster and update the great debates on social sciences in the Valencian region, and to facilitate participation by leading experts in the field. The Debats journal is now a bi-annual publication. Its objective is to: (1) bring together current intellectual reflections on culture (both in its broadest sense of cultural practices and in the narrower sense of the Arts); (2) examine the links between culture and power, identity, geographies, and social change. The Journal covers matters that are relevant to Valencian society and its wider setting. That said, the aim is to make Debats a key scholarly publication in both Europe and further afield. Debats’ starts from the perspective of the social sciences but it also aims to forge links with contemporary analysis and debates in the humanities, communication studies, and cultural studies fields. It calls for methodological pluralism while fostering innovation through the adoption of new research techniques and ways of communicating scholarly findings to a broader public. In a nutshell, the Journal is an invaluable tool for analysing emerging problems in the cultural field and in contemporary society. In playing this role, it takes a broad, multidisciplinary view and combines social impact with scientific rigour in scholarly publications and debates at the international level.

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Special Issue

Plurinationality, Federalism, and Sovereignty in Spain: at the Crossroads
Introduction: post-politics and the validity of nationalism in the Spanish state

Since 2008, when the economic crisis triggered by the international financial system crunch brought about a political and social crisis in many countries around the world, the debate about nationalism has gained renewed attention. As in the analysis of other critical historical moments in the advance of nationalist forces, destabilisation of the material bases supporting the social order has led to the search for various national-type theoretical and political solutions. Thus, this scenario gave way to a marked social mobilisation and to displacement of political-party positions, both on the left and the right in many political systems (Kyriakos, 2015). Therefore, the hypotheses that emerged during the nineties, that assume that state systems are an obstacle to economic development—including theses on the end of history and neoliberal viewpoints on the global village (Fair, 2008)—, as well as the Third Way as a remedy for social-democratic decline (Giddens, 2013), were thoroughly questioned.

In the framework of a return to politics, new nationalist political projects, both at the state and substate levels, settled upon two forms of rejection of neoliberal globalisation and its social and economic effects. On the one hand, conservative populist nationalisms, led by elites that conceive the nation-state as a resource for

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1 This is reflected in, for example, nation branding, which is considered to be a postmodern style of depoliticisation and social demobilisation in the domestic sphere (Lury, 2004). In contrast, from the perspective of publicity planning, it has been stated that national has scant compatibility with the marketing of state (Van Ham, 2001, p. 69), because it contains elements of political and social conflict.
rebuilding the industrial fabric of their countries and who articulate their scrutinising discourse about rejecting immigration, Islam, and the fight against terrorism (Corbett, 2016; Belina, 2013). This nationalistic ideal, therefore also rejects the multiculturalist project and questions the effectiveness and necessity of their key policies. In the European case, this approach is accompanied by an increase in Euroscepticism that still spans several political and social-sector domains. On the other hand, progressive nationalisms, which are torn between internationalism and several populist configurations—in which the identity-defining element is the grouping of demands (even to the point that they become scattered)—as a product of the way the neoliberal productive system is itself configured (Conversi, 2013; Rendueles, 2015). In this case, cultural diversity is often incorporated into the concept of ‘the people’ as one of the ways that the idea of ‘bottom-up’ versus ‘top-down’ exists nationally.

These are different pro-sovereignty projects which are pursuing the aim of regaining the power delegated to the global financial system and supranational institutions that preside over the current world order. Each of these projects initially had to navigate the contradictions of an international scenario characterised by a globalised economic system, a postmodern cultural model that promotes a cosmopolitan identity based on the digital world, and some low or very low-intensity democracies (Bauman, 2013). However, the growing social mobilisation occurring in many countries around these new political projects, now adopting various forms of nationalism, has demonstrated the power of political projects built around an imaginary shared nation. Therefore, the events of the last decade confirm the vitality of national identities and their validity as an instrument of political-social mobilisation, and also reopen questions about their potential for development. In this sense, digital cities and communication are presented as fundamental elements for the current forms of nationalist construction and are two of its fundamental analysis axes.

This process has manifested itself in a very specific way in Spain. Among other things, the prolonged economic crisis and accompanying austerity policies have affected the foundations of the Spanish welfare state (Sánchez Medero and Tamboleo García, 2013), clearly contributing to the disruption of the political-party structure—with the sudden emergence of two parties, one to the left and the other to the right of the system—and have pushed through a change in leadership in the Kingdom of Spain. This combination of elements means this period can be described as a political-cycle change. This sort of change is also linked to a ‘regime crisis’ in relation to the institutional and economic order achieved by the constitutive-process pacts made and which ended in 1978 (Pisarello, 2014; Rendueles, 2015). These processes led to a rethink about the country’s political-territorial order, which was interrelated with a crisis in Catalan politics, and intensified nationalist social mobilisation. This led to an expansion in the social pro-sovereignty base in the region, a phenomenon that became more acute over the years.

This current special issue of *Debats* analyses this process and examines the topic of current Spanish-state nationalism, looking at its different distinctive features by taking several different theoretical approaches. This project started a year ago during a conference held at the University of Valencia in April 2016, which brought together a significant
number of the academics featured in this current monograph. In this context, the many national territorial and sociocultural realities that coexist in the Spanish state were contrasted and their current relevance was debated. The special issue, corresponding to number 131, of the recently relaunched journal *Debats* collects several of these proposals and adds others from other academics invited a posteriori that enrich the whole and allow the phenomenon to be covered from several angles. In order to introduce this set of articles, in the following section I develop the main theoretical coordinates of nationalism. I then summarise how some of the elements corresponding to these theoretical approaches are manifested on the aforementioned axes and the problems developed in the articles in this issue.

**Cultural and political nationalism**

Following several conceptual schemes, cultural nationalism is often differentiated from political nationalism. For De Blas Guerrero (1995, p. 16) the former refers to the ‘committed’ and ‘emotive’ character of certain traits shared by a society as an ‘objective in itself’. It is the collective affirmation of different symbolic styles of self-referencing and differentiation with regard to other social and individual groups that do not necessarily exceed their own limits of enunciation. In contrast, in political nationalism “a more meaningful practical and pragmatic sense can be assumed, both as a source of legitimacy and as a generator of nation-state loyalty, which in the Western world, has been transformed into a reality comparable to the liberal democratic political system” (De Blas Guerrero, 1995, p. 16). In this vein, there are two major theoretical approaches to the emergence and development of nationalism. One is the functionalist approach, based on analysing the process of modernisation in Western states and its impact on the national construction. The other groups together several idealistic theses, which are rooted in the classic German theorists such as Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried von Herder, or Johann Gottlieb Fichte.

Within the framework of functionalism, nationalism is defined as a device designed for the construction of political legitimacy that facilitates the process of economic and social modernisation. In this context, the emergence of modern nationalism is explained mainly by the appearance of an industrial society in the eighteenth century, which unlike agrarian societies, had to be politically centralised to function. Similarly, industrialisation promoted the deepening of labour specialisation, which favoured the progressive standardisation of the relationship between

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2 This conference was titled *A plurinational state? Crossed views from Valencia, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarre, and Europe*, was organised by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Valencia, and was moderated by Albert Moncusí Ferré (UV). It was attended by Igor Calzada (from the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at the University of Oxford), Joaquim Rius Ulldemolins (UV), Rafael Castelló Cogollos (UV), Vega Rodríguez (UV), and Mikel Irujo (Delegate of the Government of Navarre in Brussels).

3 I would like to thank the Editorial Committee at *Debats* for inviting me to edit the current special issue and in particular, its Director, Dr. Joaquim Rius Ulldemolins.
producers and those who organise production (Gellner, 1997, p. 18). This process had two consequences in terms of social movements: obtaining the popular consensus about the homogenisation of state power and its complexification in the development of new nations emerging within this scheme, based on a common culture (Gramsci, 1997).

But within the framework of functionalism, ethnicity and culture are used mainly as instruments for accumulating state power in the modernisation process. In this sense, Gellner points out how, in the course of pre-industrial society specialisation, occupational mobility is inhibited by ethnic or cultural factors that act as in a segmental way in each of these groups; to get to that point, mobility must destroy symbolic models or ‘stereotypes’ (Gellner, 1981, 755). Therefore, there is a marked contrast in the organisational dynamics developed by “a society with inherently unstable technology, and one accustomed to continuous economic growth (and which treats it as a right and a cultural norm) is condemned to the continuous appearance of new specialities” (Gellner 1981, p. 756). Consequently, the need to develop specialisations through training and based on the division of labour, drove modern societies towards institutionalisation of the education system, which is required for organising the relationship between training and employment. In this context: “nationalism is essentially the transfer of the focus of humankind’s identity towards a culture that is mediated by literacy and a comprehensive formal education system” (Gellner, 1981, p. 757).

As opposed to the idealistic side of nationalistic theory—also defined as primordialist—Elie Kedourie sets the foundations of what he calls a nationalist doctrine, within a historical-ideological perspective. He also states: “it holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known for certain characteristics that can be ascertained, and that the only type of legitimate government is that of national self-governance” (Kedourie, 1998, p. 1). Unlike Gellner, for Kedourie, from the nineteenth century onwards, the state organised—and, in the case of the French, restored—a series of cultural elements and common ambitions that had already existed in several forms since ancient Roman times. Therefore, within this theoretical framework, the principle of total sovereignty resides in the nation itself, and its totality is essentially based on a common culture, which is the foundation that supports it all. Therefore, the individual Kantian way of critical thinking cannot be understood outside of its national character, that is, outside of the organisation that naturally integrates it (Kedourie, 1998, 33). Significantly, Kedourie points out in his analysis of the process of construction of the Napoleonic Empire, that nationalist processes can gain some weight by using aesthetic elements at the time of their dissemination.

For the Israeli historian, Eric Hobsbawm, nations originate in the process of organisation of the modern state and in a particular historical period of economic and technological development in which the invention of the printing industry played a central role. Therefore: “nationalism precedes nations. Nations do not build states and nationalisms, but rather, the opposite occurs” (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 18). In this sense, recognition of a nation by its discernible traits—which for Kedourie, are pre-existing—is based on useless criteria: “language, ethnicity, or whatever it may be, are also blurred, changing, and
ambiguous” (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 14). For Hobsbawm, another way of defining a
nation is based on subjective criteria. It is constructed based on a conscious sense of
belonging individually or collectively to a type, which gives an a posteriori definition
and a tautological type. This absence of objective and universal criteria for defining
a nation “makes them extremely useful for propagandistic and programmatic
purposes, even though they are not very descriptive” (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 14).

However, Hobsbawn is often situated within the framework of constructivism, given
that it emphasises the importance of addressing the form of national construction he
calls *bottom-up* (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 19). In other words, taking the role that social
movements play in historical nationalist processes into account. In this sense, he shows
how the national conscience developed unevenly in several regions, but advanced in
several phases; a temporary evolution carried out by different social groups in each
instance. These stages of nationalist development were defined by Miroslav Hroch,
who analysed the complex evolution of the relationship between ethnic (linguistic
and religious) and political borders. According to his view, the nationalist movement
started in Europe in the nineteenth century, in a stage of literary, cultural (folk), and
intellectual production, but still reminiscent of the Middle Ages and ‘primordial’
ethnic groups (Hroch, 1994, p. 47). In the second instance, a series of ‘national idea’
militants very quickly and consciously spread this discourse, ushering in nationalist
politics itself. In several nationalist processes, this development emerges because
of an identity crisis, provoked by transformations in the relationships between
the dominating and dominated groups, as exemplified by the case of Catalonia
in the 1870s (Hroch, 1994, p. 52). Finally, in a third phase, these proclamations
reached popular consensus, giving rise to new social or state organisations.

The role of the social movements in the dialectic between state and ethnic borders
has also been considered from the perspective of the international system. Influenced
by the monarchical tradition, until the start of the nineteenth century, nationalism
functioned as a legal mechanism for legitimising the state (Marx, 2009) and was used
to generate citizen identity and loyalty towards it (Mann, 1991). Nevertheless, for Hall,
nationalism took another form throughout the twentieth century, moving from being
an element sustaining national sovereignty (*a rason d’etat*) to also becoming a factor in
national self-determination. From this perspective, the self-identification variable of
the social actors linked to nationalism, is opposed to the realistic determinism of the
generation of state order. The significance given to nationalism in the configuration of
the international system leads to criticism of the excessive analytical nationalisation,
which reduces it to an ‘epiphenomenon’ of ‘hard relationships’. Therefore, in his
approach to nationalism and the international system, Hall warns of the latter that
“changes in the collective identity of societal actors transforms the interests
of the collective relevant players that constitute the system” (Hall, 1999, p. 5). In
this view, interests of the social group are not immutable or objective in that they
are both subject to self-definition of their identity with respect to other actors.
Consequently, the collective social identity functions as an independent variable of
the transformations in the legitimising elements and in the institutional structure
of the international system (Hall, 1999, p. 7; Colás, 2002). This constructivist thesis provides another explanation of the ways in which substate nationalist mobilisation develops, distanced from analysing resources and aimed at incorporating the impact of nationalism and the behaviour of social actors in these geopolitical processes (Hall, 1999, 11).

NATIONALISM AND THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH STATE

In current politics a tension can be felt between cultural nationalism, which adopts several sociopolitical forms, and the political institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of national identities. With the latter we refer to several types of top-down nationalism: in advancing governmental control, multiple spaces that act to legitimise, defend, and normalise the elements comprising cultural nations are being hegemonised. Nonetheless, the differentiation of two instances, one sociocultural and the other political, in the development of nationalism—and therefore of the political organisation about the diffusion of languages, religions, or social traditions—is a conceptual scheme that has been questioned as an analytical instrument. As Keating points out, in reference to a region’s capacity for political development: “The analytical problem is based on the fact that ethnicity is not, and cannot be, defined as an independent factor in political mobilisation” (Keating, 1993, p. 10). In non-existent extremes only, there are two possible isolated scenarios which may underlie this: understanding political institutions as instrumental spaces that generate identities, and as domains which determine social organisation absolutely. In this sense, the possibility that nation substate societies may develop an integral capacity for autonomous organisation is relative to multiple social and geopolitical factors in the current globalised world. Therefore, beyond analysis of the foundational elements and processes of each nation, the present world requires us to rethink statist theses on nationalism and also to consider new social, economic, and cultural elements that guide its development.

Analysis of this complex interrelation between state and societal factors in the evolution of Spanish state nationalism requires brief reference to the historical evolution of its political-territorial system. The profound process of social and cultural modernisation that the country underwent from the nineteenth century onwards encountered a serious barrier in the reactionary and undemocratic state (Juliá, 2003, p. 19). The pact that gave rise to the Bourbon Restoration (1874) established—within the framework of the constitutional monarchy—the alternation between liberals and conservatives, giving a political-institutional framework to this authoritarian dynamic. However, this power scheme collided with Spain’s political-cultural diversity, itself closely related to nationalist political movements (mainly Basque and Catalan) that emerged in this context (Solé Tura, 1985, p. 43). This opposition between regime and society, expressed in the state’s disregard for the distinctive features and rights of the various groups that formed the country, led to strong social mobilisation. The dichotomy that appeared deepened because of the lack of prestige given to both the political system and the monarchy during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and eventually culminated in the Second Spanish Republic (Jackson, 1999).
This democratic process, which opened the state up to the incorporation of national substate demands, once again encountered several difficulties in its power struggle with the ecclesiastical and conservative sectors that came together during the military uprising in 1936. The protracted Franco dictatorship developed between 1939 and 1975, and after a phase of isolation it obtained the approval of the European powers which was important for its legitimisation (Berdah, 2002). It was based on a nationalist, anti-communist, and catholic ideology and was structured around the precepts of so-called organic democracy. This concept implied removal of the parliamentary system and its replacement with an autocratic and totalitarian regime, where cultural and national diversity was not only denied, it was also persecuted (Muñoz Cáliz, 2014, Abellán, 1984). The political inheritance from the dictatorship strongly influenced both Spain’s constitutional and administrative order, agreed during the democratic transition, as well as the country’s interpretation of foreign policy, which subsisted in different facets of its new work in Latin America (Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 1991).

In contrast, during the democratic transition the Spanish state evolved from the marked centralism that characterised it during the Franco regime, towards a manifestly decentralised system, which has been restructuring and reconfiguring itself since the eighties. This process was fraught with negotiations between the political forces involved, and was established based on various party positions on which new political-territorial structure the state should adopt (Colomer, 1998). In the late seventies, an agreement was made between sectors of the political right, Spanish leftist forces, and nationalist parties representing the Basque and Catalan minorities, to institute a new state model, the so-called state of Autonomies (Solé Tura, 1985). This was embodied in a constitutional scheme that sought to promote the deconcentration of public administration in order to provide efficiency, support national unity, and simultaneously address the historical claims of sovereignty by different ‘historical nationalities’: Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia.

A PLURINATIONAL STATE? DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF NATIONS IN THE SPANISH STATE

This monograph provides several axes for the general analysis of the recent evolution of nations, subnational entities, and nationalism, always taking the Spanish state as a point of reference. In the first part of this special issue which comprises three comparative studies, John Loughlin analyses the evolution of federal and confederal state systems in plurinational countries. The author

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4 The Spanish Constitution (CE; Constitución Española) of 1978 pointed to the political structuring of the new parliamentary monarchy as a decentralised unitary state and fixed its territorial disposition. This arrangement comprises three levels of government: municipalities, provinces, and autonomies, taking into account the existence of various ‘nationalities and regions’ (Article 2 CE). These were incorporated into the Autonomous Communities scheme, first-level political-administrative units governed both by the Magna Carta itself and by its respective statutes of autonomy.
exposes how regional power or territorial asymmetry in different countries manifest themselves, revealing the growing adoption of hybrid models in state organisation, and highlighting the influence of subnational nationalisms in this development. Loughlin points out the limitations of the traditional nation-state in terms of its recognition of internal cultural diversity and in exercising the values of liberal democracy, and conceives new forms of governance as possible future projects.

On the other hand, Diane Saint-Pierre and Alexandre Couture Gagnon analyse the differential deployment of the Convention on Cultural Diversity (2005) in two subnational entities: Quebec and Catalonia. This analysis allows us to see how state political and legal frameworks condition or enhance the development of policies oriented towards social minorities, but in no way define the limits of such initiatives within the framework of national substate projects. In this sense, there are also different international-projection or domestic-repositioning strategies aimed towards concentrating national power on the basis of this Convention, whether in the context of cultural claims or within the framework of quasi-state projects. Finally, Igor Calzada establishes a comparative approach to nationalism, taking the cases of Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country as examples. The recent intensification of the political dispute between these regions and the governments in charge of their respective states is analysed, considering two determining factors in their development within the European framework: the federalisation (or devolution) model and how it is scaled up; he highlights the notable differences in the organisation of territorial and social nationalism in these three cases. In this context, Calzada identifies the development of innovative solutions to the accumulation of substate political power, which counteracts the increasingly ‘post-national’ character of their large cities.

In the second part of this special issue, we focus on the realm of national realities within the Spanish state. Rafael Castelló considers how the styles of relationships between state and society determine, in a relative way, the construction of regional identities. Using the Valencian case—with its complex network of social representations linked to several sociocultural and productive factors—as an example of how substate nationalisms can take very different forms. The scant construction of an identity and a self-perception distinct to regionalism or to Spanish unionism, have limited the organisation of a political project distinct to that of the state. This political failure to accomplish a national non-regionalist project in Valencia is explained by several factors, such as the class-structure of Valencian society and the influence of the language itself. While Castelló explains the national evolution of Valencia based on the sociology of identity, Germa Bel’s article allows us to discern the structural framework of the Spanish state from its infrastructure policy. The limited delegation of control to the political substate units in this area reveals the existence of a unitary conception of the public, which was inherited from the monarchic tradition. Thus, rail transport infrastructures, and subsequently, airport infrastructures were developed as an instrument of national construction and reaffirmation. Thereby, the author reveals how the lack of rationality and democratic limitations shown by its insufficient decentralisation are the product of specific political decisions.
On the other hand, Toni Rodon analyses the evolution of the political programs of the main Catalan parties, focusing on their positions on the processes of sovereignty being developed in the region. These parties have assumed positions ranging from demands of independence to legalistic unionism, and there is a wide range of Catalanist options and proposals for decentralisation. Through an exhaustive analysis of recent electoral processes and voting-intentions surveys, the author explains the heterogeneity of the organised independence block in Catalonia and the nationalist elements that support its convergence, as well as the incidence of nationalism in the discourse of the other groups involved in the Catalan political-party system. Finally, closing this section, the work I authored comparatively analyses the evolution of cultural policies in the Autonomous Communities of Madrid, Andalusia, and Catalonia, focusing on the explanatory factors of their different governance styles, including the differential impact of identity as a factor in each of its configurations. This analysis shows that while the Community of Madrid has articulated its cultural policies to the capital’s and central government’s institutions without reference to autonomous identity, Catalan nationalism was fundamental to the socio-institutional discussion that gave rise to a cultural policies project that is independent and isomorphic to the state systems.

The third part of this special issue presents another fundamental dimension to understanding the current status of nationalisms in Spain: how it fits into the multilevel European governmental system. Luis Moreno analyses the sovereign projects of substate nations in the current design of the EU, which is characterised by the marked interdependence of its member states. The author emphasises how different nationalist substate projects exist in a setting of tension linked to the search for greater political autonomy within their state systems, as well as maintaining or repositioning their fit in the system of states. As a result of this analysis, the author proposes the idea of ‘cosmopolitan localism’ as a way of conceptualising and politically orienting such sovereignty projects. In the Points of View section, Mikel Irujo analyses the singularity of stateless nations and how they fit in this multilevel system from the standpoint of the right to decide. The author explains his legal and political view of the European system, stating the importance of political deliberation in giving way to legitimate territorial demands, as has already happened throughout European history with other stateless nations.

The set of articles we present in this monograph allows us to contrast several elements already explained by theory on nationalism. First, the historical importance of path dependence, both at the state and substate levels, in the evolution of nationalist politics. Second, this monograph describes the intensification of nationalism in a scenario of international economic crisis and delegitimisation of welfareist and European projects. While the functionalist tradition allows this process to be explained, constructivist theses provide conceptual tools that more adequately explain elements such as sociocultural mobilisation and the discursive orientation of new nationalist projects, as well as their new ways of social organisation. Third,
the importance of multilevel governance and the strengthening of the fabric of transnational institutions (networks of cities, regions, etc.) for European national projects is elaborated upon. The delegation of sovereignty by states translates into the growing importance of cities and supranational political organisations—alongside their discourse—for state and subnational nationalism. Finally, this phenomenon is also favoured by digital communication, which transforms urban areas into nodes and international organisations into more viable interlocutors. Hence, the mechanisms of devolution become more complex and substate bodies have more instruments for the development of sovereignty, mainly in the capacity that cities have as ‘amplifiers’ of nationalist processes.

However, as we have seen, the distinctive features of the Spanish case are diverse and are situated within the particular context of the breakdown of the so-called consensus of ’78. The recent economic and political crisis paved the way for a general rethinking of the political-territorial system, the dynamisation of social mobilisation around national identity, and several forms of political instrumentalisation of national identities, both at the state and substate level. This process has a clear historical explanation: despite factors such as Europeanism, the territorial and economic models in development since the eighties presented themselves as being hegemonic in Spain, and so the signifiers of a homeland and nation became historically disputed. In the new political-economic scenario all of these elements were contested.

On the one hand, this scenario led to the emergence of new social actors, such as the PAH5, and to significant change in the strategies of political action of sovereign forces in the Basque country. However, in this regard, Catalonia has taken centre stage; it has made decisive progress in the institutionalisation of its demands for independence and in favour of the so-called right to decide. On the other hand, the new players emerging in the political-party system, Podemos (We can) and Ciudadanos (Citizens), positioned themselves as antagonists in terms of this debate. While the former assumes sovereignty to be a social right and prescribes a plurinational state on the basis of constitutionalist discourse, the latter rejects the possibility of giving greater power to historical nations. Again, in functionalist terms, one may wonder how the future evolution of the economy, the productive system, and the Spanish labour market could have repercussions in recomposing some of the previous consensus. In constructivist terms, one can question which elements of the new political culture might survive beyond the crisis, translating spaces and critical positions into power or into a new political-territorial scheme. The work presented in this document provides several clues in this regard and sheds light on the limitations of, and possibilities for, national development within the Spanish state, allowing us to rethink its plurinational character.

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5 The Platform for those [negatively] Affected by Mortgages or PAH (for Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca in its original Spanish) is a social organisation that produces political and legal actions aimed at defending the rights of families and individuals evicted from their homes in Spain. It was established in Barcelona in February 2009 and currently has more than 150 delegations in the territory.
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Post-national urbanity beyond (pluri)nation(al) states in the EU: Benchmarking Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country

Igor Calzada

ABSTRACT

This article compares three small, stateless, city-regional nation cases: that of Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country after September 2014. Since the referendum on Scottish independence, depending on its unique context, each case has engaged differently in democratic and deliberative experimentation on the ‘right to decide’ its future beyond its referential (pluri)nation(al) states in the UK and Spain. Most recently, the Brexit referendum has triggered a deeper debate on how the regional and political demands of these entities could rescale the static nature of these (pluri)nation(al) state structures, and even directly advocate for some sort of ‘Europeanisation’. Based on a broader research programme comparing city-regional cases titled Benchmarking City-Regions, this paper argues that the differences in each of these three cases are noteworthy. Yet, even more substantial are their diverse means of accommodating smart devolutionary strategic pathways of self-determination through politically-innovative processes, which include pervasive metropolitanisation responses to a growing ‘post-national urbanity’ pattern emerging in the European Union. Thus, this article examines the following questions: (1) To what extent are the starting points for ‘smart devolution’ similar in each case? (2) What are the potential political scenarios for these entities as a result of the de- or recentralisation strategies of their referential (pluri)nation(al) states? (3) What are the most relevant distinct strategic political innovation processes in each case? Ultimately, this paper aims to benchmark how Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country are strategically moving forward, beyond their corresponding (pluri)nation(al) states, in the context of the new so-called post-national urbanity European geopolitical pattern, by formulating devolution, and even independence, in unique metropolitan terms.

Keywords: right to decide, political innovation, small stateless city-regional nations, smart devolution, self-determination, democratic experimentation.

INTRODUCTION: CITY-REGIONS BEYOND (PLURI)NATION(AL) STATES

Nowadays, city-regions (Passi et al., 2017; Harrison, 2010) are neither static territorial entities nor isolated geographical areas inside European (pluri) nation(al) states such as the United Kingdom or Spain. Nation-states—which are responsible either actively or passively, voluntarily or involuntarily, sceptically or acceptingly, alone or with others—end up playing a game of interdependence with them, and entering into agreements on common grounds. Therefore, in this era of politics beyond nation-state borders, and given the recently forged intimate relationships between these nation-states and city-regions (Calzada, 2015a), the
hegemonic idea that predominantly considers city-regions as sub-national entities nestled within singular nation-states (Agnew, 2015, p. 120) has been superseded in some small stateless city-regional nations such as Scotland, Catalonia (Colomb et al., 2014), and the Basque Country (Calzada et al., 2015). Indeed, it could be argued that this change was triggered by the development of a new political equilibrium regarding regional-identity confrontations, as an evolutionary step toward rescaling some specific nation-states. As such, two main hypotheses are presented in this article:

(a) A new political pattern of regionalism characterised by ‘smart devolution’ (Calzada, 2017; Khanna, 2016; Politics in Spires, 2015; Goodwin et al., 2014) and self-determination claims (Guibernau, 2013), and expressed and embodied via geo-democratic practices such as the ‘right to decide’ (Barceló et al., 2015; Cagiao and Conde et al., 2016), is emerging in these cases.

(b) Factors driving the changes in these cases could stem from a ‘post-national urbanity’ insofar as these small, stateless nations are driven by metropolitan values and therefore advocate a new, socially-progressive political agenda based on ‘civic nationalism’ and appealing to universal values, such as freedom and equality, in contrast to ‘ethnic nationalism’ which is zero-sum, aggressive, and draws on race or history to set the nation apart (The Economist, 2016).

It is likely that 2014 will be remembered as the year in which two (pluri)nation(al) states (the UK and Spain) faced rather different debates but which would later result to be similar turning points in their relationships with their corresponding small, stateless, city-regional nations (Friend, 2012). While the UK witnessed a referendum agreed between Prime Minister David Cameron and Former Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond, Spain, whose permanent position is that the Spanish nation-state must remain territorially unified, refused any expression of self-determination (Guibernau, 2013), which eventually resulted in Catalonia’s considerable population demanding a referendum (Cramer, 2015).

Nevertheless, the cases in Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country can be depicted in rather different ways. This is the point of departure for this article, which aims to address the trends and rapidly changing balances between small nations (Kay, 2009) and their referential (pluri)nation(al) states (Hennig et al., 2015). Thus, the political history of each small nation and the political statuses they were able to achieve by negotiating with their (pluri)nation(al) states will be explored. This helps to highlight the power relationships in play and establishes the preconditions for future negotiations of the devolution of power from the state level to the regional level. Although this article will focus solely on comparing these three cases, this section will show the eight cases that have been studied as part of the Benchmarking City-Regions research programme, funded by Ikerbasque (the Basque Foundation for Science) and the RSA (Regional Studies Association). Specifically, this comparative study consists of eight city-region cases and makes reference to their nation-states, as follows: Catalonia (Spain), the Basque Country (Spain and France), Scotland (UK), Reykjavik (Iceland), Oresund (Sweden and Denmark), Dublin (Ireland), Portland (Oregon), and Liverpool and Manchester (UK; Calzada, 2015a).

Focussing on the crux of this paper, we must not only explicitly make new geopolitical readings of these nation-states (Park, 2017; Keating, 2017), but also provide analytical evidence for the interpretation of the

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1 The summary and the outcomes of this study can be read in the following article: Calzada, I. (2015). Benchmarking Future City-Regions beyond Nation-States. RSRS Regional Studies Regional Science, 2:1, 350-361, DOI: 10.1080/21681376.2015.1046908. Accessible at: www.cityregions.org, August 31, 2015
somewhat confusing city-region term (Morgan, 2013) as a specific concept. As such, in this article, the notion of the plurinational state (Requejo, 2015) will be deconstructed from the perspective of city-regional and multi-level governance (Alcantara et al., 2015). Therefore, in order to define a suitable epistemological perspective so that city-regions can be suitably studied, we will focus on cases involving a considerable degree of regional autonomy. Thus, the analysis in this article will incorporate three perspectives: political geography, urban and regional studies, and social innovation studies. As an analytical tool, we will examine the processes of political innovation in the three aforementioned cases.

Nevertheless, the study of city-regions suggests a broader conceptual scope that could cover a range of politically and economically-driven city-regional dynamics (Scott, 2001; Harrison, 2010; Morgan, 2013). Hence, rather than merely defining a region as “an intermediate territorial level, between the state and the locality” (Keating, 1999, p. 9), we will specify the taxonomy of the city-regions we refer to in this article. City-regions can be defined thus: (1) through their tensional power relationships with their counterpart (pluri) nation(al) states; (2) their potential for internal and autonomous management; (3) their ability to externally portray themselves as internationally self-sufficient actors driven by paradiplomacy (Moreno, 2016). Unlike the five cases in the Benchmarking City-Regions research programme (Calzada, 2017, in press) the three cases examined in this article all follow this aforementioned taxonomy as ‘small, stateless, city-regional nations’.

Therefore, within this preliminary framework, this paper attempts to increase the general understanding of the emergent nature of city-regions as new, dynamic, socio-territorial, networked entities in (pluri) nation(al) state contexts (Herschell, 2015; Harrison, 2010). A recent natural consequence of the post-2008 economic recession was the acceleration of some city-regions’ tendencies to highlight politically-driven nationalist devolution strategies in order to move beyond their nation-states (Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Iceland2), while others steadily continue to implement economically-driven strategies within their nation-states’ borders (Oresund, Liverpool/Manchester, Dublin, and Portland). Nevertheless, in both cases, city-regions are widely recognised as pivotal, societal, and political-economic formations that are key to national and international competitiveness and to rebalancing political restructuring processes within and, indeed, beyond nation-states (Ohmae, 1995; Scott, 2001). As Soja (Brenner, 2014, p. 282) recently pointed out:

[The city-region] represents a more fundamental change in the urbanisation process, arising from the regionalisation of the modern metropolis and involving a shift from the typically monocentric dualism of dense city [sic] and sprawling low-density suburbanisation to a polycentric network of urban agglomerations where relatively high densities are found throughout the urbanised region.

Hence, city-regions (Herschel, 2014) have become a hotly-debated topic in urban and regional political studies (Agnew, 2015) over the past decade. However, relatively few comparisons have been made between diverse city-region cases that trespass their nation-state boundaries, especially because these cases clearly have the potential to reshape the political and economic policies and spatial configurations of their corresponding nation-states. Despite the centrality of city-regions to modern accounts of economic success (Scott, 2001), critics argue that advocates of a new city-regionalism approach overlook the political construction of these entities (Harrison, 2010), beyond their understanding of plurinationalism and nation-state borders (Herschell, 2014). Therefore, the different forms of territorial politics which link city-regionalism with nation-states’ innovative visions (Jonas et al. 2016, p. 1) and the need to examine the processes involved in political innovation (as in Scotland, the Basque Country, and Catalonia), led to the identification of ‘smart devolution’ strategies in relational terms. Furthermore, as Keating (2001, p. 1) argues, “globalisation and European integration have

2 The fact that Iceland is a former colony of Denmark plays an important role here.
encouraged the re-emergence of nationalism within established states”, a notion that connects directly with city-regions. Similarly, as Khanna (2016, p. 78) more recently noted, “The entire European Union is thus a reminder that local independence movements are not the antithesis of lofty post-national globalism but rather the essential path toward it”.

These claims sparked a flurry of research aimed at developing an understanding of nationalistic or non-nationalistic city-regionalism in order to avoid “the ecological fallacy [that] supposes that what is true of some city-regions is true of all city-regions” (Morgan, 2013, p. 1). However, recent work has explicitly focussed on non-nationalistic, state-centric led initiatives such as those in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, among other countries (Harrison, 2010, p. 17). Meanwhile, the current pervasive and changing geo-political European context fuelled by ‘devolutionist movements’—in other words, the continuing struggle by (pluri)nation(al) states with new emergent centres of political identity and agency and their resultant quests for consideration of their own specific interests and agendas—is absolutely ignored.

**POST-NATIONAL URBANITY: METROPOLITANISATION BEYOND (PLURI)NATION(AL) STATES**

The key idea underlying this article is that the three nationalist city-regions analysed here present unique political-innovation processes as challenging and timely research tasks with regard to the recent ‘devolution’ claims in the UK and Spain. Nevertheless, generally speaking, city-regions could be seen as emergent networked socio-territorial entities heading in either one strategic direction or another. Consequently, some city-regions are embracing recentralisation within their nation-states,
while others are vigorously calling for devolution or even independence (i.e., secession, in purely political terms, from their respective nation-states). In this context, factors such as institutional self-sufficiency and economic opportunity are driving city-regions in specific directions by fundamentally transforming their relationship with, and even the nature of, their established nation-states. However, before focusing on our three specific case examples, it is useful to first assess some preliminary general comparative city-region data (Hennig and Calzada, 2015). Thus, figure 1 shows the relationship between nation-state GDP per capita and city-region GDP per capita.

In a nutshell, by investigating the GDP and population contributions of the city-region cases in relation to their plurinational states, we concluded that ‘regional political tensions’ can be explained when city-regional entities pointedly stand out through some ‘alternative’ economic, political, or social dynamics that differ significantly from their plurinational states. These regional political tensions should be understood as consequences of natural rescaling processes in their transition into plurinational and nation-states (Brenner, 2009), insofar as they are merely an outcome of a diverse range of political and economic factors that lead city-regions towards new regional equilibrium and order. Thus, this issue can be understood in a context where the city-regions produce a higher GDP and its population contributes more to its corresponding plurinational state. This situation also has many consequences in terms of the tensions surrounding political and economic sovereignty, whether in favour of, or in opposition to, recentralisation or devolution/independence.

Focussing only on the three small city-regional nations presented in this article, the percentage of each city-region’s population and its GDP contribution is disproportionate to that of its referential nation-state on both counts. This is the case in Scotland, which constitutes 8% of the UK population and 9% of the UK’s GDP. In Catalonia, one of the main arguments for increased devolution of power is its large contribution to Spain both in terms of population and GDP (16% and 19%, respectively). Similarly, the Basque Country constitutes 6% of Spain’s GDP but 5.5% of its population (see Table 1), although it does benefit from a self-governing tax agreement (the Concierto Económico; Uriarte, 2015) with the Spanish central government.

Notwithstanding this geo-economical evidence-based analysis, we can also argue that within the scope of the European context, these complex dynamics occur through political-innovation processes and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY-REGIONAL SMALL NATIONS</th>
<th>POPULATION IN MILLIONS (NATION-STATE %)</th>
<th>GDP CONTRIBUTION RELATED TO NATION-STATE (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>5.3 (8)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>7.5 (16)</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>2.2 (5.5)</td>
<td>6</td>
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1 This data relates to the Basque Country side in Spain. The French side is not represented in these figures.

SOURCE: Calzada, 2014
smart-devolution strategies, and that these both require further pervasive and qualitative analyses to explain the sources and potential scenarios of this new city-regional order. This so-called post-national urbanity is characterised by a profound rescaling process (Brenner, 2009), in which (pluri)national states are under huge pressure because of their internal and external structural shifts. ‘Post-national’ (Sassen, 2002) ‘urbanity’ (Corijn, 2009) refers to the current pervasive metropolitanisation phenomenon (Katz et al., 2013), which is increasingly shaping the political regional claims in small stateless European nations for the right to decide their own futures and to the potential rescaling processes in some (pluri) national states such as the UK and Spain.

In fact, globalisation restrucutres the flow of spaces (Castells, 1996), repositioning cities and regions on a wider scale than just their national environments. At present, Europe’s changing refoundational momentum, shaped by small, stateless nations’ claims and fuelled by metropolitan dynamics, is both part of, and a reaction to, these pressures. The EU currently regulates at least half of the daily lives of the citizens in 27 of its 28 member states; simultaneously, significant devolution processes are occurring in (pluri)national states in terms of the transfer of socioeconomic regulatory power in competitive environments to smaller units. As Khanna (2016, p. 63) argues, “Devolution is the perpetual fragmentation of territory into ever more (and smaller) units of authority, from empires to nations, nations to provinces and provinces to cities. Devolution is the ultimate expression of local desire to control one’s geography, which is exactly why it drives us toward a connected destiny”.

According to Barber (2013), this ‘connected destiny’ is already happening in cities and regions, rather than between (pluri)national states. Thus, plurinationalism itself is a term that is at stake between decentralised positions, such as federalism, devolution, secessionism, and recentralisation of state imperatives. Looking at cities and the global-local nexus in the European context, immediately introduces the question of urbanity as a pre- and post-national formation, and therefore as a para-national domain: cities are not just parts of countries. In the current post-national context, urbanity—made up of city-regions in certain state configurations—is trespassing upon plurinationality in internal geopolitical terms while establishing an uncertain and unpredictable scenario (in external geostrategic metropolitan terms) between small, stateless, city-regional nations, their referential states, and the supranational European Union.

THE TAXONOMY AND BENCHMARKING OF SMALL, STATELESS, CITY-REGIONAL NATIONS: POLITICAL INNOVATION PROCESSES AND SMART DEVOLUTION STRATEGIES

For the purpose of this article, it is difficult to analyse political innovation processes and smart devolution strategies based solely on politically-constructed subjective categories such as nations. According to Benedict Anderson, nations are ‘imagined communities’, which could be interpreted ethnographically in many different plurinational and cross-border national territories (Moncusí, 2016). Yet, Guibernau (2013, p. 368) provides a wider definition when she defines nations as “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future, and claiming the right to rule itself”. It is, therefore, a subjective construction that could be applied to any nationalistic political idea. Paradoxically, nation-states are the entities which are the most reluctant to accept that they were also built on the basis of ‘invention’. In this vein, a BBC Radio 4 programme called The Invention of Spain was recently aired, which aimed to provide objective information regarding the controversial debate on the Catalan self-determination strategy, fulfilled in the plebiscitary election of September 27, 2015 (Basta, 2015).

Regarding Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Scotland, the political-innovation processes occurring in such changing contexts reveal that there are separatist challengers to nation-states, even beyond Europe. These make their cases for greater autonomy based not only on identity-based arguments, but also on considerations
of a fair distribution of resources within their nation-states. These three entities have long histories of making claims for increased regional autonomy and have been characterised by already achieving significant degrees of devolution over the past two decades (Colomb, 2014): they each have their own parliaments, governments, and executive leaders. Therefore, by measuring devolution, we mean that power is shared between tiers of government, and the power exercised by the lower tiers—such as regions and provinces—varies across and within (pluri) nation(al) states. In the context of this article, we will use a working definition of political innovations as processes “which allow [it to] going [sic] beyond the containerised view of territory, by starting from the political dimension of territories, and by placing and considering innovation and networks in their spatial and historical context without losing sight of the material territoriality” (Calzada, 2015a, p. 354). Despite the fact that the three cases present the same drivers of devolution, not only are their political innovation processes grounded in diverse factors, but their smart devolution claims proceed with different strategies and cover varying dimensions (See Table 2).

In the case of the Basque Country, after suffering from political violence (BBC, 1955), there is remarkable evidence that this era is now being left behind. Evidence-based qualitative data in support of this statement is the fact that an unprecedented summer school event titled Political Innovation: Constitutional Change, Self-Government, The Right to Decide and Independence took place in 2015 in San Sebastián (Calzada et al., 2015). The event showed that political parties were pursuing a normalised context in which to express projects without the threat of political unrest and violence. Thus, there has been intense and committed effort from institutions and civic society to cure the wounds of political violence. Indeed, devolution claims may not be radicalised but, the self-government status rooted within the population itself has deliberately engaged in further city-regional devolution. In line with the citizens’ willingness, the Basque autonomy and Navarra Statutory Community have full fiscal powers as a consequence of the economic agreement (the Concierto Económico) with the nation-state, the source of the Basque Country’s historic self-government system. Similarly, it can be argued that after this political devolution, the Basque Country has presented remarkable public policy (in terms of education and health, among other issues) insofar as the regional political parties determine strategic discourse. Due to the increasing presence of Basque institutions stemming from institutional bolstering instruments, in place for the past 36 years, since the implementation of the Guernica autonomy Statute, institutions have been the principal leaders of this autonomist strategy. In regard to the political innovation processes currently driving Basque society, we could summarise the current situation as post-violence political momentum. Thus, the devolution agenda may have some ‘smart’ modifications as a consequence of the acceleration of these processes.

Scotland is recognised as a constituent nation of the UK, an issue that contrasts with the “indivisibility [sic] unity of the Spanish nation” that is the principal source of conflict in the case of Catalonia. Scottish autonomy is newly developed; it was established by the Scotland Act implemented by the New Labour Government of 1998 and which led to the election of the first Scottish Parliament in May 1999 and the formation of a new, devolved Scottish Government in charge of a wide range of policy fields, including health care, education, and energy. Thus, Scotland has slowly been gaining more political and policy devolution, fuelled by the new Scottish Government. This is the same Government that held the 2014 independence referendum (Geoghegan, 2015) and obtained 56 out of 59 Scottish MPs in the 2015 UK general election. However, the Scottish public’s appetite for increased independence will ultimately be derived from achieving greater levels of trust in Holyrood than in Westminster, even beyond claims for further fiscal devolution. Furthermore, even though independentists were defeated by a very short margin (45% in favour of independence versus 55% opposed to it), the rationalised way in which the independence debate was run featured intelligent discourse and constructive identification of the pros and cons (BBC News, 2014). Hence, we could argue that, based on many other assessments (Hazell, 2015), the September 2014 referendum and the recently confirmed Brexit vote established a turning point, not only in Scotland and the UK, but also for devolutionist processes elsewhere.
Finally, the pro-independence parties in Catalonia framed the 2015 Catalan regional election, held on 27 September, as a proxy for an independence referendum (Martí et al., 2015). Since then, the new Catalan Government aims to declare independence within 18 months by unplugging Catalonia’s institutional structures from Spain. In 2006, a new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was approved by the Spanish Parliament, the Catalan Parliament, and a popular referendum in Catalonia, but it was immediately challenged in the Spanish Constitutional Court by the right-wing, unionist Partido Popular. In 2010, the Constitutional Court published its sentence on the Statute of Autonomy, having culled significant parts of the text. This led to massive demonstrations in Catalonia. The ‘Catalanist’ feeling, though not directly secessionist, became one of independentism, even though the Catalan political profile could have been described as federalist up to this point (Serrano, 2013). The so-called right to decide (Cagiao and Conde, 2016; Requejo, 2015; Calzada, 2014) became the key motto of the secessionist and federalist demonstrators, increasing tensions between the Catalan city-regional nation and the Spanish (pluri)nation(al) states—the UK and Spain. This article sets out some interpretations of self-determination and democratic experimentation for all three cases, using the EU as a supranational and geopolitical frame of reference. In this direction, as Connolly (2013) and Avery (2014) argue, independentism or secessionism is a living issue in today’s Europe, and is the consequence of two main factors. First, the effects of the post-2008 recession brought about broader processes of territorial transformation and re-scaling in the context of welfare-state reforms. Second, the ‘denaturalisation’ of nation-state space is a process that reveals that stakeholders may still share a space but that they have no common interests as to how to order that space, in the broader sense of the term.

Regarding the European metropolitan dimension, authors such as Bourne (2014), Muro et al. (2016), and Moreno (2015) have investigated the role of the future EU memberships of these three cases, as potential new states, in debates on the advantages and disadvantages of devolution, secession, or even independence. However, paradoxically, the EU’s structure may stimulate support for an independent state while discouraging acts of secession. In fact, insofar that the EU could provide a complex web of opportunities and constraints for approximately 20 significant pro- and anti-independence or devolution movements, it is likely to remain implicated in secession processes (Bourne, 2014, p. 95). These can be considered as

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3 The use of the term (pluri)nation(al) states attempts to highlight, especially in this sentence, but also throughout the article, the lack of a plural and diverse understanding of the state territory. As such, the post-national urbanity pattern pervasively depicts the centralistic resistance of the Spanish nation-state by being reluctant to articulate a federal configuration in the 21st century, as authors such as Moreno argue.


5 The grassroots movements in favour of the ‘right to decide’ in the Basque Country is called Gure Esku Dago, which means ‘In Our Hands’. www.gureeskudago.eus
Table 2: The taxonomy and benchmarking of small, stateless, city-regional nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAXONOMY AND BENCHMARKING OF SMALL, STATELESS, CITY-REGIONAL NATIONS</th>
<th>BASQUE COUNTRY</th>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
<th>CATALONIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Established fiscal, irregular policy, and political asymmetric devolution in three administrative entities (Basque autonomy, the Statutory Community of Navarre, and the Basque Country).</td>
<td>• Gradual policy and limited political devolution.</td>
<td>• Constrained political devolution and banned fiscal devolution.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fixed by institutions</td>
<td>• Fuelled by governments.</td>
<td>• Driven by civic society.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(B) POLITICAL INNOVATION PROCESSES</strong></td>
<td>Post-Violence Politics</td>
<td>Rationalised Dialectic: Bilateralism</td>
<td>Antagonistic Dialectic: Unilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(C) SMART DEVOLUTION STRATEGIES</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q1:</strong> To what extent is the starting point of each city-regional nation’s devolution similar in terms of governance, history, and policies?</td>
<td>• 1979: Guernica Statute of Autonomy with fiscal, political, and policy devolution.</td>
<td>• 2014: The independence referendum held on September 18 was a turning point in the fiscal devolution within the UK.</td>
<td>• 2010: the Spanish Constitutional Court invalidated the democratically-achieved 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2016: A new political status update requires the articulation of the right to decide beyond legal instruments, after the regional elections on September 25.</td>
<td>• The EU referendum led Scotland to implement a second independence referendum.</td>
<td>• November 9, 2014: A non-binding self-determination referendum was organised.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• General elections determined the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco; PNV) and Euskal Herria Bildu political party strategies to suggest the content of an application for the ‘right to decide’ and whether or not to link itself to constitutional changes.</td>
<td>• 2015: The Election of 56 Scottish National Party MPs in Westminster represented a powerful force for renegotiating further devolution beyond the Smith powers; 50 amendments were also recently presented in the House of Commons before Art. 50 was implemented to trigger Brexit.</td>
<td>• September 27, 2015: A plebiscitary election with a unity list in favour of yes was announced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional elections become immune to potential changes in the political status of the Basque city-region in terms of its relationship with the Spanish nation-state.</td>
<td>• Implementation of a second independence referendum is dependent on the UK’s membership of the EU (as the opportunity for legitimate secession by the Scottish National Party).</td>
<td>• Regardless of the outcome, the key issue remains pending; as long as yes wins, what will be the role of Catalonia within the EU? (see next section: Final remarks).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q2:</strong> What are the potential political scenarios for each city-regional nation as a result of the de/recentralisation attitude of its referential (pluri) nation(al) state?</td>
<td>• Without a doubt, the leading politically-innovative process was the achievement of peace. Regardless of the cause, a pluralistic approach to Basque society should be required to articulate a bottom-up and top-down ‘right to decide’.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The following questions are pending binding consultation or a referendum: Which pending power correlations would implement a popular vote on this question? and How will be the Basque Country organise a deliberative experimental consultation as the highest democratic level that guarantees the coexistence of a range of political projects?</td>
<td>• It is noteworthy that even after the independence referendum, a large majority of the public expressed opinions that the referendum implied a new turning point in Scottish politics. The positive influence of the debate among the citizens has increased trust in politics and the importance of devolution in its citizen’s daily lives.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Q3:</strong> What are the most relevant strategic political innovation processes occurring in each case?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The most striking point in the Catalan devolution dynamic is the way the yes campaigners are dealing with their differences. A diverse range of important stakeholders including politicians, activists, academics, business people, entrepreneurs, public managers, public figures, and others, are portraying themselves as a collective plural leadership.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Adapted from Calzada, 2015b

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6 The inclusion of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and some parts of Aragon, Roussillon in France, the Principality of Andorra, and the city of Alghero in Sardinia (Italy) should also be considered, in order to fully establish the nationalistic vision of the ‘Paisos Catalans’.
arguments about ‘Europeanisation’ or the ways in which European integration affects politics, policies, and institutions within interdependencies between current European (pluri)nation(al) states and small, stateless, city-regional nations.

Highlighting this timely issue, Herrschell (2015) suggests that the European Union’s regional policy and multi-level arrangements of governance have provided an important instrumentarium for such politically-innovative activities, on the basis of growing metropolitan consciousness regarding places that ‘matter’, and that are willing to take their decisions and their political futures “in[to] their hands.” Similarly, these dialectics may vary in nature depending on the respective power and influence of the relevant players. The outcome is a complex, multi-level, continuously re-negotiated, composite political identity that can express itself through local, regional, or ‘national’ narratives and implement the so-called right to decide through remarkably diverse, deliberative experimentation exercises.

However, the current context requires the EU’s adoption of an anticipative and active role within its policies and programmes so as to reinstate what we could call ‘smart devolution’. This refoundational momentum of the EU should deal with the tensions between the small, stateless, city-regional nations (such as those in Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country) and their corresponding (pluri)nation(al) states. As we have seen, such states depict different democratic articulations in order to accommodate territorial diversity, and as Connolly (2013, p. 12) points out, the EU will play a leading role in determining the outcomes of Scottish, Catalan, and Basque nationalist claims. However, he also adds that devolution, and the rights to secession and self-determination, as currently understood in international law, provide little in the way of guidance for addressing separatist claims in Europe’s stateless nations or, for that matter, other parts of the world. He continues on to say that in Europe, self-determination claims will increasingly be dealt with through the institutions of the EU as a part of the ongoing push and pull among EU member states and city-regions. Whether this results in ‘Independence in Europe’, or some form of accommodation that stops short of secession, remains to be seen. In the same vein, reinforcing Connolly’s suggestion, Khanna (2016, pp. 67-68) reflects and concludes on the nature of self-determination thus:

Self-determination should be seen as ‘pre-legal’ in the sense that it reflects the will of peoples rather than the international law’s bias toward existing states. [...] Self-determination is a sign not of backward tribalism but of mature evolution. We should not despair that secessionism is a moral failure, even if it recognises innate tribal tendencies. A devolved world of local democracies is preferable to a world of large pseudo-democracies. Let the tribes win.

REFERENCES

Post-national urbanity beyond (pluri)nation(al) states in the EU: Benchmarking Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country


**BIOGRAPHIC NOTE**

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ABSTRACT
Political activity of contemporary western societies has been structured based on a definition of territorial units of action, which we call states. This western political structure has been legitimised by a link between each state to a collective owner of sovereignty, which we call a nation. The life of this society revolves around areas linked to different fields of community life, such as production, consumption, distribution of work, etc., including the discursive elements of these practices. Social practices take place within the complex interaction between all these fields of relations, which we call social structure. Each of these collective forms (states, nations and social structure) outline several geographic and social areas, to facilitate or hinder the construction of certain collective identities and, therefore, facilitate or hinder the production of certain collective actions. In the first part, this article opens a discussion on the relationship between the concepts of state, nation, and social structure. Later, the article endeavours to empirically apply the theoretical discussion to the Valencian case, to reveal the mechanisms underlying the construction of its collective identity.

Keywords: state structures, national identity, social structure, Valencia.

INTRODUCTION
On April 8, 2016 a round table discussion was held at the School of Social Sciences at the University of Valencia. Under the title: A plurinational state? Diverse perspectives from the País Valencià, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarre and Europe, it called for shared reflection, from different viewpoints, on the situation of and the opinions on a changing political model in Spain, within the European context. I was invited to offer a perspective on the situation in Valencia. This article stems from the written formalisation of that speech.
THE STATE: TERRITORY AND COMMUNITY
Throughout history, political communities have evolved from taxation groups to absolute monarchies, and in turn, from the latter into modern states: the result is a wide range of territorial dimensions. As size increases, strength (even if it is through voting) tends to replace consensus: political power tends to hold onto elements of domestic power, but without being mitigated by emotional bonds.

Weber considers that “the state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory—the concept of ‘territory’ is essential to the definition” (Weber, 1922, p. 1,056). The state’s action is always a territorial action delimited by borders, binding its citizens. The organisational core of the state is comprised by a rational apparatus with a permanent and centralised military power, which monopolises the creation of law and the legitimate use of force, and it organises the administration with a dominance of specialised public officials. From thereon, public administration, territoriality, and community become central components of collective action.

For Marx, the political structure sanctions the social order established through the dominant mode of production: social relations provide an explanation of the state, and not the other way round. The social division of work facilitates the emergence of bureaucracy, with the separation of private interests and general interests, and the split between the private and the public. This split produces a dual life; life in the political community, where the individual is a citizen and is valued as a social being, and life in civil society, where they act as a private person and consider the others as means (‘objects’). However, bureaucracy is intended to be the will of the state and state power, and its particular interest is aimed at being general. The State’s objectives become those of bureaucracy, and vice versa, without this impenetrable combination excluding conflicts. Thus, the state summarises and represents social conflicts, the needs of society as a whole, expressed through the mode of production, establishing a close connection between social structure and the state.

The state’s power is therefore based on the monopoly it holds, whether legitimate or illegitimate, over the use of force. It is a power based on violence, or the threat of using it, in other words, the power to destroy life or to protect it from destruction. However, the state can only exercise its power over a community within the limits of a territory. That is to say, the state is structured around natural elements that give rise to social constructs: in the state, the people and land become the nation and territory (Foucault, 1996, 2006, 2007).

Bourdieu tries to complete the Weberian definition, as the state’s power becomes clearly apparent within the realm of symbolic relationships: “the state is an X (to be determined) which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population” (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 97-8). This symbolic violence facilitates the concealment of possible alternatives, such as the ultimate expression of power (Lukes, 2005).

That is why, for Habermas (1976, p. 245), the state emerges in order to ensure the identity of the social group, in order to legitimise coercion and in order to achieve social integration more effectively. According to his approach, through binding decisions, the state prevents social disintegration. In order to be maintained and remain effective in the long term, political dominance needs to obtain recognition as the legitimate power, and not only as the legal power.

Thus, in addition to the official apparatus of the government, the components inherent to all states, whether they are traditional or modern, are a territory that delimits the exercise of power and legitimate rights, which provides backing to the decisions made by the government in the territory. The sources of this legitimacy have changed over time, and in Western modernity it is communities which have become ‘nations’ that assume this legitimising capacity.
Territoriality

Territorial action, like all social action, is always aimed at affecting, influencing, or controlling the ideas and actions of others (Weber, 1922, p. 5) and consequently, also their access to resources, which means that territorial relationships are the result of power.

The real political space of relations of domination is defined by the relationship between the distribution of powers and assets within the geographical space, and the distribution of agents within this space, the geographical distance to those assets and powers is a good index of power (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 70).

These territorial divisions have significant effects over who is dominated, by whom, and for what purpose. The creation of a territory produces a special kind of space that, unlike others, requires a constant effort in terms of establishment, maintenance and reproduction (Sack, 1986; Soja, 1985). Whatever the scale, all societies need to engage in territorial activities in order to coordinate efforts and specify responsibilities. Therefore, when we talk about territory, we are talking about a structured series of economic and cultural resources that are established within in the space (infrastructures, industries, social provisions, etc.) which facilitate social functioning, and form the foundation of the mode or production (Harvey, 1985; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983).

Thus, any territorial organisation can oppose the interests and objectives of certain social groups. Territorial behaviour is not only a means of creating and maintaining order, rather, it is a resource for creating and maintaining a context to experience the world through, and give it meaning. The territory is therefore a physical element, defined geographically by its borders, but it is also a symbolic element that affects the definition of the community itself and included in the Weberian concept of a state.

At this juncture in history, the opposition between globalisation and individualisation results in several situations of social confrontation, which the current policy of the state does not appear able to resolve effectively.

The revolution of information technologies and the restructuring of capitalism has produced a new form of society, which is characterised by the globalisation of decisive economic activities from a strategic viewpoint, due to its organisation in networks, flexibility and instability in work and individualisation, through a culture of virtual reality, constructed via an omnipresent system of media that is interconnected and diversified, and the transformation of the core materials of life, space and time, via the creation of a space of flows and timelessness, as expressions of dominant activities and the ruling elites (Castells, 1997, p. 23).

However, there are also expressions of collective identity that challenge this globalisation and individual seclusion in the name of cultural uniqueness and the control people have over their lives and environments. These expressions are manifold, diverse, and follow the cultural contours and path of the historical generation of each of these identities.

Legitimacy: identities and communities

Identity is a process through which meaning is constructed, along with an objective for action, addressing one or several personal attributes, which are given priority over the other possible sources of meaning (Castells, 1997, from p. 28 onwards). Identity fulfils three main functions: it helps us to take decisions and to make sense of and establish objectives for action: it makes relationships possible with others, by enabling mutual recognition in positions and relationships, and it provides strength and resistance, by giving references for action (Guibernau, 1997, p. 115).

These attributes establish limits between those that have them and those that do not, therefore the fission and fusion of social limits affect individuals in terms of identity. These limits can be contested,
but not abolished: the disappearance of one always involves the emergence of another (Oommen, 1995). The social significance of specific attributes, which are possessed individually but shared collectively, leads to the emergence of collective identities, which facilitate cohesion between those who share these attributes (‘us’), through similarity-based strategies, and distinguish those that do not share said attributes (‘them’), through strategies of differentiation or diversification (Barrera-González, 1997, p. 232; Bourdieu, 1979).

Socialisation processes are those constructing correspondence between the social structure and cognitive and symbolic structures (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 205): the correspondence between the objective divisions of the social world and the principles of “vision and division” that the agents apply. Ongoing exposure to specific social conditions imprints long-lasting attitudes on individuals, who interiorise the needs of the social environment and inscribe their outer reality onto their inner being. “Talking about habitus is to suggest that what is individual, and even personal, and what is subjective, is also social and collective. Habitus is a socialised subjectivity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 104). This correspondence fulfils eminently political roles, because the symbolic systems are not only instruments of knowledge but also instruments of domination. Recognition of legitimacy is rooted in the harmony between the cognitive structures that become unconscious, and the objective ones.

In the process of constructing collective identities, a path is taken that leads us from diversity and social complexity to public statements about shared identity via mechanisms that Larrain (1994, p. 164) groups into four specific elements:

1. **Selection** mechanisms; only some attributes, some symbols, and the social experience of some groups is taken into account, the rest are excluded.

2. **Evaluation** mechanisms; the values of certain groups or institutions are presented as general values, while others are disparaged, or simply excluded.

3. **Opposition** mechanisms; the ways of life and ideas of certain groups are presented as foreign, strange, not normal, atypical, etc., and, if necessary, these differences are exaggerated.

4. **Naturalisation** mechanisms; the previous traits are presented as given, immutable, normal, and natural.

Ultimately, the social effectiveness of a collective identity depends on the capacity to select, evaluate, oppose and naturalise certain characteristics, and not others. It depends on the capacity to impose a way of seeing social reality as truth, regardless of its scientific support. This capacity is not distributed equally among social groups: having power makes it possible to institutionalise a way of seeing and of objectifying this reality.

The objectification of a collective identity occurs, firstly, out of the mutual recognition of individuals, by referring mutually to an ‘us’, leading simultaneously to the emergence of a ‘them’ and a ‘you’. Secondly, it is objectified through recognition of the group by others. Thirdly, there is the political or institutional objectification, with the provision of formal recognition structures and schemata for linking this identity with that of the others.

It is these objectification processes that can result in conflict. When the first and second coincide, but the third does not, we face a clash of identities or a conflict between identities. At the same time, the existence of these conflicts is a form of objectifying collective identity. This is a conflict based on the non-correspondence between legal recognition and de facto recognition. As Simmel (1908) said, whenever the interests of two elements refer to the same object, the possibility of coexistence depends on whether there is a boundary line that separates them. If the limitation is juridical (in law) it can mean the end of the conflict, if it is based around power (de facto) it may mark the start of conflict. When the first objectification and the second do not coincide, we face identity conflicts or conflicts about identity if
the definition is questioned socially from within the
group, from outside the group, or from both sides of
the boundary, the identity is not socially obvious.
The identity conflict is a conflict about the collective
‘us’, between two or more forms of defining reality. In
any case, these conflicts regarding identity necessarily
contain conflicts between identities.

Therefore, states may be questioned regarding the
conflictive nature of the identity that they promote
over their territory, and that they aim to be legitimised
in order to exercise power. That is to say, states can
see their legitimacy questioned due to the emergence
of alternative collective territorial political projects.

NATIONS

It is not clear therefore that the state is a community,
as Weber claims. The state is undoubtedly a form
of the territorial organisation of political power,
which needs legitimisation. It is therefore advisable,
as suggested by Connor (1994) and Tivey (1981),
to differentiate between the concepts of state and
nation. The most detrimental flaw in “scholarly
approaches to nationalism lie in the fact that there
has been a tendency to use the term nation to denote
a territorial legal unity, the state” (Connor, 1994). Its
relationships may coincide, when the territory and
the community governed by the state overlap, or do
not coincide, when a specific territory is home to a
community that differs to that which is promoted
by the state (Pérez-Agote, 1989, p. 184). That is why
Guibernau (1997) asserts that there may be legitimate
states and illegitimate states, and Hall (1999) analyses
national identities as independent variables in studies
on internal or external state policies.

Nations are a phenomenon that belong to the world
of the conscience of social agents. They are effective to the
extent they are capable of influencing or determining
the behaviour of the agents. This capacity depends on
the social objectivity achieved, in the sense of what
is socially recognised in a shared way. It is therefore
a performative category (Pérez-Agote, 1993): its
production and reproduction is linked to its capacity
for social mobilisation (Máiz, 1997). Ultimately, a
nation is an imagined community (Anderson, 1983),
formed by a group of individuals that identify
between one another on the basis of very different
attributes —including territoriality, volition, history,
and ethnicity—according to the specific situation, and
which is considered the sovereign subject of political
power over a territory (Gellner, 1997; Núñez, 1998;
Smith, 1989).

It is this nature of exclusionary legitimacy that
distinguishes a national identity from a regional
identity. A regional community is an identity that is
politically subordinated to the identity of the nation
state. According to Moreno (1997), what regionalist
movements have in common with nationalist ones
is their basis in a territorial identity, the existence
of a conflict with the state (whether economic,
political, or cultural) and the emergence of political
and social mobilisation organisations. However, as
Pérez-Agote (1995) points out, in order to recognise
the legitimacy of state power, regionalisms do not
demand the capacity for self-determination, but
rather the delegation of the central power to the
regional territory. Nevertheless, regional identities,
regionalisms, and regional institutions can act as
active builders of a national identity: they can generate
the perception of shared and different interests and
create favourable conditions for the emergence of a
nationalist movement (Nuñez, 1998).

SOCIETIES: SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The construction of national identities presupposes the
existence of specific social conditions: in relation
to ethnicity (Smith, 1986), social structure (Hroch, 1985),
and/or territory (Hechter, 1985). However, obtaining a
functioning notion of ‘society’ for empirical research
is difficult, for two main reasons: the difficulty of
establishing consistent limits in time and space, and
the difficulty of determining whether the limits define
a differentiated and coherent social entity (Tilly, 1984,
from p. 37 onwards). However, we can make it work with
the use of the concept of social structure, in the sense of a framework of relations that organises the activities of the parts that form it. In fact, the term social structure is almost always used to refer to the characteristics of groups, as traits that cannot be attributed to individuals. At times it denotes the coherence of social institutions, at others it opposes it, in order to refer to more persistent and organised societal relationships. Although the agents involved are not always aware of its consistency, the structures continue working, regardless of their conscience and desire.

The major theoretical debates of social sciences have focused on the nature of this relationship between individuals and society, and can be summarised in two blocks. A debate about whether social agents are free when they act, or whether they are constrained by external conditioning factors; and a debate about whether structure is conferred by the material characteristics of society, or by its immaterial characteristics. However, the most recent approaches attempt to integrate this duality in order to try to acquire an image that more accurately portrays the complexity of the social and structural dynamic: material and immaterial, voluntaristic and deterministic, all at the same time (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992).

Social agents operate simultaneously in several exchange networks: bodies with the ecosystem, the production of goods and services, power and social control, fears and beliefs, where emotional, economic, political and cultural resources are exchanged (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Villasante, 2000). Among these interrelated areas, the political sphere (with the state as the central institution) plays an especially important role, inasmuch as it has the capacity to formalise the rules for exchange with the other interrelated areas. Social actions are approached as recursive processes, created by social agents, but continuously recreated through multiple structural resources. The continuity of these social practices presupposes reflexivity that is only possible because of the continuity of the practices themselves (Giddens, 1984; Lamo de Espinosa, 1990). The result is contingent and has no specific direction: it seems that the strategies lead nowhere in particular. Fate is uncertain, unclear and risky, and social change has no apparent direction (Therborn, 2000), thus building a society of risk (Beck, 1998). As Sztompka points out (1993, p. 190) “Society appears to be in perpetual and continuous motion [...] any occurrence becomes an event; any agent can act; any state is only a phase in an open process”. This does not mean that these processes do not plot out a temporary path and present a historic dimension: ultimately, we do not know where we are going, but we are going somewhere.

The processes of globalisation and individualisation exacerbate this uncertainty: historic uncertainty (globalisation) and biographic uncertainty (individualisation). The effects of this are a reduction in predictability, an increase in antagonisms, a decrease in complementarities, a rise in conflicts...; a situation in which the old institutions fail (Morin, 2004). Ultimately, the result of all this uncertainty is insecurity and a lack of protection: i.e. fear.

**SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND NATIONALISMS IN VALENCIA**  
Traditionally, human beings have tried to overcome this fear by associating with other humans, as a means of managing it. Let us return to the starting point of this article and ask the question: is the state legitimised by a nation the most suitable form of collective association in this historic context? Whatever the response to this question may be, in order to overcome the nation-state, if applicable, it is necessary for it to first be questioned with an alternative. In the País Valencià, adherence to the political proposal of the Kingdom of Spain has not had a politically significant response. Unlike Catalonia and the Basque Country, up until a few years ago, Valencian disaffection towards Spain was rather symbolic: shown by qualitatively significant social sectors, its quantitative importance was, however, very limited.

The País Valencià shatters the expectations outlined by the main theories on nationalism. It is a society with its own language, which differs from Castilian Spanish, even though language is considered as a cultural
hallmark with a great capacity for transmitting identity, especially in conflict situations (Ninyoles, 1971). This is also a society that has also very quickly implemented processes to absorb an immigrant population, which according to the primordialist theses, could have generated identification according to origin (Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1957). Furthermore, the economic structure is based on outsourcing which, according to the theories of rational choice, would facilitate the presence of a national political conflict (Hechter, 1989; Rogowski, 1985). Moreover, the political decentralisation process of the Kingdom of Spain, with the introduction of the system of *autonomous regions* or *communities*, could have reinforced sub-state identities, as an effect of the regional policies themselves (Brubaker, 1996), or as the result of the structure of political opportunities that this new form of territorial organisation offers (Tarrow, 1994).

Nevertheless, it is as if Spain had achieved its objective of creating a Spanish national community in Valencia. As it is frequently pointed out, this is certainly very much the case: from the territories in the Kingdom of Spain, Valencian society is among those that identify most closely with Spain. However, it is also true that the Valencian case is more complex which we should study more deeply to better understand, and to highlight some of the mechanisms that may have helped it reach this level of adhesion.

The Valencian territory

One of the greatest issues for the progress of a possible alternative policy to the Spanish one in Valencia is the special territorial concentration of a population from the constituency of Alicante (especially in the provincial capital and its area of influence towards the south), which believes its community is not the Valencian community. The Valencian-Spanish *unionism* is concentrated very significantly in the Alicante region, and is in considerable contrast with Castellón and Valencia, where regionalist positions prevail. So great is the difference, that this territorial fissure causes serious internal cohesion problems in Valencia.

This is one of the effects of provincialisation and the infrastructures policy that the Spanish state has applied in the Valencian region: provincial rupture and negligence in the policy of infrastructures required for Valencian territorial cohesion. Nor should we forget that a significant part of the territory in the south and west of the current autonomous community was incorporated into Valencia and Alicante with the provincialisation of the 19th century, stemming from Castile.

Furthermore, we should add that among the Valencian population there is a high level of identification with the Spanish territory: a territorial identification that involves the full territorial integration of *País Valencià* into the Kingdom of Spain. The autonomous territorial unit does not exclude the state, but rather complements it; those that most territorially identify with the Valencian territory are also those that identify most with the state territory. Not even Valencian nationalists identify primarily on a territorial level with the autonomous community itself: they are more municipalists than non-autonomists.

Ultimately, the Kingdom of Spain is the politically significant territorial unit for the population of Valencia and, furthermore, there is no Valencian alternative. Spain is the only territorial political reference (Burguera, 1990; Guía, 1985). None of the possible national positions view the Valencian territory as autonomous, and the immense majority opt to identify with Spain.

The Valencian social structure: territorial origins

The construction of an alternative identity calls for the existence of an alternative social structure that is perceived as plausible. In the case of Valencia, there is a significant generational divide when it comes to definitions of *nation*. Specifically the Valencian population born after 1950 is more prone to discourse

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1 The quantitative empirical statements used throughout the article result from multiple empirical studies carried out by the author, with all the surveys on autonomous community, regional, and national identity by the Spanish *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (Centre for Sociological Research [CIS]) in Valencia since 1996.
that is critical of the state. This is nothing special, given that it is normal for the younger generations to adopt more critical stances to the existing order; however, in this case, Valencian nationalism is practically non-existent in the population born before 1950.

This is a consequence of the weak political projection of Valencian identity during the Renaixença (Renaissance) of the 19th century and during the Second Spanish Republic, which it brings us back to the 1970s. This was a decade when Valencian society underwent very significant changes to its social structure, particularly demographic and economic changes that caused an upheaval of traditional structures. Immigration, urbanisation, and industrialisation were very intense processes during these years, and a fraction of the Valencian elites began to question the definitions set forth by Spain. The decade began with the publication of “Nosaltres, els valencians” (We, the Valencians) by Joan Fuster (1962), marking a profound qualitative change in national reflection in Valencia. For the first time, there was an open presentation of the chance to create an alternative national discourse to that offered by the state, i.e., it is possible to be Valencian without being Spanish. Thus, promising Valencian discourses offering an alternative to Spanish identity are very young on a societal level.

This late development also helps us to understand the poor relationship between the territorial origin and the national position. In Valencia, it is the Valencians with ancestry in the region who maintain regional or unionist definitions, rather than those of Valencian nationalism. In fact, in terms of transmitting national definitions of reality to children, parents prefer to opt for the official Spanish definition, over the alternative which is barely experienced.

**The Valencian social structure: social classes**

Marx pointed out that national projects are an expression of the relationship between production and productive forces, of class relationships. This complex establishment of interests lays the material foundations for the formation of territorial alliances—those based on class. The purpose of these alliances is to preserve or improve existing production and consumption models, dominant technological combinations, social relationship patterns, levels of profits and salaries, business management technique and workforce quality, physical and social infrastructures, and the cultural qualities of life and work. Every single resident in a given territory may take an interest in influencing the future shape of the territory they inhabit (Harvey, 1985).

However, in Valencia we do not find these class alliances with a Valencian territorial base. The elites manifest a significant level of fragmentation in their definitions of the Valencian national reality. Business people adopt a mostly regionalist position, and in doing so they coincide with employees from the private sector, coinciding with the predominant definition of the Valencian population. However, the permanent salaried employees in the public sector (civil servants) find themselves closer to a Spanish unionist position. The field of economic relations and that of state structures lead us down different paths, and the position of Valencia's economic elites are not those the closest to unionism, but rather it is that of the political elite civil servants. This distribution locates the identity conflict in the sphere of bureaucracy itself, as it is also among the public workers where we find the largest presence of Valencian nationalists. Therefore, the difficulty in developing an alternative to the Spanish definition lies in the presence of the state structure itself, staffed mainly by workers with unionist views, rather than in the weakness of the Valencian business community which is certainly more inclined towards regionalist positions, hinting at the theory of the decapitation of Valencian society (Fuster, 1962; Mira, 1997).

**Language as an identifying trait**

Language usually plays a highly significant role in the construction of collective identities and in the Valencian case it assumes a crucial leading role (Ninyoles, 1969; Piqueras, 1996). The process of replacing Valencian with Castilian Spanish has progressed greatly since the 1960s, with prominent state intervention in the political, educational, and communicational systems.
The use of Castilian Spanish was promoted in all these public spheres, with Valencian being confined to private use. Furthermore, in order to speed up the declining use of Valencian in the public sphere, the secessionism of Valencian has also been fostered, with anti-Catalan sentiment encouraged among the Valencian population.

The result is that in Valencia the key oral and written active skills in Valencian, i.e. knowing how to speak and write the language, are not what discriminate between national positions there. Specifically, they do not differentiate regionalist positions from unionist ones: both groups display diglossic behaviour in relation to Valencian (Ninyoles, 1971). It is only written skills, whether active (knowing how to write) or passive (knowing how to read), which establish distinctions, separating the nationalist Valencian positions from every other kind of Spanish identity, including regionalist identity.

This has important consequences in terms of the performativity of a possible alternative identity, and in structuring the field of symbolic relations. The written skills, which are more formal and acquired during schooling, are possessed by a small part of the Valencian population (the Valencian language was incorporated into the educational system in 1983, and a part of the population can also exempt themselves from learning it at school). However, active oral skills (knowing how to speak), are more widely distributed among the population. With this situation, in Valencia, the national conflict occurs between a minority that knows written Valencian and a majority that do not know it. In other words: Valencian national identity is not spoken in Valencian, it is only written, with the social effects that this has on its capacity for dissemination and circulation.

This division in skills leads us to linguistic secessionism and the self-interest dispute over Valencia-related legislation, which facilitates the rupture between oral and written skills, and hinders the link between Valencian language and a possible alternative national community to the Spanish one. Also, although the apparent value placed on Valencian is extremely low, it is the value dimension (opinions) and not the instrumental dimension (use), which discriminates between the different national positions. The relative instrumental lack of relevance of Valencian as an identity trait, can be explained due to the lack of appreciation of the collective identity linked to the use of the language. That is to say, in Valencia where you are from bears less weight than how you rate the Valencian language. This shows the lack of indifference and the high emotive triggering of linguistic attitudes, as an expression of the doubts that the language itself generates among the Valencian population, including (and most importantly) the Valencian-speaking population.

Conflict regarding identity and performativity

All this may seem highly contradictory, but indeed Josep Vicent Marqués previously stated that “Valencian reality is contradictory” at the start of his País Perplejo (1974, p. 11), outlining the existence of what he called a murky conscience, and what Ariño and Llopis call the Valencian anomaly (1993).

If we recall the definition of legitimation provided by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 120-121), by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) or by Habermas (1973), the capacity for legitimation is achieved via the coincidence of cognitive schema and objective structures. We have just pointed out, for example, how attempts have been made to upset the cognitive definition of the language of Valencians in relation to its use and objective existence. Thus, discourses are constructed with legitimisation hurdles due to the dissonance between what they want to be and what they are, and the high level of emotive triggering stemming from this. The effect is that we not only find ourselves facing a conflict of identities but also a conflict about identities: what is being questioned is the legitimacy of the proposed national identities.

This lack of legitimacy reinforces performativity problems. Adherence to positions more in favour of their legitimacy does not represent the majority, especially positions defending a rift from the Spanish
definition. With no legitimate nationalist discourse, there is no nation: the relative presence of the Valencian nationalist stance is low; however, unionism does not represent a majority position either as it is surpassed by regionalism.

Also, the general structure has not enabled the participation of Valencian nationalism in the creation of a socially predominant discourse. In fact, in País Valencià, unionists and regionalists account for around three quarters of the population; they engage in a conflict regarding the centralisation–decentralisation of the state, more than a national conflict. Therefore, Valencian nationalist discourse has been excluded from the field of relations, and as Bourdieu would assert, its symbolic capital has proven relatively insignificant.

In fact, up until very recently, it was practically impossible to predict the position on nationalism depending on associations with the political-party system; the Valencian parliamentary system does not express any national conflict (Beltrán, 1994; Franch, 1996; Mira, 1994). The lack of a stable Valencian parliamentary reference during the transition has made it difficult to perceive a Valencian political structure as a plausible alternative to the Spanish one. We cannot forget that the regional electoral limit of 5% throughout the entire autonomous region has meant that when the Valencian nationalists have obtained parliamentary representation they have done so alongside a party from the state sector, with a Spanish definition of the Valencian reality.

CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions lead us to put forward three arguments to explain the minimal impact achieved by alternative definitions to the one proposed by Spanish politics. These are arguments to which we must add the effects of state structural intervention on Valencian reality, with policies aimed at dismantling attributes with the potential to promote a desire for collective power, which might challenge the Spanish definition.

Political vagueness

In Valencia, apparently, language is the only attribute with a certain capacity for political construction. However, this capacity rests only on the assessment of the language expressed through opinions, and not on its public use. If language has an effective political function when used in the public sphere, among the Valencian population it fails to move beyond a secondary or potential role. Therefore, one of the effects of the diglossia has been to maintain the political function of language as an underlying force in the collective construction of Valencian society.

Secondly, among the Valencian population we do not find a proper territorial reference that has an impact on defining the policy for an alternative identity to the Spanish one. It is not the case that there is incompatibility between the Spanish territorial identification and the Valencian one; that does not exist. Rather, in the Valencian definition, the territory does not even come into play. This shortcoming also has devastating effects on the economic model and the destructive way in which the territory has been used, and also the lack of impetus in protests against the state in relation to issues such as funding or infrastructures.

Thirdly, we would like to add vagueness in relation to the construction of a them-and-us relationship between the people of Valencia and the other peoples belonging to the Spanish state. The most striking aspect is that the Valencian collective reference has no relevance, either positively or negatively, it simply does not come into play. Nor is there any negative collective reference for the rest of Spain, therefore we cannot detect others: from the Valencian point of view, in Spain we are all one. However, some positive references do appear that construct a hybrid Valencian us: between Catalan and Manchego identity. This result brings to mind the hypothesis of Mollà and Mira (1986) regarding the creolisation of Valencians. This is a hybrid construct which encourages more Spanish identification.

In terms of political definition, we therefore find ourselves with a language that has shadow effects (not effective ones), a non-existent territory and
a Valencian *us* constructed out of a mixture of Catalan and Manchego identity, with no reference for *otherness* among the rest of the Kingdom of Spain. Could there be any greater political vagueness? As Fuster put it, “Neither meat nor fish”.

Part of this vagueness can be attributed to the alternative discourse itself, to the extent that there are no significant differences between *Valencian nationalism* and the other groups, regarding the existence of a territorial unit in itself and the non-existence of a Valencian collective reference. The only language factor is a defined nationalist variable, and it stands out due to greater public use of Valencian, i.e. the political effectiveness of the language. However, this linguistic effectiveness does not significantly distinguish this group from *regionalists*. This confirms that a language without a territorial reference does not create a nation, but rather a region (Keating, 1996; Linz, 1985).

*A murky consciousness*

The murky consciousness is based in the high level of identification with the Spanish territory, the lack of linguistic appreciation of Valencian (diglossia), and the hybrid perception of identity itself. Thus, problems do not emerge so much with regard to what one wants to be, but rather in the perception of what one is. This is a kind of cognitive dissonance and the affected population is local: those that use Valencian as their mother tongue, those that use it on a regular basis, those that identify more closely with the Valencian territory, and those that express most sympathy for the Valencians. This clearly poses a question relating to the descriptive, pragmatic, and evaluative information that refers to identity itself.

It is worth highlighting an aspect deriving from this dissonance that is very important when it comes to determining the nationalist positions of Valencians: *anti-Catalan prejudice* (Bello, 1988; Flor, 2011). This prejudice operates within the framework of a murky consciousness and it especially affects the local population, and those with regionalist tendencies. Thus, while a lack of political definition was especially linked to nationalist Valencian positions, this cognitive contradiction is more linked to regionalist positions.

*The incompatibility between Valencian nationalists and regionalists*

The combination of vagueness and a murky consciousness has led to an incompatibility between the definitions of the Valencian reality between Valencia’s nationalists and regionalists, with the backdrop of anti-Catalan sentiment. An insurmountable wall has separated them over the last few decades. As a consequence, in the Valencian case, regionalism has not been a pre-political stage for a possible alternative national identity, as Núñez points out (1998). In the Valencian case, the effect has been the opposite: *regionalism* has been a retaining wall holding back *nationalism*.

Indeed, territorial identification, the valuing of the Valencian language and anti-Catalan sentiment are dimensions that bring Valencian *regionalists* and *nationalists* into conflict with one another. This confrontation arises out of a combination of the vagueness of nationalist territory and the regionalist linguistic difference. This is a situation that will only be able to change if either territorial vagueness or linguistic dissonance are disabled, or even more so, if both are. In this regard, the Valencian *nationalist* movement has taken the most effective steps forward so far (Mezquida, 2015).

Ultimately, the combination of territorial vagueness, linguistic dissonance and anti-Catalan sentiment have contributed to the fact that, at present, alternative definitions to the Spanish one have not attained the social recognition required to pose a serious challenge to the state. Indeed, the Spanish proposal is one with devastating effects on the politics, economy, and culture of Valencian society. Indeed, one only has to look at the development of events and data over the last few decades, in each and every field relating to Valencian social structure. This devastation would have been more difficult to perpetrate if Valencian society had offered a stronger alternative to Spanish identity.
REFERENCES


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**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

Rafael Castelló-Cogollos has a PhD in Sociology (University of Valencia) and is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the University of Valencia (1989). He has worked specifically on issues related to national identity, linguistic practices, demographics, and political sociology with reference to Valencia and has participated in several collective projects analysing the Valencian social structure.
ABSTRACT
Mature economies tend to invest less in new construction and more in maintenance and management. This is particularly important in the case of Spain, which in addition to being a mature economy presents a huge excess capacity in all interurban modes, and particularly in the radial corridors. The key to a reorganisation of the infrastructure policy in a hypothetical state that recognises itself as multinational is the transfer of management to units forming the federation; in some cases, ownership should be transferred as well. In this regard, this paper presents a new model of infrastructure policy for a different Spain, and it does so by taking advantage of lessons taught from other infrastructure policies widely applied in parts of Europe and the US.

Keywords: territorial policy, transport, management, funding.

INTRODUCTION
Mental frameworks set invisible boundaries—invisible but effective—to ideas. Considering proposals of infrastructure policy in Spain from a plurinational perspective inevitably leads to the imposition of restrictions imposed by proposals of generalisable application to Spain as a whole. This will happen until one realises that thinking from a plurinational perspective breaks away from this restriction, itself enforced by a generalisable proposal. Indeed, this is the heir to Jacobin federalism, the only federalism that has held the potential promise of progress in Spain since the traumatic collapse of the First Republic in 1874. This issue is pivotal in the debate on potential changes in the infrastructure and transport policies, because the recent past has commonly witnessed condemning statements that have put paid to the debate. These include statements like: “But X only wants this”; or “Then everyone will want it and it cannot be given to everyone” (note, incidentally, the mutually exclusive character of both arguments).

Here, in fact, lies the key to the heart of the matter. A plurinational perspective demands conceptions based on the fact that something is desired either by just one or by everyone, to be put aside. Because just as plurinationality is not something generalisable, the ability to generalise cannot be a requirement of the policy model in a plurinational state (although it can sometimes be a convenient aspect from the technical and operational standpoint of the policy itself). This has, on the one hand, a symbolic dimension: the nation; and on the other, a very concrete dimension: the state, the distribution of power.
Within this context, the infrastructure policy model, implying the distribution of political power in relation to infrastructure, has a special relevance. This is because this policy has been one of the most relentless instruments applied by the State in pursuit of its goal to construct a single nation (Bel, 2010), namely, the Castilian-based Spanish nation. This constitutes a specific policy that is part of a general orientation of Spanish public policy, which began in the 18th century and became more ingrained in the 19th century. Since then, the following concept has been consolidated: for the political-administrative construction of the modern Spanish State “everything should be planned, ordered and supervised from a nerve centre, a capital, a headquarters of government” (Álvarez, 2001:535). To be precise, one of the first areas to which this trend was applied was territorial homogenisation, with “the non-explicit objective (and possibly unaware, in as much as they believed in the reality of the nation) being that it was to give an ‘image of unity’ of the social body” (Álvarez, 2001:535). This is an observation that corresponds perfectly with the view of Benedict Anderson (1983) on nationalism as a project for the implantation of constructed national cultures to create the imagined community. This approach also connects well with the vision that Hobsbawm (1990) sketches of nationalism as the top-down creation of an institutional and social structure, with the creation of infrastructure policy for it being instrumental. In this light, it is easier to understand statements made by the Minister of Development, Magdalena Álvarez, regarding the policy of extending the high-speed railway in Spain: “We are sewing Spain [together] with steel cables. This is the real way to make a country, to defend the unity of Spain: to sew it together with steel threads” (interview published in several peripheral newspapers on May 11, 2008). Or a more recent affirmation by another Minister of Development, Ana Pastor: “The Spanish AVE (high-speed train) makes us equal” (Informe Semanal TVE, April 21, 2012). It is not at all common to find justifications of this kind in the infrastructure policies of neighbouring countries.

This text proposes, first of all, to provide a diagnosis of the instrumental function of the infrastructure policy in the construction of the Spanish nation. Then, I will go on to illustrate some of its most relevant results within the context of our discussion. Finally, I will propose changes to the institutional design in the ambit of infrastructures and, therefore, competence in the applicable policies, in a way that encompasses a plurinational approach (far) more appropriately.

THE CENTRALISED STATE: GENESIS, GROWTH, AND SPLENDOUR

A little over 300 years ago, the end of the War of Spanish Succession brought with it the political unification of the Hispanic monarchy. The utter control of the monarch over the policies and estates of both the Crown of Castile (which he had previously held) and of the territories of the Crown of Aragon empowered him to make policies applicable to all the territory that now forms Spain. Thus he used this faculty to implant the French model of absolute centralisation of power (Álvarez, 2001; Vicens, 1996 [1952]).

The inaugural landmark of the centralised state dates to the general regulations for the management and government of the major mail and postal offices in Spain (Reglamento General para la Dirección y Gobierno de los Oficios de Correo Mayor y Postas de España). These were promulgated by Felipe V on April 23, 1720 during his journey, establishing the character of royal highways and, therefore, setting a priority action targeting eight routes, six of which converged in Madrid. Later on, due

1 The fact that, as suggested by the interesting work by Grafe (2013), the monarchy was unsuccessful in achieving its goals (unlike the French case) does not make any less valid the observation that these goals were pursued with determination and at any cost.

2 This thesis is more extensively developed in Bel (2010) and Bel (2011). Significantly, the English edition of d’Espanya, capital París is entitled Infrastructure and the political economy of nation building in Spain, 1720-2010 (Bel, 2012).
to the fact that the municipalities responsible for funding these roads and lanes did not do so diligently, the priority established by King Fernando VI promulgated the Royal Writ, in 1747, which established the possibility of financing the royal highways, alone, by means of the Crown treasures. Note that for the first time in the history of Spain (whatever the meaning of Spain might be), the State directly assumed financial responsibility for the construction of roads. Shortly thereafter, in 1761, Carlos III launched a highways plan, which ultimately excluded the two planned routes that did not converge in Madrid. Consequently, there were just six, which all converged therein, coinciding with the current highways known today as A1 through to A6. Thus, the current map of motorways in Spain is, largely, heir to these three provisions laid down in the eighteenth century.

The second milestone in the development of the centralised state was the extension of the railway network in the second half of the 19th century. The initial deployment of the railway was generally based on the demand of existing traffic (except for the Madrid-Aranjuez line, promoted by the future Marqués de Salamanca) in the mid-nineteenth century. It was therefore concentrated around a series of routes, the funding of which was the responsibility of private investors. Concerns about the situation of rail isolation threatening Madrid was one of the main factors leading to the promulgation of general legislation, established by the General Railways Act, of 1855 (Mateo, 1978, p. 56). In summary, this law established the preferential character of five radial lines that were to connect Madrid with different ports and borders of the peninsula. These lines consumed practically all of the huge volume of budgetary resources allocated to subsidising the construction of the railway. Later, the second Ley de Ferrocarriles (railways law) of 1870, contemplated the radial line in the north-west as preferential, and it set the priority of connecting Madrid with all the Provincial capitals throughout the peninsula, drawing the cost from all necessary public resources. Analyses of the infrastructure and transport services policies applied in the 18th and 19th centuries show that the legal norms and the state budget were used to organise political power and to meet the needs of the Crown and its capital (Bel, 2010). This gained special importance as of the decade 1840, when an effective state control was established by centralised interests in Madrid, the capital in which “liberalism should become the hub of centralised governmental machinery” (Carr, 1970:203).

This was done irrespective of the priorities of the economic system and the needs of connecting hubs of economic production. The latter were systematically left out of the established priorities, and were therefore placed in the rearguard when it came to the allocation of state funding (in the event such funding was applicable). The administrative and political goals—namely the construction of the nation—were subordinate to the efficiency of the transport and its contribution to productivity of the economy. Indeed, it always enjoyed a higher rank.

At this point, it could be argued that these decisions created what is called path dependence. That would explain why this model was to be applied in the future, without necessarily following the objective of national construction, but rather as a natural continuation of an allocation dynamic stemming from an initial accidental event, such as the highway policies of the 18th century or railways of the 19th century. However, this thesis clashes with a necessary requirement to affirm path dependence. It is not possible to state that it is a natural evolution of the market, without further exogenous interventions required for the evolutionary dynamics of the economy.

3 This is the thesis exhibited in the work of Myro, Martí, and Rey (2014), presented at the International Conference of Regional Science 2014 (Zaragoza), which has not yet been published. Their results contradict those obtained in the simulation of extending the road network published by Adamatzky and Alonso-Sanz (2011) using the plasmodium model organism, Physarum polycephalum. This organism has been adopted as a model for a large number of studies due to its Amoeboid movement and cellular motility.

4 To gain greater insight into the meaning and characteristics of path dependence, see David (2007).
In the practical field, this path dependence hypothesis is refuted by the sequence of events in the subsequent modernisation of infrastructures, the network of busy highways (motorways and tolls). Since the state’s budgetary availability was very small at the beginning of the 1960s, the government decided to begin to implement user-financed highways, by introducing tolls. The decision to use tolls led to the first major motorways, which followed the routes with highest traffic density and increased growth potential, i.e., those skirting the Mediterranean corridor and the Ebro valley. However, in the mid-1980s the model changed in favour of funding and developing highways with financing from the public budget. At this point the priorities adopted were the six radial routes formerly established in the highway policies of the 18th century. This was the case, and several non-radial routes with higher traffic intensities were postponed in favour of radial motorways.

The validity of the pattern of radial prioritisation irrespective of demand in infrastructural development is found again in the most recent modernisation, that of the implantation of the high-speed railway (AVE), which has been funded entirely on state budgetary finances. Again, the priority lines chosen are the six classic radial routes. In fact, the Barcelona-Valencia route was the one with greatest traffic density before the implantation of the AVE, and even today there is still a single-track stretch (L’Hospitalet-Tarragona; the last forecast of the entry into the service of a two-track infrastructure is 2017). This stretch lacks the technical benefits of the AVE, as well as being insufficient to meet the demands of freight transport by rail, which is a critical factor affecting the Mediterranean corridor, the channel for most of the country’s exports from the mainland.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS SPANISH INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATION

Let us look more closely at this pattern of the radial connection of Spanish infrastructures, generally financed by the state budget. This is so in the case of overland networks, with a design both of extension and technical benefits regardless of demand. This has resulted in a repetitive mismatch between infrastructure supply and transport demand; indeed, the latter has traditionally been unable to absorb the great endowment provided by the infrastructure. This mismatch was criticised by Jovellanos back in the 18th century (Jovellanos, 1795), and in 1867 by a special commission in charge of proposing a general plan for railways (Special Commission, 1867). With regard to the latest infrastructure policies, the mismatch between supply and demand has been documented and analysed by Bel (2010) and Albalate, et al. (2015).

In recent decades, the railway (and as part of this, the high-speed tracks) and highways (particularly motorways) have been the modes of transport that have consumed most of the infrastructure-related investment in Spain. We do not know the precise amount of money invested in the AVE high-speed railway, since there is no public information providing total investment figures for the construction of the tracks and stations. The data compiled and estimated by Albalate and Bel (2011, 2012) place the accumulated investment up until 2010 at about 50,000 million Euros (constant data). By the end of 2016, the accumulated investment volume, executed or contracted, can be placed at between 60,000 and 70,000 million Euros (constant data). This huge investment of public funds has meant that the Spanish AVE network now has an extension of over 3,100 km in service, making it the second largest in the world in absolute terms, after China, and the first in relative terms, considering any relativisation factor (population, surface, GDP, etc.). For example, the density of the Spanish network in relation to the French network (the next largest in terms of extension in Europe) exceeds it by 50% in terms of km/inhabitant, leaving the remaining European countries far behind.

5 Other additional factors have also contributed to the excess in supply. For example, the importance of the public works construction sector in Spain and its close relationship with Spanish governmental institutions (Bel, Estache and Forcaud, 2014).
Furthermore, if we consider the network under construction, the superiority of the Spanish one is even more impressive.

By contrast, the density of use of the Spanish AVE railway network at the beginning of this decade, whether measured in passenger/km or passenger*km, was much lower than in other countries; For example, passengers*km for the AVE network in Spain equate around 1/5 of those in France, 1/4 of those in Germany, and 2/5 of Italy (Albalae et al., 2015). The trend in these differences has doubtless been aggravated, given that since then a large number of kilometres with low-density traffic have been launched.

The motorways network in Spain is also the most extensive in the whole of the European Union, there are well over 15,000 km of toll motorways plus toll-free highways or motorways (this figure is about 17,000 km if we add the dual-carriageways, according to the last annual report of the Ministry of Development, for 2014). According to the homogeneous data provided by Eurostat for EU countries, the kilometres of motorway in Spain in terms of population (per million inhabitants) far exceeds 300, well above comparative countries. In fact, this figure is only surpassed by Slovenia and Cyprus, countries that are difficult to compare given their characteristics. Notwithstanding, in this case also, having the longest network does not imply the largest traffic volume. According to recent OECD data, traffic density (passenger-km per km of motorway) in Italy was 4.3 times higher than in Spain, in France 2.8 times higher, and in Germany 2.6 times (Albalate et al., 2015).

The mismatch between supply and demand in Spain is also found in non-terrestrial modes of transport. Spain has the most airports apt for international commercial traffic of any country in continental Europe, enabling it to demand higher cost standards. It should be pointed out that in the air-travel sector the intensity of use of airports is not comparatively as low as in the terrestrial modes, since the Spanish market, together with the German one, stands out among those in continental Europe. Despite this fact, many Spanish airports register null or marginal regular traffic. In 2015, up to 14 airports managed by AENA (a 100% publicly-owned company until 2001, mixed ownership since then, and always under the control of the Ministry of Development) have been used by less than 50,000 passengers. The panorama in the ports is similar. Ports of the state are dependent on the Ministry of Development, which has control over all 50 of them, declared of general interest. Albalate et al., 2015 have constructed the investment ratio for accumulated/traffic in tonnes, obtaining a figure of 6.2 Euros per tonne for the period 2005-2010 This figure is: 3 times higher than that of Italy and Germany, 3.7 times higher than that of Portugal, and 7 times higher than that of France and thus, represents a highly significant supply surplus.

For any economist with some knowledge of transport, this outstanding mismatch between supply and demand is a clear indication of the inefficiency of the infrastructure and transport policy. In recent years, empirical work has been published showing inefficiency in different sectors of infrastructure and transport in Spain. Generally speaking, and given the investments made in all modes of intercity transport, they promote the political objectives of centralisation (Bertomeu and Estache, 2016). Considering these results on the infrastructure policy in Spain, the changes in related planning, financing and management models could serve a twofold objective: (1) to achieve characteristics that are more consistent with a country that recognises plurinationality and recognises itself as a plurinational reality, both in the symbolic dimension and in terms of political power; and (2) improve its contribution to productivity and social welfare.

6 The same has happened with new airports with territorial ownership such as Lleida-Alguaire (autonomic), Ciudad Real (private, already closed to regular commercial traffic), Castellón (owned by the Diputación Provincial [provincial council]), and the international airport of the region of Murcia (autonomic).
AN INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY MODEL FOR A PLURINATIONAL SPAIN

This section is divided into different subsections, each of which refers to a mode of long-distance transport.

Road infrastructures

In general, the current system of government in Spain distributes the responsibilities for roads as follows: those that are of an interregional nature are competence of the general state administration, whereas intra-autonomic roads are under regional or provincial responsibility. Focusing on the high-capacity road network (motorways and toll roads), it must be said that it is already fully deployed in practically all road corridors in Spain. This explains the vast number of kilometres of highway referred to in the previous section.

Note that the most well-established handbooks for guidance on the need for infrastructure and service levels, such as the U.S. Highway Capacity Manual, places the threshold from which high capacity highways are needed on an average daily traffic (ADT) intensity at some 15,000 vehicles (a figure that is reduced to 10,000 when there is persistent congestion due to the design or significant proportion of heavy vehicles). However, in Spain, roads have been built with an ADT intensity of less than 5,000 vehicles and a tiny volume of trucks, such as the Benavente-Zamora A66. Moreover, the existing plans of the Ministry of Development even contemplate routes with an ADT intensity under 2,000 vehicles, such as Huelva-Zafra, Cuenca-Teruel, or Alcolea del Pinar-Caminreal, without any specific justification.

Clearly, apart from some very localised blank points, the endowment of high-capacity roads in Spain has long gone beyond reason and one of the consequences of this is that the maintenance and reconditioning requirements of this large-capacity network are continually growing. In this situation, a significant improvement in the planning, funding, and road management model would be for the regions (should they wish) to take charge of the powers related to the state network running through their territory. This would involve both maintenance and reconditioning responsibilities, such as decisions related to funding these tasks, so they could choose to finance them under their budget, or through user-tolls, or other alternative formulas.

There is no reason to believe that the effectiveness of sub-central governments would be less than that of central government in this area, but it is reasonable to think otherwise. For example, sub-central governments can be more responsive to citizen preferences in terms of resolving blank spots and poorly serviced sections. On the other hand, and quite relevant in the case of Spain, this would help to streamline the system (which has become increasingly irrational), of funding state highways, since the territorial discrepancies in the use of toll roads are important. Thus, the citizens in each region could decide whether they prefer user payment (residents in the region itself mostly) or allocate funds from the budget to fund maintenance and reconditioning of the roads, by raising taxes or reducing other public expenditure.

This system is not original; it already exists in the USA. Most highways in the US were planned and built by the federal government, as part of the Interstate Highway System, promoted since 1956. More recently, the competencies on interstate highways were transferred to the states themselves, which are responsible for their management and for funding their maintenance and reconditioning. Each state takes the decisions that seem most pertinent to the citizens, and it is not unusual for the same freeway to have a toll in one state but not in the next, and then revert again. Finally, the citizens of each state decide whether to pay tolls or pay more taxes. Clearly to the extent that they internalise the benefits and costs of their decisions, divergences between states do not cause controversies such as those arising in numerous territories of Spain.

7 It should be taken into account that the federal government’s authorisation is necessary to implement tolls on highways financed by federal funds.
In the United States, the regulation concerning elements related to road traffic is almost exclusively state-centred. However, in the case of Spain, it might be desirable for the regulatory powers relating to road safety to be partially retained by the central institutions. Ultimately, it would be somewhat inconvenient to have divergences in matters such as speed limits and other safety regulations, especially in comparatively small territories such as the autonomous regions. In any event, this seems to me a less relevant issue, from the perspective of the attribution of competencies according to governmental level, than that of managing the infrastructure itself.

The sub-central management of motorways is not exclusive to the US alone. It also exists in Spain now. Noteworthy are the cases of the provinces in the Basque Country and Navarra, which have the competence of managing the roads that run through their territory. Also the autonomous regions of the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands are responsible for all terrestrial infrastructures in their respective areas.

**Railways: networks and services**

Railways have very different characteristics to roads. The railway network is not characterised by atomised and free access, but it has traditionally been monopolised by state-private companies in its origin, with specific exceptions such as the Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat or the narrow-gauge railways (FEVE). At present, the incipient liberalisation of freight transport by rail is subject to strict regulation, because there is greater rigidity in the granting of user rights, and service coordination needs are very strong, so the integrated management of the railway network seems a reasonable option. This perspective is directly applied to long-distance passenger railway routes as well as freight. However, it is also noteworthy that countries like the US and Japan have territorially segregated control, ownership, and management of medium-and long-distance railway infrastructures, without any technically relevant problems.

However, the case of short-distance rail services is different, as are those of a regional nature. The main function is to organise metropolitan mobility, as well as accessibility of the peripheries to the regional centres of population. Management has undeniable elements of territorial policy that transcend those of the transport of long-distance travellers and of freight, in which the elements of transport and mobility dominate (or should dominate) totally. That is why territorial management of local and regional railway services makes sense (as well as that part of the infrastructure that is not used in a systematic way for long-distance passenger services).

The notion of territorial management of the local and regional services is quite common in the developed world, and is even common in countries like France. With respect to Spain, Catalonia has advanced in this direction with the transfer of suburban services, but the inability of the Catalan Government to act on infrastructure has been a source of frustration at both the institutional and, especially, the user level. Thus, we should bear in mind that a history of systematic disparity in investments among the different commuter-train systems in Spain has led to appreciable differences in the capacity of the services.

**Airports (and ports, by analogy)**

As explained above, practically all Spanish commercial airports are managed in an integrated and centralised way by a company, AENA, which was partially privatised in 2015. However, the Spanish government still maintains the majority shareholding and control of its management. This implies that all the airports are considered to be a single infrastructure. Among EU and Anglo-Saxon (and OECD) countries, Spain is the only one of its size and population where airports are subject to integrated management, and where management and ownership belong mainly to the central government.
The fact there is not a policy of own service provision (and investment, tariffs, and commercial plan) for airports may have been one of the main factors explaining the major discrepancies between the profitability levels of each of airport (it is worth pointing out here that Madrid airport has recorded poor profitability since 2013, after major losses between 2007 and 2012). Indeed, many airports with regular services show negative results.

When it comes to discussing which direction we should take in the area of airport (and port) management, we must separate the control of air (or maritime) navigation,—which should continue to be managed centrally as a reference point, perhaps by the EU in the future—and that of airports (and ports). It need not be problematic for the formal ownership of airports to continue (initially) in the hands of the general state administration, within a framework in which contracts or management concessions are sufficiently long-lasting for continued state ownership not to distort the autonomy of their management. Decisions on how to address the management of each of the airports should be transferred to consortia comprising different levels of government, and which could incorporate private non-profit organisations. In principle, it would be desirable for local governments to have a leading role in these consortia, and given the current institutional reality of Spain, it would also be advisable to also consider inclusion of the regional administrations.

It would not make much technical or functional sense for the government to be present in these authorities. Furthermore, there would be other elements that would preserve the capacity for action and supervision at the level of central government: control of air navigation, maintenance and ownership of the installations, exercise of the regulatory powers considered opportune, and management of funds to subsidise designated airports, among others. The consortia responsible for the management of each airport could establish management contracts with managerial companies that could be either mixed (public-private) or private. The partial privatisation of AENA makes it difficult to think, in the short term, of the complete public management of companies (we shall return to this issue later), in contrast to what may happen with ports. Although legislative, institutional, and regulatory frameworks should be the same for each airport, the specific characteristics of the managerial companies need not be identical in each and every case. It would be advisable to grant a broad degree of discretion, in this regard, to the consortia responsible for their management. The airport management company should be assigned the following functions:

– Pricing: This capacity may be limited by the supervision of competing authorities. It is worth mentioning, however, that recent international experience indicates that tariff regulation does not need to be too restrictive, even in cases where management companies are usually totally private. (e.g., Australia and the United Kingdom). On the one hand, the interaction between representatives of local or regional interests and management companies and, on the other, the possibility of establishing restrictions in the event of monopolistic pricing practices, would allow for the moderation of preventive regulation.

– Investment decisions: These should be left completely in the hands of the airport management companies. In dynamic terms, to avoid inefficiency, it should be taken into account that when the end of the management contract or the concession approaches, agreements on investments should be reached with the administration responsible for concession or contract renewal.

– Lastly, to the extent that airports are designated to receive subsidies that facilitate their operation (assimilated into what would be public service obligations), investments in these airports should be agreed between their management companies and those responsible for the administration of subsidies.

9 Individual airport-level financial data between 2009 and 2012 can be found in Betancor, et al. (2013).
– Decisions on landing and takeoff rights (slots): These decisions are dependent on EU regulation, although certain areas of discretion may arise in some cases. These should be left to the management companies.

– Trade policy: the promotion of services offered by the airport. In particular, relations with airline companies at the airport level. Different companies set different objectives for each airport. Each airport should be able to have a trade policy, which should respond to the objectives of the airport itself. This is a basic and inevitable point in the management of airports in the future.

As mentioned above, the regulatory authority should remain within the ambit of the general state administration, and should preferably be exercised by a separate regulatory agency. This same agency could be responsible for the management of the funds required to finance the public service obligations (PSOs) instituted with respect to those airports designated to fulfil this PSO function, when its operation is not financially self-sufficient. With regard to the provision of funds to finance deficits at airports designated as PSOs, it would be preferable for them to have budgetary control. However, it could be more feasible and operational, as is the case in Canada, to establish a nurtured fund with contributions from airports that have financial returns, albeit in a transitory manner.

In any event, overestimations of PSO designated airport financial subsidy requirements are unnecessary: AENA data for 2014 suggest that the sum of operating deficits for all the airports with negative results is around 200 million (and not all these airports are PSOs). Furthermore, the individualisation of management is likely to result in improved efficiency at lower-traffic airports, which would reduce the amount of the subsidies required.

These reform guidelines, which would promote an airport system very similar to those existing in comparable countries in the region of Spain, have been reported on several occasions, for example by Bel and Fageda (2011). The work by these authors was referred to in the report providing an evaluation and recommendations for the Spanish economy made by the European Commission in 2012 (European Commission, 2013, p. 28). The partial privatisation of AENA in 2015 has hampered its implementation, and its potential total privatisation in the future would do so even more.

One practical option would be to segregate airports run by AENA—at the regional level if regional administration were willing—maintaining a public-private sector shared capital structure, like the one existing at the time of secession. Individual management would be implemented at the airport level, although in most regions this would not be a central issue. In this respect, it should be taken into account that, for reasons of promotion and defence of competition, obligatory segregation of the airport group could be desirable. This would be very similar to what the UK Competition Commission did in the latter part of the last decade. This commission obliged BAA, owner of the main airports in London and Scotland, to sell two of its three airports in London (Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted; the last two were sold), and one of its two main airports in Scotland (Glasgow and Edinburgh; the latter was sold).

Note also that the individualisation of port management would not have to face the practical difficulties that the partial privatisation of AENA (a centralised monopoly) has imposed on airport reforms, even though they are similar to airports, with the exception of details imposed by the different economic characteristics of airports and ports.

**OVERVIEW**

This paper has discussed the instrumental role played by the Spanish infrastructure and transport policies in the construction of national centralisation. The paper also highlights some of the consequences of this model, and a series of desirable guidelines for the future of planning, financing, and management of infrastructure in Spain. Undoubtedly, many of the specific details of the proposals put forward here are debatable and improvable. However, I consider it advisable to reiterate an important point, which
One last point must be made. The main stumbling block to reforming the infrastructure policy following these guidelines is not technical but political-ideological. Changing the instrumental role of Spain’s infrastructure implies deconstructing the pattern of Spanish national construction: forgetting the desire to create a single nation through the state and formally and institutionally accepting and recognising the plurinational reality of Spain. In my opinion, this change seems too great and transcendent for the Spanish institutions and for a majority of Spanish citizens. Therefore, the odds of its materialisation tend to zero.

affects each and every one of the infrastructures: the need to distinguish between ownership, proper management, and regulation. Taking these distinctions into account can help to achieve a desirable goal, i.e., to make the guidelines proposed herein, a reality.

That said, these proposals (modified in their more technical details) would provide the basis for a model that would be more consistent with a plurinational conceptualisation of Spain, both in terms of symbolic elements (the nation) and the substantive elements of political power (the state).


**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

Germà Bel i Queralt is a senior professor. He graduated in Economics at the Universitat de Barcelona, earned a Master’s Degree in Economics at the University of Chicago, and was awarded his PhD in Economics from the Universitat de Barcelona. He was given the William E. and Frederick C. Mosher Award for the Best Article written by an academic in 2009 from the American Society for Public Administration and won the award for the Best Paper in 2010 from the US Academy of Management. He was also awarded the XIII Premi Catalunya d’Economia (Societat Catalana d’Economia–Institut d’Estudis Catalans) for the best research on Economics in 2011, for the book *España, capital París*, (Barcelona, Destino 2010 [Spanish]; Barcelona, La Campana 2011 [Catalan]).
A trip through the corridors of power:
the evolution of the regional debate in Catalonia

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ABSTRACT
The regional debate has occupied a pre-eminent place in political discussions in Catalonia for several years and both citizens and the political class have been engaged in fierce debate on the subject. Moves towards independence in Catalonia and the demands made by other parts of Spain have shaken up the national and regional issue and forced political parties to take positions and come up with proposals for accommodating demands for a pluri-national state and for regional decentralisation. This paper gives a perspective on how citizens and parties have changed their positions on Catalonia as a region and as a nation. Through the analysis of survey data and parties’ manifesto proposals, we show the size of the political changes and the direction they have taken. The paper ends by setting out future scenarios for Spain’s regional model and the main points of agreement and of disagreement among the various players.

Keywords: decentralisation, pluri-nationalism, public opinion, political parties, surveys, secession, self-determination.

INTRODUCTION
If a political analyst had examined Catalonia ten years ago and compared his findings with the situation now, he would find things had changed greatly. During the period of 2010–2016, many of the attitudes defining Catalan citizens have undergone a sea change. Political behaviour, which was fairly stable up until the end of the first decade of the 21st century, has undergone a remarkable transformation. The result is a new, much more complex panorama of political parties and very different political attitudes. The political analyst from the past would find today’s society one scarred by the economic crisis. He would also find a society that was more politically mobilised and interested in politics. That said, today’s society is less willing to bend to the powers that be, not least because of the endless stream of corruption cases [affecting politicians in general and Spain’s government in particular]. Last but not least, a sizeable chunk of Catalonia’s citizenry has changed its preferences regarding the regional organisation of the state. Put another way, the number of citizens who support the regional status quo—Spain’s so-called autonomous community model—is much lower than it was a decade ago.
In today’s fast-changing world, it is all too easy to overlook this sea-change in Catalan politics. This paper offers a panoramic analysis of the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish State from the post-dictatorship institution of self-government. Two intertwined strands are examined. One is the change in citizens’ attitudes, the other is how these attitudes have changed parties’ discourses.

It is well-known in political science that citizens’ attitudes and political discourse follow an endogenous process. Thus, it is hard to unpick citizens’ views from political discourse, given that the latter often changes in the light of public opinion. We therefore warn the reader that this paper does not seek a causal mechanism explaining attitudinal and behavioural changes whether in the political elites or in the general public. Such an aim would require more sophisticated methods than those used here. Instead, the paper’s aim is show the reader both the scope and the direction of the changes that have taken place during this period. This is important for we can only know whither we are bound if we know whence we have come.

**A CONFRONTATIONAL REGIONAL MODEL**

After forty years of General Franco’s dictatorship, Catalonia’s 1979 Statute of Autonomy marked the recovery of Catalonia’s self-government and opened a scenario in which Catalan institutions could decide on matters lying within their powers.

The Sau Statute was drawn up following a series of agreements between Spain’s central government and the Catalan government. The fact that no party had an absolute majority in Spain’s Parliament meant that votes from regional parties were needed to govern the country. Hence the central government’s willingness to make concessions. These agreements led to the creation of an ambiguous regional model during Spain’s transition to democracy. The model reflected a confused mixture of...
of ideas on regional government and put off the roll out of self-government until after approval of Spain’s Constitution and any decisions the Constitutional Tribunal might make. The model finally adopted cut back the initial proposals for self-government and was one in which central government kept the whip hand. Pressure from Spain’s army and other key players also shaped the model: the idea was that its shortcomings could be dealt with later in a piecemeal fashion.

The failed coup d’état on the February 23, 1981 redefined Spain’s regional model. Spain’s Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, abbreviated to PSOE), after years governing the country, passed the Autonomous Government Harmonisation Act (Spanish acronym: LOAPA). The Act set out to extend the model of autonomous government on the one hand, and to cut back on the degree of self-government in Spain’s regions on the other. Although many of LOAPA’s provisions were declared unconstitutional, it defined a model based on a degree of self-government, symmetric powers in all regions, and a much lower level of shared governance. However, the model was also characterised by considerable instability in self-government given that it was fairly easy for the central government to re-assume powers whenever it saw fit (Guinjoan and Rodon, 2016).

Thus, as shown in the Regional Authority Index, Catalonia’s powers in relation to self-government (the ability to design its own policies in various fields), at least at the formal level, is slightly below that of regions in Federal States in countries that are generally highly politically and economically decentralised. By in contrast, Spain’s regional model exhibits a very low degree of shared government (that is to say, the regions’ abilities to influence central government decisions); little regulation of Spain’s pluri-national nature; and a very weak federal political culture (perhaps as a result of all the foregoing factors; Rodon, 2015b).

**Figure 2: Self-government and shared government. Regions**

![Figure 2: Self-government and shared government. Regions](source: Regional Authority Index. Hooghe et al., (2016))
While the regional model’s ambiguity has given some flexibility when it comes to regional development and design, it is also true that Spain’s system of ‘autonomous communities’ has become a legal minefield (Rodon, 2015b). At the beginning of the 1980s and the 2000s, as well as over the last few years, there have been many appeals lodged against state and regional legislation (see Figure 3). The fact that the members of Spain’s Constitutional Court are effectively chosen by the two big national parties (PSOE and Partido Popular, abbreviated to PP) and that the regions have no say (as in most federal states) has undermined the legitimacy of the court in deciding regional issues. This loss of legitimacy is particularly pronounced in the yes of a large chunk of Catalonia’s electorate. Perhaps the clearest case is that of Judgement 31/2010 delivered by The Constitutional Court on The Statute of Catalonia, which was strongly rejected by Catalonia’s institutions and many of its citizens.

In the first stage of Catalan self-government, based on the first data we have available (gathered by the Centre for Sociological Research [the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas in its original Spanish] in 1984), 38% of Catalans then wanted greater self-government. One could argue (and this political point was made) that the (slow) applications of the Statute of Autonomy, with the torturous process of devolving powers, could have led to part of the population demanding more self-government as a way of exerting pressure. Thus, when almost all the powers had been transferred, the issue would merely become one of haggling over their application with central government.

Yet the data reveal that this is not what happened. Far from being satiated by the transfers of power, the percentage of Catalans wanting greater self-government in Catalonia continued to grow. As time went by, the Catalans wishing for more self-government became a sizeable majority, reaching 68.6% in 2012.

Nevertheless, the wish for greater powers of Catalan self-government was not accompanied by a major shift in citizens’ preferences for regional organisation. This is shown by the longitudinal series extracted from the surveys conducted by the Institute of Political and Social Sciences (the Instituto de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales in its original Spanish). These surveys run from the early

**STABILITY AND TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION**

Regional confrontation (whether politically articulated or through the courts) and the wish of Catalan parties to increase Catalonia’s self-government, has been mirrored by trends in Catalan public opinion on the issue.

**Figure 3: Trends in Constitutional confrontation between regional governments and State institutions: 1981–2011**

![Trends in Constitutional confrontation between regional governments and State institutions: 1981–2011](source: Rodon, 2015b)
years of the restoration of democracy. As can be seen in Figure 5, the percentage of respondents ‘in favour’ of independence stayed steady between 1991 and 2002. Even though there was a small peak in those wanting secession between 2003 and 2004, the percentage settled down from 2005 onwards.

Thus, a fairly stable preference regarding the model of regional organisation was the norm. Although Catalans still wanted greater self-government, independence was still not seen as an option. This all began to change from 2010 on. Figure 6 shows this clearly. Up until then, Catalans’ first preference was for an ‘autonomous community’ [self-governing region]—something that could be interpreted as acceptance of the status quo (35-40% of respondents saw it in these terms). The second preference was for a ‘Spanish Federal State’, which attracted close to 30% of support. The third and least popular choice was for Catalonia to become ‘a region of Spain’, attracting support from only 10% of Catalan citizens.

Figure 4: Trends in regional preferences in Catalonia (1984–2012)

![Graph showing trends in regional preferences in Catalonia from 1984 to 2012.]

Source: Centre for Sociological Research (CIS)

Figure 5: Trends in support for independence (1991–2007)

![Graph showing trends in support for independence from 1991 to 2007.]

Source: Institute of Political and Social Sciences (ICPS)
There was a sea change in preferences in the period running from 2010 to the beginning of 2013. In just two years (from 2010 to the end of 2012), the percentage of Catalans wanting independence first and foremost doubled. At the beginning of 2012, independence had become the first choice and by the end of the year, over 45% stated it as their first option. The peak came in 2014, when almost 50% of citizens made it their first choice. This growth in support came at the expense of those supporting the federal option and in particular, those choosing the status quo (the so-called autonomous communities model).

The various data at our disposal indicate a clear trend in citizens’ preferences. The specialised literature has delved into these changes over the last decade and comes to the following preliminary conclusions:

• According to the survey data and election results, between 35% and 40% of Catalonia’s population has a strong preference for independence and between 30% and 35% of the population is opposed to independence. Those in the middle have weaker preferences and, depending on the political context and individual factors, would choose one way or the other.

• This distinction is important when weighing up the reasons that lead a given population segment to lend its support to one option or the other. While those with a strong preference for independence appeal to questions of cultural identity, those with weak preferences use other arguments such as management capabilities or the economy. By contrast, those who oppose independence are more likely to resort to arguments based on identity whether their preference happens to be strong or weak (Muñoz and Tormos, 2015).

• The ideological position of those wanting independence is more left-wing than hitherto. Many of the arguments used by those advocating secession are based on improving living standards and policy management by institutions that are closer to citizens.

• Support for independence has grown throughout Catalonia, especially in the interior. In the Barcelona Metropolitan Area and in Tarragona, one can see local polarisation of political preferences. While the city-centres of Barcelona and Tarragona are clearly in favour of independence, the outskirts reject the idea. Between the two, there are areas where views are more nuanced and there are more ‘don’t-knows’ (Rodon, 2015).

Figure 6: Trends in choice of regional model (2006–2014)

![Figure 6: Trends in choice of regional model (2006–2014)](source: Centre for Sociological Research (CIS))
• The electorate for parties in relation to the independence issue is more homogeneous. This is especially true for the Convergència i Unió (CiU)/ Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) on the one hand, and the Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña (PSC, the Catalan arm of the PSOE) on the other. The exception is Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (ICV-EUiA)/ Catalunya Sí que es Pot (CSQP), which still has an electorate with diverse preferences for a regional model.

• While support for independence has grown among voters, the proportion of ‘don’t knows’ has stayed the same. The latter group can be split into two sub-groups: (1) A group that would vote for independence under certain circumstances (for example, if there were no prospects of changing the central government’s position); (2) a group that either would not support independence or that believes in Spain’s ability to become a Federal State. This group would only vote for independence if an unlikely set of events occurred (for example, repeated failure by the state and Catalan institutions to reach agreement on a referendum).

The early 2000s saw big changes on the political scene with the succession of a new leader in the CiU. The new man was Artur Mas, previously a Minister in Jordi Pujol’s government and the future President of Catalonia. There was broad political agreement on the need to reform Catalonia’s Statute of Self-Government and regional funding—aims that were reflected in the 2003 manifestos of all parties except the PP. In the CiU’s case, the change in leadership was accompanied by greater co-ordination between the two parties making up the CiU alliance—CDC and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, which signed a federation agreement in 2001.

The process of reforming Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy began in the seventh legislature (2003–2006). The last elections, dubbed ‘plebiscitary’ were held on the September 27, 2015 and marked a decade of great changes in the Catalan party system. These changes were particularly striking regarding the political parties’ configuration and demands on the independence issue (Guinjoan and Rodon, 2016).

1 The political pact between the two parties would last until June 2015. Its demise marked the end of 37 years of jointly running for election and governing from local to regional levels (Lo Cascio, 2008).
A decade of transformation: electoral weakness and fragmentation

The transformation of Catalan party politics over the last decade has followed a dynamic that has some things in common with what has happened in other Western democracies. On the one hand, there was dwindling electoral support for parties that had hitherto been in a dominant position (in this case, the PSC and CiU) and the springing up of new parties (Ciutadans [C’s], Candidatura d’Unitat Popular [CUP], Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència [SCI], Podemos [Podem in Cataluna], Comuns, and the refounding of the CDC). On the other, and as a corollary of the first, there was a notable rise in political fragmentation and polarisation (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015), a trend that can be seen throughout Western democracies (Thomassen and Ham, 2014).

The CiU and the PSC gradually lost their leading role as voters were lured away by smaller parties that had gradually consolidated their position over the years. This did not mean that the dwindling parties became weaker as a result: Barberá, et al. (2009), found that, paradoxically, this loss of voters was offset by greater internal strength.

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2 We have already mentioned that CiU lost its pivotal role and then embarked on organisational restructuring—a process that is still underway at the time of writing. The 2010 election results and the electoral coalition with ‘Junts pel Sí’ [hereinafter ‘JxS’] in 2015 were fairly good but did not give CiU an absolute majority. However the instability of the party system has had a big impact on the PSC. This party attained its peak support in 1999 (with 37.85% of the vote and 52 Members of Parliament) and in two tripartite coalition governments led by Maragall (2003–2006) and Montilla (2006–2010). The emergence of new parties and tensions between the PSC and PSOE (the Catalan and Spanish socialist parties, respectively) slashed the PSC’s share of the vote to just 12.72%, leaving the party with 16 seats. These dramatic losses would be offset by gains in the general and local elections.

3 In this respect, they reveal the importance of funding political parties through public sources rather than through members’ subscriptions. (Barberá, et al., 2009)
From 2006 onwards, the Catalan political scene showed novel features as new parties sprang up. In 2006, the C’s entered Parliament based on its; (1) opposition to Catalan independence; (2) denunciation of Catalonia’s language immersion policy; (3) positioning as a protest party. This served as a warning to Catalonia’s established parties. In 2010, SCI also entered the Catalan parliament, and in 2012, so did the CUP, having shown its strength in the municipal elections; it consolidated its position in the 2015 regional elections.

Thus the Catalan party system had gone through a double transformation characterised by (1) greater fragmentation and (2) greater polarisation. An indicator of political fragmentation is the effective number of parties taking part in each election. This number rose from 4.20 in 2003 to 6.06 in 2012, even though there was a drop in 2015 because of the election campaign coalition between Junts per Sí (JxS) in which they joined forces with the CDC. While proportional representation systems tend to lead to more fragmented political systems, this indicator tends to mirror political complexity (ideological clefts). It is also an indicator of potential instability, given that the presence of more parties can make it harder to form governments. In the Catalan case, this trend is clearly linked to the independence movement. However, it is also related to one of the biggest economic crises Catalonia has ever experienced.

If we look at the ideological axes (see Figure 8 and Figure 9), one can see that the main change in the system of Catalan parties is the proliferation of areas of competition. Medina put it thus: “The ERC and CiU compete for the nationalist vote; ERC, ICV, and CUP are rivals for left-wing Catalan voters; PSC and ICV battle for the support of moderate Socialists; the Socialists can lose voters on various fronts (CiU, ERC, ICV, [and] C’s); and PP, CiU, and C’s try to win over the most moderate voters.” (Medina, 2014, p.7).

4 Sudden changes in the fragmentation index may indicate the party system is going through periods of instability and that the clefts splitting the electorate are becoming deeper.
This dynamic is still clearly present in the legislature that followed the elections held on September 27, 2015. While the JxS coalition, formed by the independent candidates CDC and ERC, allowed these two parties to put their electoral competition on ice, it does not mean they have stopped competing for political space. This was made clear when they stood separately in the general elections of the 20th of December 2015 and June 26, 2016. Moreover, consolidation of the CUP, which played a key role in forming a majority pro-independence bloc, has heightened tensions in the secessionist camp. The refounding of the CDC after the CiU split from the UDC, fanned controversy and internal currents within the same political space. At the same time, the (re)configuration of the political space occupied by CSQP added complexity. This is especially true following the emergence of Podemos, and the forging of municipal alliances, especially in Barcelona under the leadership of Ada Colau. Last, the gap between the parties opposing independence has narrowed. Growing support for C’s has placed the orange-badged party ahead of both PP and PSC. The leader of C’s—Inés Arrimadas—has become the leader of the parliamentary opposition.

The emergence of ‘the right to decide’ and the independence movement: big manifesto changes

The transformation of the Catalan party system has not been limited to changes in candidacies and which party occupies which part of the parliamentary spectrum. It has also been reflected in manifesto positions on self-government. The process of reforming Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy and the growth of the independence movement described in the first section have also changed the programmes of Catalan parties. These programmes are much more complex than before. Regional, pro-independence parties have changed the content and form of their political proposals in every election since 2003. These parties have shifted from proposing reform of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy to embracing unilateral independence. Their demands are exceptional even within the context of European secessionist parties. This is the fruit of constant clashes with central government and huge grass-roots mobilisation (Guinjoan, et al., 2013). We will now analyse this evolution, first regarding the formation of a pro-independence bloc and then in connection with federalist parties.
The formation of a heterogeneous pro-independence bloc

- The CiU: the party that had played a pre-eminent role in Catalan politics for many years, had put forward the gradual recovery of self-government as the best option. The federated party had always defended Catalonia's status as a nation but did not question the territorial unity of Spain—at least in the short term. The aim was to achieve greater regional self-government. However, from the tenth Party Congress onwards (held in 1996), pro-independence ideas began to gain ground and it was decided not to renounce self-determination because of the political leverage this gave.\(^5\) This aim was linked to the party’s moderating role in Spanish politics and which dovetailed with the traditional Catalan aspiration of modernising and democratising Spain.\(^6\) The CiU had supported the Spanish government when the governing PSOE was in a minority (1993–1995) and supported the PP (1996–2000), adopting precisely the same strategy (Guibernau, 2010).

- The CDC: from CiU to JxS: In 2003, CiU proposed drawing up a new Catalan Statute of Autonomy—something that had not been achieved to date even though the PSC’s leader (Maragall) had mooted the idea in the previous elections. This CiU proposal marked a break with the Pujol era. The election results led to the CiU being in opposition for two legislatures. CiU now demanded an ambitious Statute of Autonomy not only in terms of taxation and funding but also with regard to powers and recognition. The CiU later went on to play a key role in getting the Statute through the Bill stage and passed by Spain’s parliament at the beginning of 2006. Yet the biggest change regarding regional demands came with the manifestos presented for the 2010 and 2012 regional elections, which beefed up the pro-independence positions taken by the party.

Various waves of municipal non-official referendums and mass demonstrations on July 10, 2010, under the slogan “We are a nation. It is for us to decide”, and on September 11, 2012, with the slogan “Catalonia, A New European State”, together with a clear change in public preferences (analysed in the first part of this paper), was accompanied by the incorporation of demands for independence. While the CiU’s 2010 manifesto aimed to get it back into government and defend public services, it already incorporated Catalonia’s right to self-determination. It did so step by step: “We aspire to financial sovereignty that not only serves the interests of Catalans and economic progress but also gives us more political sovereignty and strengthens Catalonia’s self-government” (CiU, 2010, p. 82).

The failure of this negotiation strategy with Spain’s President Rajoy, and the growing mobilisation of Catalan society led to the CiU prioritising pro-independence initiatives that were not limited to fiscal aspects. One should recall that before the 2012 elections, Parliament had passed Resolution 742/IX which covered the demand to exercise the right to self-determination. The Resolution was passed by the CiU, ERC, ICV-EUiA, and JxS (Resolution 742/IX). The 2012 programme presented by CiU is important, as Lo Cascio (2016) noted, because it set the narrative for the 2012–2015 legislature and above all, the strategy that led up to the public consultation of November 9, 2014. This document contained the following:

Catalonia has the right to decide its future. The moment has come to exercise this right. After thirty years, it is time to choose and for Catalonia to make its own path in a natural fashion. This path—a national transition—will allow us to make our own decisions and choose between the options we have. It means living better (CiU, 2012, p. 12).

The CiU (which had espoused regional autonomy for over thirty years) now defended a manifesto that put an end to its moderating role in Spanish politics:

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\(^{5}\) See CDC (1996).

\(^{6}\) What Jordi Pujol called the Espriu-Vicens Vives Project. See Ribera (August 22, 2010).

\(^{7}\) For a detailed history of the CDC, see Culla (2000).
“We want to build a broad social majority so that Catalonia can have its own State within the European framework, allowing us to take our rightful place among the nations of the world” (CiU, 2012, p. 12). Moreover, the party fully committed itself to consulting Catalonia’s citizens on independence:

The Catalan Government will consult the Catalan people so that they can freely and democratically decide their collective future. The consultation will be held in accordance with the Law and will have full democratic legitimacy (CiU, 2012, p.13).

The shift towards pro-independence positions between 2010 and 2012 was relatively fast for a party that had hitherto taken a very gradual approach to realising Catalonia’s national aspirations. Yet as the legislature unfolded, it became clear that it would be impossible to hold an official referendum under Spanish Law and thus public consultation would end up being no more than a Catalonia-wide straw poll. Against this background, tensions mounted within the pro-independence coalition (the CDC) regarding the ‘route map’, which envisaged holding plebiscitary elections (on a common platform with the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya [ERC], Assemblea Nacional Catalana [ANC], and Associació de Municipis per la Independència [AMI]). The Unió party (the ‘U’ in ‘CiU’) decided to put an end to its long-standing pact with Convèrgencia (the ‘C’in ‘CiU’). At the same time, pressure on the ERC to create a joint platform for the plebiscitary election led to the creation of JxS.8

The cross-cutting candidacy fostered by the CDC [formerly the Convergencia part of CiU, renamed the CDC] and ERC and the participation of Demòcrates de Catalunya, Moviment d’Esquerres, and candidates from Civil Society associations (ANC and Òminum) re-forged their alliance with a programme that went beyond the demands stemming from the right to self-determination formulated in 2012 by the CDC.

The new document, with some variations, followed the route map agreed on the March 30, 2015 among the political players behind JxS. This ‘route map’, which is currently being carried out by the Catalan government presided over by Carles Puigdemont, sets out a programme and marks the steps on the path to secession.

The institutions of a new State, and Catalonia as a European nation. In this case, ‘The Right to Decide’ was considered exercised through the elections and the document legitimised a unilateral approach:

To sum up, since July 2010 to December 2014, the Spanish State’s response to the mass mobilisation of Catalonia’s Civil Society and Catalan Government proposals has been a repeated ‘No’. It has been ‘No’ to: (1) Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy; (2) the fiscal pact; (3) Catalonia’s declaration of sovereignty; (4) discussion of a referendum in the Spanish Parliament; (5) the public consultation held on the 9th of November. All of this has culminated in criminal charges being laid against three members of Catalonia’s Government. This wholly negative attitude on the Spanish State’s part and refusal to discuss matters leaves plebiscitary elections of the Catalan Parliament as the only option. Here, the parties must give the elections a plebiscitary character and turn them into the public consultation that the Spanish State has blocked at every turn (JxS, 2015: 29).

8 For an analysis of CiU’s political programme, see Barrio (2014).

- The ERC: From the tripartite pact to JxS. As we have said, the ERC also took part in this joint candidacy. The evolution of the republican electoral programme was also relevant during this period. That said, if one analyses the ERC’s track record, the party opposed the 1978 Spanish Constitution because it did not enshrine the right to self-determination. Here, one should note that the ERC defined itself as an independent party at its 17th Congress, which was held in 1991, (ERC, 1991). Thus, the evolution of the party’s political programme has more to do with tactics at any given moment than with deep-seated changes in ideology.
The party programmes of 2003 and 2006 focused on improving self-government through Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy. The ERC advocated voting ‘no’ in the referendum on the amended Statute because the party stuck to the text that had originally been passed by the Catalan Parliament in December 2005. In contrast, in 2006 the ERC committed itself to implementing the new Statute:

Esquerra is committed to full and rigorous application of the Statute of Autonomy. ERC’s long democratic tradition and institutional soundness means we will both respect the referendum decision and strive to put it into effect. The ERC will act to ensure the provisions of the new Statute are implemented (ERC, 2006, p. 5).

In this text, the party set out its political project as one that was “progressive and based on self-government” and made commitments to striving for a pluri-national and pluri-lingual State. ‘The Right to Decide’ was mentioned in the same paragraph and vaguely linked to the idea of transforming the Spanish State. This moderation was much less apparent in the 2010 political programme and even less so in 2012. In the 2010 elections, the ERC put forward a direct defence of an “Independent Catalan State” and committed itself to using the Public Consultation Act to hold a referendum on independence. This programme was clearly much more pro-independence than the one put forward by CiU but it is also true that it made ending the economic crisis a priority. It also stressed the ERC’s social policy achievements in two tripartite governments. In this respect, the 2012 manifesto was a watershed (ERC, 2010).

Like in the CiU’s case, the ERC 2012 manifesto marked a watershed. The text set the aim of building an “Independent State”. Moreover, the party elected a new leader—Oriol Junqueras—under whose leadership the ERC doubled its parliamentary seats compared with the 2010 election. The cross-cutting points proposed by the ANC (a non-party, grass-roots association): sovereignty, referendum, and citizens’ participation in the constitution to cap off the new State (ERC, 2012, p. 6), were incorporated in the ERC’s 2012 political programme. Moreover, the programme also made reference to Resolution 742/IX approved by the Catalan Parliament. The programme set out a ‘route map’ to hold a referendum in 2014—a point shared with CiU—but it went further in proposing the drafting of a Catalan Constitution and the end of the path to independence.

- The CUP: last, the pro-independence bloc ended up having to accept working with the CUP. One cannot say that the bloc changed its programme in this period, given that it had never before formed a common electoral platform. Both in the 2012 and the 2015 elections, it maintained a pro-independence position bordering on rupture, social transformation, civil disobedience and working on a new constituent assembly (CUP, 2012, pp. 9-11). In this respect, the ‘route map’ put forward for the elections of September 27, 2015 differed greatly from that agreed between the CDC and ERC. The CUP advocated a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) but undertook to work with the pro-independence majority to draw up the way-points on the ‘route map’, including a constituent assembly and sundering links with Spain (and, in the CUP’s case, from the EU too) (CUP, 2015, p. 10).

**The Right to Decide from a Federalist perspective.**

Analysis of political programmes up to the creation of a majority pro-independence bloc in the Catalan Parliament (after the 2015 elections) also needs to cover shifts in the parties traditionally advocating Federalist solutions. The ‘Federalist’ parties are PSC and ICV-EUiA (which, since the last election, form part of the CSQP parliamentary group, together with Podem and Equo). We have already seen that the Federalist option was one of the biggest casualties of the rising pro-independence tide—at least in terms of parliamentary seats. Both PSC and ICV have gone through major internal upheavals and, in the PSC’s case, with splits and ‘purges’ of leading pro-Catalan members. For ICV, the creation of Podem in January 2014 (to stand in the EU parliamentary elections in the same year) saw the party lose support at both the local and the national level, forcing ICV to forge alliances...
The main difference between advocates of Federalism has been their position on ‘The Right to Decide’ and independence. Both the PSC and ICV have defended a Federal model for Spain (albeit with nuances). In the case of the PSC, ‘The Right to Decide’ was absent from their programmes; the party touched upon the subject in different ways during the 2012 and 2015 elections.

- The PSC: ‘The Right to Decide’ or constitutional reforms? With civil society mobilising for ‘The Right to Decide’, the PSC presented a programme in which it undertook “to foster the reforms needed so that Catalan citizens can exercise their ‘Right to Decide’ through a referendum held in accordance with the Law.” (PSC, 2012). Successive votes in the Catalan Parliament and the Spanish Congress put these commitments to the test and created major rifts in the party.

- The ICV: ‘The Right to Decide’ and the CSQP. The ICV-EUiA’s candidacy (which formed part of the CSQP’s manifesto in 2015) showed much greater continuity than PSC’s in relation to ‘The Right to Decide’. The party’s electoral programme referred to the concept, which it considered more feasible through the ‘Federal’ route:

  The construction of the EU means that it no longer makes sense to plan State powers in the same way as in the last century. Even so, one cannot deny that States still have a lot of power in Europe. That is why one cannot dismiss self-determination as a thing of the past (ICV, 2006, p. 287).

Accordingly, the 2010 and 2012 electoral programmes did not contain any big changes. The 2010 Eco-Socialist manifesto focused more on self-determination, foreshadowing the three options set out in the public consultation held on November 9, 2014:

‘The Right to Decide’, should the State refuse to negotiate on the constitutional reform advocated by Catalan institutions, will involve holding public consultation to decide Catalonia’s future. Here, citizens could choose from among three options: sticking with the status quo; a State within a Federal Spain; or independence (ICV, 2010, p. 221).

The manifesto for the 2012 programme reiterated this proposal and threw in the idea of a national accord on ‘The Right to Decide’ through a Public Consultation Act. Here, one should recall that during this period the party’s Members of Parliament voted for the parliamentary resolutions of 2012, which requested the Catalan government to hold a referendum, and the declaration of Catalonia as a sovereign nation in January 2013. In 2015, with the entry of Podem, The CSQP explicitly rejected the plebiscitary nature of the elections called by pro-independence groups and instead, placed Catalonia’s aspirations within the state framework:

The opening of a constitutional process is Catalonia’s contribution to breaking with the political regime established throughout Spain in 1978. It is based on the desire to work with other peoples in fostering constitutional processes capable of mutually influencing and strengthening one another, each based on a given cultural and national identity. Embarking on a constitutional process does not pre-judge Catalonia’s future relationship with the Spanish State. A Catalan Republic is compatible with an Independent State, a Federal or a Confederate State—the decision rests with the freely-expressed will of the people (CSQP, 2015, p. 210).
In the same programme, the party again advocated a referendum on Catalonia’s constitutional future and reaching broad agreement on a constitutional process (CSQP, 2015, p. 211).

**Corollary: parliamentary consolidation of the independence movement**

To sum up, the analysis of the manifestos presented by Catalan political parties and alliances for the Catalan parliamentary elections over the last decade reveal a clear radicalisation. The 2012 elections marked a watershed in this process. If we compare this trend with the one described in the previous section, it is clear that citizens’ preferences have changed in step (and in some cases, even preceded) this radicalisation, explaining the shifting positions taken by political parties. While the 2012 elections consolidated a parliamentary majority in favour of ‘The Right to Decide’, the 2015 elections did the same, but this time round, with a pro-independence majority.

That said, the results of the elections of September 27 (see Figure 9) showed that this majority was not only secessionist (as one could infer from the ‘plebiscitary’ nature of the elections) but also favoured (yet again) ‘The Right to Decide’ and the constitutional process (Orriols and Rodon, 2016). The JxS coalition, even though presenting a pro-independence programme, included the possibility of a referendum agreed with the Spanish State:

> We wish to keep open the option of negotiating a binding referendum on Catalan independence with the Spanish State. This offer must be compatible with the time horizon for declaring independence and the holding of constituent elections (JxS, 2015, p. 35).

Nevertheless, here one should add two major considerations.

First, (1) the Spanish central government’s point-blank refusal to consider the various proposals made by Catalan parties and institutions on the holding of a referendum or public consultation during the 2012-2015 legislature; (2) the deadlock following the public consultation of November 9, 2014, which led the pro-independence parties to agree on an alternative road map based on holding a full-blown referendum. Second, the prospect of the Spanish general elections in 2015 (yet another general election was held in June 2016) shaped expectations on the prospects of political change in Spain. In ICV’s case, there was the need to dovetail its position on ‘The Right to Decide’ with that proposed by Podem in order to draw up a common manifesto as part of an electoral alliance. On the other hand, the PSC’s most pro-Catalan wing split from the party during the legislature. As a result, the party’s 2015 manifesto was both less ambitious and vaguer than its 2012 one on ‘The Right to Decide’. Thus, 2012 marked a watershed in the creation of a broad, majority agreement on the need for a referendum or public consultation to channel demands for ‘The Right to Decide’. So while the pro-independence forces radicalised their demands in the face of State intransigence, the ‘Federalist’ forces watered down their demands to ‘constitutional reform’ or a Spain-wide constitutional process.

**EXPLAINING THE ELECTORAL CHANGES IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION**

A conclusive analysis of what caused these changes goes beyond the scope of this paper. That said, it is worth noting some of the questions that researchers and historians need to answer.

First of all, there is the question of to what extent public opinion foreshadowed changes in the parties and how this shift in preferences affected the discourse of political leaders. An analysis of manifestos and survey data point to the wave of support for ‘The Right to Decide’ coming before changes in party political programmes—especially in the CiU. Yet to confirm this hypothesis, one would need to not only analyse electoral documents but also the public discourse of party leaders. A more detailed study would also need to be undertaken on each party’s voters. The relationship is probably a two-way one (and thus to some extent endogenous).
Second, the fragmentation and polarisation of parties is a trend that goes beyond Catalonia. This makes us think that these trends have an explanation that goes beyond the purely regional frame and may have played an important role.

The economic crisis is a factor that needs to be borne in mind when delving into the reasons for the political changes in Catalonia. Here, one should note that this factor has been cited as a major driver of change in other political systems over the last few years (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016). While Catalan preferences on the regional government model began changing before the onset of the economic crisis and its fall-out, one cannot rule the crisis out as an important factor in this shift. Various hypotheses can be made in this respect. On the one hand, the crisis’ impact on individuals’ behaviour and opinions might have led to frustration being channelled into the issue of regional conflict with central government. On the other, one can also point to the way the economic crisis has helped the State pursue its recentralisation agenda. Here, the Spanish government has been able to seize upon ECB dictated austerity and bail-out terms to weaken regions’ powers and regional funding (Viver, 2011).  

A COMPLEX SCENARIO: UNILATERALISM, MAJORITY, AND ‘ROAD MAPS’

At the beginning of 2017, Spain’s political situation did not seem to favour either constitutional reforms or agreement on other solutions. The re-election of a conservative Spanish government meant Madrid’s policies remained the same, exemplified by judicial persecution of advocates of the ‘route map’ drawn up by the Catalan government and JxS.

9 See also Muñoz, J. and Tormos, R (2015)

Figure 11. Results of the Catalan elections of the 27th of September 2015: candidacies and independence support

SOURCE: Author, based on electoral data from the Department of Governance, Public Administration and Housing
In this context, the Catalan debate is linked to interpretation of the Catalan elections held on the September 27, 2015 and the pro-independence majority it delivered. The pro-independence forces—JxS and CUP—considered their joint parliamentary majority justified them following the ‘route map’ (set out in the Statement of November 9, 2015). Yet various circumstances meant that certain pro-independence sectors—for instance, the ANC again raised the issue of holding a referendum to give effect to ‘The Right to Decide’. These circumstances were: the fact that the Catalan government was a minority one; the difficulty of making the elections plebiscitary (Orriols and Rodon, 2016); and the fact that pro-independence votes did not reach 50% of all those cast (which, as we mentioned, was the threshold defined as ‘plebiscitary’ by JxS). As we saw in the previous paragraph, the referendum proposal was not initially part of the ‘route map’ that is now being followed by the Catalan government. Yet it was argued that such a referendum would legitimise a subsequent Declaration of Independence and the application of transitional laws to constitute a new Catalan State.

Be that as it may, the radical shift in Catalan politics over the last decade is a fact. It not only mirrors changed preferences for regional government/secession but is also reflected in a more fragmented, polarised system of political parties. The pro-independence movement, which used to be a fringe phenomenon in parliamentary terms, now occupies centre stage in Catalan politics, together with ‘The Right to Decide’.

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**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

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Cultural policy governance, sub-state actors, and nationalism: a comparative analysis based on the Spanish case

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ABSTRACT
Since the nineties, regional governance has acquired an increasing importance for cultural policies in the developing world. However, the elements determining the development of unequal models of cultural governance within the same country, and the differential relevance of subnational nationalism in this regard, have not been completely explained. In this article we develop a comparative analysis of the autonomous cultural policies of Catalonia, Madrid, and Andalusia. Thus, we explain how their models of horizontal governance are determined by common elements, such as the model of public policies, and other specific differential factors such as historical and industrial local heritage and regional identity, where nationalism is specifically relevant.

Keywords: cultural policy, governance, nationalism, state of the autonomies.

INTRODUCTION
The cultural policies drawn up in Spain over the last 30 years have been examined through a wide range of analytical and conceptual lenses, and have been covered in their state, regional, and local spheres. The academic literature has dealt with: (a) the structural development and purposes of central government’s cultural management (Rubio, 2008a; Rubio, 2005); (b) the diversity of regional policies and the ways they have been articulated with state public administration (Bouzada, 2007; Rius and Zamorano, 2014); (c) the relationship between local cultural policies and intermediaries (Martínez and Rius, 2012; Rius, et al., 2012). This scholarly output has been enriched with monographs and various reports on the workings of the state system as a whole from a more descriptive, institutional perspective (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, 2004; Villarroya, 2012a). A recent collaborative work has brought together many of the major authors in the field in a compendium covering the last 30 years of cultural policies in Spain (Rius and Rubio, 2016).

Many of these studies highlight the various shortcomings in the multi-level co-ordination of cultural policy in Spain. Here, the framework of cultural policy was one marked by wrangling between central government administration and regions [‘autonomous communities’] with a historic claim to nationhood. These elements were
present in studies analysing identity-forming processes in cultural policy (Crameri, 2008; Villarroya, 2012b) and programmes in relation to their legitimising discourses (Barbieri, 2012b). Other studies have examined: the degree of Federalism (Rius and Zamorano, 2014); governance (Bonet and Negrier 2010; Bouzada, 2007); and foreign cultural policy (Zamorano and Rius, 2016).

In studying the various kinds of actions undertaken by public administrations in the cultural field, the literature has stressed the importance of the various interrelationships between cultural policy programmes and state national projects. For example, some of the correlations between political nationalism (whether ‘Spanish’ or of a ‘regional national’ variety) and the lack of inter-governmental co-ordination have been studied. The frequent lack of inter-governmental articulation found in cultural policy in the country stems from the partisan political scenarios found in Spain’s state institutions (Ruis and Zamorano, 2014).

Here, one should note that the cited corpus of studies has not focused on identifying and explaining the differentiating ‘national’ dynamics at work in regional cultural policies. On the one hand—with the exception of the emerging perspective of sociological analysis of cultural policy (Rodríguez and Rius, 2012b)—the scope of these studies has been confined to the network of socio-institutional relationships. On the other hand, there have been no comparative studies analysing the kinds of links between ‘identity’ and political policies in Spain’s various autonomous communities [regions].¹ These shortcomings stem in part from the fact that studies in this field depend on policy analysis (which is pre-eminently of an institutional nature). Such studies tend to skate over socio-cultural features and sectors which have a bearing on the links between nationalism and governance of Arts and heritage in each region. In particular, differences in forms of social participation in the public administration of culture should be taken into account. These forms range from open, horizontal governance to models of corporate relationships between cultural actors and governments.

In this paper, we comparatively analyse three cultural policies carried out by different regions with the aim of evaluating the elements determining the forms of horizontal governance adopted in each case. That is to say, we delve into the main ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms and dynamics in the relationship between regional public administrations and socio-cultural actors.

To this end, we take three key variables into account: (1) articulation of the relationship with the industrial fabric and heritage; (2) its model of action; (3) the role played by regional identities and their orientation. Thus we analyse the socio-institutional fabrics underpinning culture in three autonomous communities with different national dynamics: Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid. These three regions are not only the biggest in Spain in terms of population, they also exemplify three radically different models of identity and ideological governance. Andalusia has a unique regional character that is highly integrated into Spanish national identity. The region has been governed by the Spanish socialist party, PSOE, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español, since Andalusia became an autonomous community. Catalonia is a historic nation in which demands for self-determination enjoy broad popular support. The region’s system of political parties, electoral sociology, and political culture clearly set it apart from the rest of Spain. Last, there is Madrid, which has been governed by the right-wing Spanish conservative party, the PP (Partido Popular) since the 1990s. It is an autonomous community with no regional identity and in which central government tacitly plays the leading role.

In presenting these three cases, the literature is examined under the following four headings:

1 While there are studies analysing ‘identity’ processes in regional cultural processes—especially in the Catalan case (Barbieri, 2012a; Villarroya, 2012a; Crameri, 2008)—there are no comparative studies. It is worth mentioning that some studies have focused on certain aspects from a comparative perspective, such as cultural facilities (Rubio and Rius, 2012), or the study directed by Rodríguez and Rius (2012a), which analyses Spanish cultural policies from a systemic standpoint.
(2) a brief summary of the evolution of cultural policy in Spain, its aims, regional organisation, and the strategies of the main cultural actors;

(3) the three cases and their socio-institutional dynamics in the cultural policy sphere. This is based on desk research, drawing on direct and indirect sources\(^2\) that feed into the qualitative analysis;

(4) A comparative analysis between nationalism and the various forms of horizontal governance and the Spanish state, distinguishing between different forms of corporatism and cultural participation.

### MODELS OF CULTURAL POLICIES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL MANAGEMENT

The setting up of France’s Ministry of Culture in 1959 marked the beginning of the institutionalisation of cultural policy. France’s example was followed in 1965 by the United States, who set up the National Endowment for the Arts, and in Great Britain, with the Office of Arts and Libraries. Since then, English-speaking countries and those in Northern Europe have chosen different models of cultural policy, and these models have inspired cultural policies to be drawn up around the world. France fostered the incorporation of cultural sectors and actors (cultural democracy), applying an interventionist strategy that was mainly Paris-centred (Urfalino, 1996). In contrast, the English-speaking world mainly adopted a decentralised approach to cultural management, with the private sector being given a greater role and the state a more limited one, based on the *arm’s length principle* (Mulcahy, 1998).\(^3\)

Various distinctions have been drawn between cultural models, depending on the role played by the state in the cultural sector. These distinctions take into account factors such as each model’s role in redistributing cultural capital and its administrative mechanisms. Four state cultural models have been identified: the *Facilitator*, the *Sponsor*, the *Architect*, and the *Engineer* (Hillman and McCaughey, 1989), listed from least to most state intervention and control in the artistic field, and with different strategies in the relationship between public administrations, associations, and the private sector. One can discern three broad models in the cultural policy field: the *Liberal Model* (characterised by weak state intervention), and the *European Model* (with a powerful public administration that strongly promotes culture), and the *Nordic Model* (active, decentralised government intervention that has an impact at the local and community levels (Zimmer and Toepler, 1996; Zimmer and Toepler 1999).

Here, it has been noted that the nation-state’s intervention in this field has weakened as regional cultural policies have been beefed up (Menger, 2010; Pongy and Saez, 1994). The latter have proved capable of reproducing and re-directing the traditional aims of state cultural policies, fostering different identity-based projects (Villarroya, 2012), and for developing cultural industries at the regional scale (Pérez and Vives, 2012). Diverse discursive constructs have strengthened the hand of regions in the cultural sphere (Johannisson, 2010) and have legitimised the special forms taken by national models (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre, 2008). This re-configuration of public cultural action has given rise to various kinds of governance, which are not without their drawbacks. Here, Bonet and Negríer (2010) highlight the tensions between efficiency and legitimacy in Spain’s cultural policies. These tensions stem from the historical tussle between the country’s centralising state and its peripheral regions, with the latter doing their utmost to resist national and cultural assimilation. These authors argue that Spain’s cultural policy has been built through a dialectic between standardisation and differentiation and is manifested by various

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\(^2\) One should note that many of the key documents studied are drawn from the research project *El sistema de la política cultural en España* [translated as Spain’s Cultural Policy System], funded by Spain’s Ministry of Education and Culture. Project CSO2008- 05910, the National Scientific Research Plan, Development and Technological Innovation. Its Lead Researcher was Dr. Arturo Rodríguez Morató and the author of this paper took part in the project.

\(^3\) Following this order, these refer to the dominant theoretical models. Miller and Yudice (2004) have relativised the notion of there being little state intervention in the English-speaking world.
transfers of institutional powers from the centre to the periphery. The authors compare this situation with other countries, such as France, where legitimacy lies with the central government and takes a top-down form. Although cultural policy works within the framework of national models, it seeks to manage sectoral dynamics in all cases—for example, by fostering artistic output, protecting heritage, fostering a common identity, and treating culture as a way of life (Garretón, 2008, p. 77). Thus, in cultural terms, this activity has a representational dimension. State administrations come up with different strategies for resolving the relationship between state and culture, depending on official categories comprising the common identity of the groups making up society. In this respect, cultural policy delimits which artistic and heritage goods must be rescued, conserved, and disseminated, and the public they cater to (Dubois, 1999; Lebovics, 2000). Thus, culture becomes an instrument that may favour a given social order, through its fostering of new practices and the building of social representations, some of which are of a national nature (Zolberg, 2007).

Each nation’s institutions, and political and cultural idiosyncrasies are reflected in its cultural policy. They stem from the special historical, social, and cultural features of each state (for example, multilingualism or multi-nationalism). Two structural elements—socio-cultural heritage and path dependence (Kangas and Vestheim, 2010)—are two of the key variables defining a state’s public administration. These elements shape cultural policy models (making them more liberal or more interventionist, as the case may be), predetermining their content and influencing inter-governmental relationships.

4 While it is only right to mention the key factors in structuring cultural policy, these schemes need to be compared in each context. This is because the literature has shown that the political agenda can also be based on other variables and interests, such as economic and political instrumentalisation (Barbieri, 2015; Gray, 2008; Parker and Parenta, 2009). Various agency factors have been shown to be determinants in the orientation and transformation of cultural policies.

THE GOVERNANCE OF CULTURAL POLICY
AND ITS SOCIO-CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS

The governance of cultural policy has waxed over the last few decades. This has occurred in a context in which: (a) cultural diversity has shaped government policies (Taylor, 1997); (b) decentralisation and an opening up to social actors have become key criteria in approaching cultural policies (Vidal, 1997). Governance is a model for implementing cultural policies and conducting theoretical analysis. It emerged from the crisis of the Weberian ‘vertical’ model of government and its focus on the application of norms (Peters and Savoie, 1995, p. 389). The old hierarchical scheme of government was based on legal frameworks and rigid programmes. The new school of ‘governance’ supposes that the state must create forums for social participation and deliberation to accommodate changing public demands for political action.

This framework considered two interrelated governance processes in the field of government management: (a) hierarchical processes; (b) processes based on openness to various social action groups. Hence the adoption of the bottom-up governance model, which in some cases led to greater democracy within the liberal state as a result of community intervention in public policy-making (Peters, 1995). Thus cultural policy governance has been presented as an opportunity to better cater to national and regional diversity in the cultural field. The bottom-up approach and constant, pro-active state openness to community actors is a hallmark feature of Scandinavian cultural policy models (Blomgren and Johannisson, 2014), which may favour greater representation in political and cultural matters.

Nevertheless, Peters considers the deterministic link between governance and better political representation as a purely reductionist argument. One of his reasons is that active recognition by the state of a changing society may lead to over-compartmentalisation of government and lead to inefficiency and legal ambiguity (Peters, 1995). In this respect, governance systems in the cultural policy field have also exhibited various corporate vices that limit community participation. Corporatism has been characterised as a government model with: (a) a
strong, dirigiste state; (b) various restrictions on interest groups’ freedom and activity; (c) the incorporation of these interests as part and parcel of the state system, with representatives of these interests, and as helpers of the state in administering and furthering public policies (Wiarda, 1996, p. 8). Corporatism in cultural policy governance may incorporate the administrative fabric of the state and social bodies—something that has been analysed in relation to: Catalonia’s cultural projection abroad (Zamorano, 2015), Finnish cultural policies (Kangas, 2001, p. 61), and multinationals’ influence over the political agenda. Thus, these dynamics can be structured around multiple extra-cultural aims, which may range from favouring certain corporate interests in cultural industries to building national hegemony at the sub-state level.

THE INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL POLICIES IN THE SPANISH STATE

The 1978 Spanish Constitution (SC) established Spain as a constitutional monarchy and a decentralised state. Its provisions led to three tiers of government: municipalities, provinces, and ‘autonomous communities’ (ACs) [regions with some self-government]. Given the existence of various ‘nations, and regions’ (Article 2, SC), these were made into fully-fledged political and administrative units, with the state comprising self-governing regions is of a quasi-federal nature. One of its unusual features is the decentralisation of social policies (Aja, 2007). The so-called differentiating features (in the language used by the SC) found in each autonomous community have been operationalised in ways that have given rise to an ‘asymmetric federalism’ (López, 1999). Stemming from this highly ‘open’ framework, judicial interpretations of the Constitution’s provisions have facilitated either decentralisation of powers to the regions or their recentralisation by the state, depending on each case.

The 1978 SC partially recognised the culturally multi-national nature of Spain. Thus, the so-called Transition Pact [that is to say, the transition from a fascist dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy] recognised Spain’s constituent ‘nationalities’ (Article 2, SC) and the country’s cultural and linguistic diversity (Article 3, SC)

5 The official, majority language throughout Spain is Castilian ['Spanish']. There are four other languages: Catalan, Galician, Basque, and Occitan are co-official languages in six of Spain’s autonomous regions. In addition, there are two more tongues: Asturian-Leonese, and Aragonese, which are not co-official languages but receive less protection in three of the country’s autonomous communities.
today stems from independent institutional dynamics, is largely a regional affair, and is of a fragmented, disparate nature (Rodríguez and Rius, 2012a).

Another important point is that the central government’s cultural policies are the heirs of a Bourbon monarchist tradition (absolutism wedded to centralisation); (Bouzada, 2007). Things were made worse by General Franco’s fascist dictatorship, which lasted for almost four decades. This led to suppression of regional identities and the weakening (or even scrapping) of the institutions of ‘high culture’ (Rubio, 2008a). Thus the rapid process of decentralisation and transfer of resources to regional governments between 1979 and 1985 led to the creation of a multi-cultural concept of Spain that ran counter to the policies pursued by the Ministry of Education and Science (MEC), which was heavily influenced by the French model (Bouzada, 2007). The belated construction of a welfare system and Spain’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 led to the slow updating of cultural policies, in keeping with the democratic paradigm and the avowed aim of facilitating citizens’ access to culture. In contrast, central government has never developed a federal dimension in regional co-ordination or in cultural policy. It has merely confined itself to the formal recognition of linguistic and cultural diversity and regional powers in such matters.

On the one hand, cultural policy in post-dictatorship Spain was partly stripped of both its centralism and the propagandistic role it had played under Franco. To some extent, the organisation of the MEC bucked this trend. The Department of Culture’s activities were limited at the time pending transfer of resources from the central government. The problem was compounded by the lack of infrastructure and a tiny budget (Departament de Cultura, 1983). The Department’s activities incorporated contributions by various artists and intellectuals who had been dissidents during the Franco regime and was seen as a logical channelling of national interests at the time. This gave rise to the subsequent institutionalisation of these links. It was against this background that the Catalan government developed a Central European kind of cultural policy, characterised by setting up a corporatist network which incorporated initiatives to promote the use of Catalan (Zallo, 2011; Villarroya, 2012b). The CiU put greater stress on heritage (Subirós, 1998) yet there were constant tensions in Catalan cultural policy regarding definitions and contents between hegemonic actors and subsidiary ones (Giner, Flaquer, Busquet and Bultà, 1996).

The Department of Culture’s resources grew markedly, as did its freedom of action. This was despite the fact that the lion’s share of funding for culture in Catalonia had...
traditionally come from local administrations (Rius et al., 2012, p. 179). In this context, the focus on heritage and the establishment of large public institutions led to a top-down approach and was accompanied by governance fostering cultural production (Barbieri, 2012b, p. 94). Public-private consortiums were one of the instruments of this policy. This approach allowed the Catalan government to gain both freedom of action and legitimacy in the cultural field, bringing together various artistic and heritage sectors which were systematically incorporated into the government’s field of action. The structuring of this system around Catalonia’s Department of Culture was considered as a form of clientelism based on dishing out subsidies (Font, 1991), a form of relationship with the cultural field based on associations (Barbieri, 2012b, p. 160). This approach fostered and strengthened the centralisation of high-profile facilities in Barcelona and was highlighted as one of the things creating a gulf between Catalonia’s autonomous administration and the lower-tier local administrations and agents in the region (Mascarell, 1999).

A new feature that emerged in the early 2000s was the renewed promotion of Catalan cultural industries and projection of the nation’s culture abroad. Here, the setting up of the Catalan Institute of Cultural Industries [Institut Català de les Indústries Culturals—the ICIC] in the year 2000 was a watershed. The ICIC initially reported to the Department of Culture and, from 2002 onwards, to the Ramon Llull Institute (IRL in its Catalan acronym). This intervention by the Catalan government in cultural industries continued throughout the first tripartite government (2003–2006). Yet the various measures aimed at articulating the Department of Culture’s policies at the local level were not drawn up until the second tripartite government (2006–2009); (Rius et al., 2012, p. 179). The creation of the National Council for Culture and the Arts [Consell Nacional de la Cultura i de les Arts—CoNCA] and the modernisation of the system forged a mixed cultural policy model—a kind of halfway house between the Central European and Liberal models. This model gradually took root through the region (Rubio and Rius, 2012), despite the tensions and contradictions between political control and delegation (Chávez, 2012). Within this general trend, Catalan cultural policy has mainly been oriented building national infrastructure for the Arts and Culture but without a clear cultural strategy. It has been characterised by corporatist governance aligned with the aim of promoting Catalonia as a nation.8

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**CULTURAL POLICY IN ANDALUSIA: TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE AND ITS REDISTRIBUTIONAL SLANT**

Andalusia set up its Ministry of Culture in 1978 in a government re-organisation that predated the region’s designation as an autonomous community. The Ministry was charged with fostering and disseminating culture (as was the case in Spain’s other regions), combining this activity with welfare policies. New powers and resources were transferred from central government to Andalusia to these ends.9 New cultural spheres were established and programmes set up to foster culture as ‘a way of life’. The discourse was more closely linked to modernisation of the region than to Andalusia’s identity (Pérez and Vives, 2012). Andalusia’s policies since then have been characterised by a progressive orientation towards the region’s cultural sectors. A special feature of Andalusia’s policy has been its close articulation with the state’s deliberate cultural promotion of ‘Spanish’ (that is to say, Castillian) nationalism (Pérez and Vives, 2012).

Andalusia’s Ministry of Culture initially combined its programme with a traditionalist concept of the region’s identity and a strategy in the artistic and heritage fields that was in keeping with principles of cultural democracy. Up until 1982, Andalusia’s policy was characterised by decentralisation in the cultural and artistic sphere, following the same principles as those adopted by Spain’s Socialist central government. Then came a second stage,

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8 Within this framework, many key cultural actors and groups forged levels with every tier of public administration and had to grapple with all kinds of policy approaches. For example, the Catalan audiovisual sector’s dealings, dealings with Spain’s Ministry of Culture in the 1980s and 1990s (Zamorano, 2015; Barbieri, 2012b).

9 Here, one should note that Andalusia took on the management of three leading institutions that were previously under the state’s wing: the Alhambra and Generalife Gardens (Granada), the Museum of Fine Arts, and the General Archive of The Indies (Seville).
with Rafael Román Guerrero heading the Ministry, when powers and resources were transferred from central government to Andalusia. This was accompanied by further development of the region’s welfare policies. With a few exceptions, the transfer of powers did not lead to any major clashes in the first decade (Pérez and Vives, 2012, p. 69). Nevertheless, there were tensions between the modernisation fostered by the new regional administration (and supported by cultural sectors) and the state administration. The latter was prone to continue the ‘cultural assimilation’ policies of the dictatorship. Under the Franco regime, anything Andalusian was grist to the mill of the regime’s narrow, propagandistic notion of ‘pure Spanishness’ (Santos, 1991). This vice has made it easy for Andalusia to align its cultural policy with that of the central government, no matter which party happens to be in power.¹⁰

Modernisation of the cultural administration and its re-structuring of functional lines was undertaken straight away. The model used was that of the Ministry of Culture, directed by Javier Solana (1982–1988). The new administration, now split into cultural sectors, temporarily ditched an approach based on cross-cutting policies (partly heritage-based) fostering Andalusian identity. Instead, it focused on working with associations in general and with corporate sectors in particular (Pérez and Vives, 2012). In governance terms, a key innovation in the early 1990s was the creation of the Public Company for the Management of Cultural and Sports Programmes (EPGPC in its Spanish acronym),¹¹ in which various cultural companies in the region took part. During Carmen Calvo’s spell as Andalusia’s Minister of Culture (1996–2004),¹² EPGPC—which reported to the General Directorate for the Fostering of Culture—was beefed up as an instrument for articulating the governance of cultural policy between the private and public sectors. This stage also allowed progress to be made in the project for cultural democracy, combining, strengthening, and modernising Andalusia’s public institutions and facilities, as well as promoting decentralisation and regional management.

Andalusian cultural industries are concentrated in two main centres: Malaga and Seville, and have several various important heritage sites (Granada, Seville, Cordoba), Andalusia also has many performing arts events serving this policy agenda. Yet the incorporation of certain groups in government activity (especially in connection with the EPGPC), reflects the interests of lobbies and corporations (Pérez and Vives, 2012, p. 76). Although ‘culturally democratic’ and decentralised, the region’s policies have steered an erratic course between fostering culture for the masses and pandering to corporate interests.

¹⁰ This was reflected in various joint projects and the solution of key conflicts, such as the creation of a trust to manage the Alhambra complex in 1986.


¹² Carmen Calvo was appointed Minister of Culture in the 2004–2008 legislature.

¹³ The great institutions of the monarchic enlightenment and the national museums are found in Madrid—for instance, the Prado, the National Library, and the National Archaeological Museum.
the autonomous government and the Madrid Provincial Board [Diputación] play a secondary role in the administration of this institutional conglomerate (Rubio, 2008, p. 211). Instead, it is the Madrid City Council and the Ministry of Culture that play the leading role in the region’s cultural policies.14

The concentration of public and private (charitable) cultural institutions, the fabric of cultural industries (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1995) and, in general, cultural production and consumption have been key factors in guiding the region’s cultural policies (Rubio, 2008b, p. 213; Rubio, 2008b, p. 213). In this respect, regional identity played no part in setting up this cultural policy. Both left-wing governments (PSOE governed the region between 1983 and 1995) and right-wing ones have focused their discourse on the existing cultural diversity (Rubio, 2008b). In contrast, the socio-cultural debate in the region’s policies focus on representing the region as a whole (that is to say, Madrid itself and the Madrid region); (García de Enterría, 1983) and as the heart of the Spanish state. Thus the political and regional element—enshrined by Madrid’s rich heritage and industrial muscle—has been key in defining (a) the lines of regional governance and (b) their articulation with local cultural groups and companies—both strongly concentrated in the Capital.

Although the region’s cultural policy has been marked by this secondary role, various advances were made in the 1990s in terms of net budget and of intervention in the film and audiovisual sector. A Film Promotion Board for The Madrid Region (Royal Decree 100/1994 of the 13th of October) was set up to boost these activities. Since then, the cultural policy model has shifted towards setting up public-private bodies, such as the Madrid Audio-visual Consortium, created in 2005.15 There is also the Madrid Network, a body fostering the creative sector (set up in 2007) whose discretionary disbursement of public funds has been questioned.16

In contrast, the model for other artistic sectors has been based on collegiate bodies comprising sectoral associations that deliberate, make proposals to the public administration, and/or carry out joint activities with it (Rubio, 2008b, p. 226). Yet this process has neither been accompanied by strategic planning of a regional cultural policy nor the establishment of stable, decentralised governance. Unlike in Catalonia, there has been very little mobilisation of Madrid’s cultural sector in questioning the regional government’s role (Rius, 2005; Rubio and Bonnin, 2009).

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: FORMS OF GOVERNANCE, CULTURAL POLICY MODELS, AND THE SOCIO-CULTURAL SPHERE**

Comparative analysis of regional cultural policies reveals that their forms of horizontal governance have been determined by three elements. The first is the legal, administrative, and state political-cultural framework. In the Spanish case, a central government administration co-exists with regional actors. The central administration has drawn up cultural policies that broadly follow the Central European model (and is characterised by having little ability to articulate the system as a whole, notwithstanding Spain’s drive to re-centralise government). Regional actors, on the other hand, adopt different strategies and orientations, whether liberal or of an ‘architectural’ nature (Zamorano and Rius, 2014). The system has been articulated in a complex way with in local governments. This tier of public administration has the biggest state cultural policy budgets and is closest to the creators and distributors of culture. Thus, collaboration and conflict among governmental actors stemming from party politics have shaped the regional governance of artistic and cultural sectors. In this respect, one should highlight the impact of regional boards and local governments on the varied roles and orientations exhibited by intermediate tiers of public administration (Rius et al., 2012).

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14 Historically, many of the great cultural institutions, such as the Prado, were funded and run by central government and made up a sizeable chunk of state spending on culture.


16 See: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/05/17/actualidad/1431894177_454214.htm
While relations between Catalan and central governments have shown ever-widening rifts (and little co-ordination with local government), Andalusia’s Ministry of Culture has maintained a fluid relationship with the State Public Administration. This even facilitated transfers of powers and resources to Andalusia during spells of Socialist government. Lastly, as one can see in Table 1, the Madrid region has a very small budget for culture, which has historically been the case. This situation has been facilitated by the fact that the Madrid government is a kind of sub-system of the central government’s political and cultural system.

Second, the kinds of regional cultural policy governance analysed in this paper have also been determined by the models implemented by each regional government. Here, one can see how progressive institutionalisation of cultural policy at the regional level has led to growing demands for more powers and resources. Nevertheless, these demands have varied in strength and have been based on different arguments. The Catalan government has continually demanded more powers and resources in the cultural field (Department of Culture, 1983) and has taken a systematically nationalist line in cultural policy, clearly setting it apart from Spain’s centralised systems. Bearing in mind this evolution, Rius, et al. (2012, p. 199) have noted that Catalonia’s cultural policy does not fit into present theoretical models, and argue that Catalonia’s model is a mixed one, combining elements of the Liberal model and of the Central European one (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre, 2008). In Andalusia, cultural policy has also gained ground but largely takes the form of cultural democracy oriented towards regional articulation. In contrast, cultural administration in the Madrid region has followed the Central European model but at a fairly low level and is focused on the Capital. Its transformations and changes are of a modernising nature and have been fostered in a top-down fashion by Madrid’s Ministry of Culture, especially during Carmen Calvo’s term of office (Rubio and Rius, 2012, p. 20).

Third, the governance of cultural policy was influenced by: links with actors in the field; the special features of regional markets for culture; social demands (national, sectoral, and so on) emerging in each case. As one can see from Table 2, Andalusia’s rich heritage meant that cultural initiatives in the museum and archaeology fields have been given much greater weight than those for cultural industries. In contrast, Madrid and Catalonia, two major centres for cultural industries serving the whole of Spain, have required a more active approach to the international promotion and projection of these sectors. In Catalonia, this need led to a clear sectoral demand that was mainly met by setting up the ICUB and a strategic programme for promoting the industry. The Madrid region took some steps in this direction but central government still plays the leading role.

Table 1. Budget and demographic data by Autonomous Communities [self-governing regions] (2014–2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ANDALUSIA</th>
<th>MADRID</th>
<th>CATALONIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPENDING ON CULTURE</td>
<td>162,095,000</td>
<td>80,175,000</td>
<td>245,437,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY</td>
<td>162,095,000</td>
<td>80,175,000</td>
<td>245,437,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% State spending</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION IN 2015</td>
<td>8,405,303</td>
<td>6,424,843</td>
<td>7,408,853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


17 After the cuts made to the budgets of all regions over the last few years.
18 Data for 2014.
Thus, there is a complex link between the heritage and the production aspects of each region on the one hand (Table 2), and governance on the other. The efforts made by Catalan cultural industries and the impact of Language Planning begun during the last decade mark a big difference with the programmes drawn up by the Madrid region. In the latter case, cultural policies have played second fiddle to the strategies of central and local governments. In Andalusia’s case, cultural policies are heritage-based and were a factor in the decision to adopt a decentralised approach.

Taking the city of Madrid as the focus for heritage and cultural production must be seen against the local context of: (a) much weaker demands for decentralisation; (b) a regional administration that has not defined itself as a key actor for the cultural sector. This situation differs greatly from that in Catalonia, where “there has been fierce debate on the direction taken by large cultural facilities” (Rius, 2005). One can say that the culture production and heritage matrix pose different levels of legitimacy and negotiating capabilities vis-à-vis regional cultural sectors, whose relations with public administration follow different logics and aims. Yet these dissimilarities also provide us with elements to gauge how corporate interests and cultural governance are structured in each region and stem from very different economic and policy aims.

In this respect, both the cultural policy model and its forms of horizontal governance have been heavily influenced by the identity factor (whether national or not). This variable has been of no importance whatsoever in Madrid. In contrast, in Catalonia the ‘national’ issue has been a source of conflict when drawing up artistic and cultural projects and as an element of cohesion in corporatist approaches to governance and in grassroots cultural initiatives. The ‘identity issue’ has not led to tension in the cultural policies of Andalusia and Madrid with regard to the role played by the Capital. Yet in Catalonia, ‘cultural identity’ has been keenly debated in connection with Barcelona’s position. Here, one should recognise that this factor dynamises cultural activity in the relationships between government and social actors, fostering interpretation of cultural policies and encouraging initiatives abroad as elements that can contribute to ‘nation-building’ (Zamorano, 2015).

### Table 2. Cultural data by Autonomous Community [self-governing regions] (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ANDALUSIA</th>
<th>MADRID</th>
<th>CATALONIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THEATRE COMPANIES</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% State spending</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEATRICAL PERFORMANCES</td>
<td>3,307</td>
<td>15,274</td>
<td>10,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% State spending</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSEUMS (COLLECTION IN CENSUS)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% State spending</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOKS REGISTERED WITH THE ISBN AGENCY</td>
<td>10,460</td>
<td>28,830</td>
<td>20,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% State spending</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVE FILM PRODUCTION COMPANIES</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% State spending</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Annual Culture Statistics 2016, ([Ministry for Education, Culture, Sport / INE])

19 45.4% is under local control and 29% is under private control.
In conclusion, as shown in Table 3, there are various differential factors determining the three governance models examined in this paper. There are also different strategies for dealing with different social demands. Yet all the regional governments exhibit a certain isomorphism in terms of the predominant top-down governance of the 1990s/2000s. They all adopt different forms of corporatism in their implementation. This issue can partly be explained by the persistence of the same parties in the administration of each region for over two decades (PP in the Madrid region from 1995 to the present; PSOE in Andalusia from 1978 to the present, and CIU in Catalonia between 1980 and 2003). While corporatist (and occasionally clientelist) cultural management in Andalusia was basically of a financial nature, in Madrid—with less public intervention—stable corporate networks did not arise. In the Catalan case, they did and were mainly of a nationalist nature. Thus, the ‘identity’ element can explain the greater intensity and strategic vision of public intervention in culture in both Andalusia and in Catalonia (Rodríguez and Rius, 2012b, p. 13). The greater socio-institutional convergence (mainly in the Catalan case) should not be seen as a single variable determining closed or corporatist governance. In contrast, various ways of intrumentalising cultural policy and finances, linked to path dependence of the historic corporatist–clientalist model found in Mediterranean countries (Esping-Andersen, 2000, p. 90), may explain both this phenomenon and top-down forms of governance.

### Table 3. Comparisons between forms of governance in Catalonia, Madrid, and Andalusia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>CATALONIA</th>
<th>MADRID</th>
<th>ANDALUSIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model of horizontal governance</td>
<td>• + top down-bottom up</td>
<td>• top down (weak)</td>
<td>• + top down-bottom up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Corporatism</td>
<td>• Client corporatism</td>
<td>• Client corporatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main discourse</td>
<td>(1) National</td>
<td>(1) Cultural diversity, creativity</td>
<td>(1) Modernising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Creativity</td>
<td>(2) Limited ‘national’ content</td>
<td>(2) Mixed Andalus and Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical governance</td>
<td>• Scant articulation with central government</td>
<td>• Articulation/isomorphism with the Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>• Articulation and institutional transfers with central tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional disarticulation (DIBA and Barcelona council local governments)</td>
<td>• Articulation/delegation in relation to administration of the Capital</td>
<td>• Co-ordination with provincial and local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres and peripheries in the regional cultural system</td>
<td>• Barcelona ‘Capital’ is the centralising nucleus</td>
<td>• Madrid–Capital is the articulating nucleus</td>
<td>• Seville, Malaga, Cordoba, Granada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tension: Barcelona Capital–interior</td>
<td>• Tension between the Capital and metropolitan area</td>
<td>• Different focii: Decentralised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** author

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**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

Mariano Martín Zamorano holds a PhD in Cultural and Heritage Management from Barcelona University. He is also an Associate Professor and member of CECUPS on institutional matters. Zamorano has a long track record in carrying out interdisciplinary academic projects (AECID, Ministry of Education, the European Commission, and so on), and has published various papers in leading scholarly journals, a book chapter, and a co-written book currently in press.
Europeanisation and the in(ter)dependence of Catalonia

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ABSTRACT
The European Union has transcended many of the old prerogatives of national independence, bringing about interdependence among member states. Within the latter there are also sub-state communities which simultaneously claim both self-government and ‘more Europe’. The future intent of this political process in the Old Continent is to make territorial subsidiarity consistent with home rule within European-framework legislation and continental institutions. The first part of this article focuses on the idea of a closer European Union based upon the implementation of territorial subsidiarity, as well as on the challenges posed by democratic accountability, multi-level governance, and the preservation of the European Social Model. The second section illustrates some of these challenges in practice through an analysis of how the meaning of independence has developed in a ‘stateless nation’ such as Catalonia. In Spain, the lack of territorial accommodation, together with a long-standing centre-periphery controversy, has fuelled claims for secession by some Catalan nationalists. The conclusions consider how ‘cosmopolitan localism’ can optimise both independence and interdependence of stateless nations like Catalonia in the global context.

Keywords: Catalonia, cosmopolitan localism, Europeanisation, independence, multi-level governance, subsidiarity.


INTRODUCTION
Interdependence in Europe is leading to the removal of internal borders, the establishment of supra-national bodies, and the muti-tier articulation of governance. Europeanisation should be seen as a process that squares the principle of geographical subsidiarity with self-government within the democratic framework of European legislation and institutions. In this paper, the analysis takes both the ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ implications of European supra-nationalising trends into account. Catalonia’s in(ter)dependence highlights the interrelationship between both of these two apparently dichotomous political developments, which have deep implications of the restructuring of political life in Europe. The wake of the economic crisis (which started in 2007/08) has raised grave doubts about the ability of Europe’s nation states (which are formally independent) to implement their own economic policies against the background of globalisation.
The first part of this paper looks at the challenges facing the so-called stateless nations (such as Catalonia), European subsidiarity, multi-tier governance, and maintaining the European Social Model (ESM). The conceptual review of Europeanisation and decentralisation affects the practical reconciliation of independence (understood as the exercise of self-determination) with interdependence within a supra-national system (the EU). The next section analyses the latest political developments in Catalan nationalism and its restated secessionist goal. The considerable rise in social acrimony seen in Catalonia reflects the surge in the number of citizens who identify themselves solely as Catalans and not as Spaniards. The concluding comments examine how ‘cosmopolitan localism’ could help optimise both independence and interdependence processes in Europe within the broader frame of the new World Order. Such an approach implies fostering society’s interests in a way that strengthens the sense of local development while participating actively in supra-national contexts (Moreno, 2000).

EUROPEANISATION AND DECENTRALISATION PROCESSES

Events occurring as the world moved into the third millennium—especially the financial crisis in 2007—have revealed the limitations of the nation state as a sovereign actor in the global economy. Functional models of majority democracy (such as Britain’s, based on ‘command and control’, or France’s Jacobin top-down approach) have proved insufficient to meet the new challenges of economic globalisation—a process that has developed in parallel with Europeanisation (Loughlin, 2007). In this respect, the EU’s institutionalisation should be considered as a hotch-potch of policies that markedly condition the formal sovereignty of the member states (Piattoni, 2010).

The constitution of a United States of Europe should not be seen as the final aim of Europeanisation. The neo-functionalist school of thought has adopted a vision whereby universal progress requires a kind of integration—equivalent to aculturation or assimilation—similar to the ‘melting pot’ found in the United States (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963). An alternative approach is integration that is not based on standardisation but instead accepts the historic, psychological and social features of a plural Europe. From this pluralist perspective, European convergence can only be articulated by taking into account history and the cultural diversity of the mosaic of people making up Europe (Moreno, 2003).

One should recall that this principle says that political decisions should be taken democratically at a level that is closest to citizens. Thus the purpose of subsidiarity is to limit the power of central authorities in supra-national bodies and nation states, assuming the principles of proximity and proportionality in governance. In addition, subsidiarity seeks to hinder the over-proliferation of controls and powers exercised by each tier of government. It therefore facilitates co-ordinated management of the growing interdependencies in a multi-level Europe. Institutional trends in the so-called unbundling of territoriality meet citizens’ expectations in various spheres (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Kazepov, 2008).

In general terms, one needs to conceptualise political communities that are constituted by citizens and have certain systemic features, whether at the supra-state, national or sub-state level (Easton, 1965). In today’s public life, independent implementation of cultural policies involves fitting in with citizens’ multi-level identities. These identities are a blend of collective affinities that legitimise different tiers of governance (supra-state, state and sub-state) and their democratic accountability (Berg, 2007). Autonomy [self-rule], decentralisation and subsidiarity try to accommodate these institutional responses to the state’s inner diversity and pluralism. These local and regional settings (and in some cases, stateless nations) tend to be based on features of ‘identity’, history, language, and traditions that are reflected in given interests, electoral systems, and channels for representing different elites. In post-dictatorship Spain, various political ‘communities’ [self-governing regions] were set up under the 1978 Spanish Constitution. The
name given to these was *Autonomous Communities*. Despite a certain institutional heterogeneity and diverse programme preferences by their governments, all of them took on an in(ter)dependent character and expressed a common aspiration to a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation.

In Catalonia, demands for the effective decentralisation and subsidiarity of cultural policies and greater exercise of political power were not only demanded by nationalist parties but also by federalist and regional ones. Various lower tiers of government were unwilling to accept rationalising intervention by elites and centralised bureaucracies when it came to exercising self-government. In a post-sovereign era, progressive transnationalisation and renewed interdependencies, sub-state governments in Spain and throughout the EU as a whole, enjoyed the financial and political security conferred by supra-state community institutions (Keating, 2001; Moreno and McEwen, 2005).

Citizenship is the fruit of a combination of identities stemming from supra-state, national and sub-state identities (Faist, 2001). Europeans’ multiple identities are a continuous variable of geographical affinities anchored in common human rights and principles of solidarity. Both civil and political spheres have expanded in the middle tier of government in EU member states. Demands on and the exercise of such civil and political rights have affected social citizenship at the regional level (Jeffery, 2009).

Geographical subsidiarity is inextricably linked to the second guiding principal of Europeanisation, namely democratic accountability. There can be no political development in Europe if decisions are made behind closed doors, as has occurred in some member states. Democratic participation and the involvement of citizens in public life are vital for preserving the ESM. This must be conceptualised as a political project articulated through the values of social equity (equality), collective solidarity (redistribution), and productive efficiency (optimisation), resulting from contemporary processes of conflict and collaboration in Europe; the ESM promises ‘social citizenship’ (the right to a decent standard of living, social welfare, and paid employment) and as a general strategic aim, the ESM pursues continuous, sustainable economic growth based upon social cohesion (Moreno, 2012).

Multi-level citizenship not only implies incorporating many attributes of European nations (whether stateless or not) but also integrating them in a common axiological base of a hybrid (and often highly mixed) nature. All this makes up the values underpinning ESM, which legitimises the redistribution of resources and life opportunities that characterise European welfare systems and that make trans-national solidarity possible (Gould, 2007).

Political interdependence and convergence in the EU does not rest on the establishment of internal frontiers or watertight fields of governance, as was the case of the co-existing system of sovereign states that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Europeanisation implies that all European citizens, are subject to European Community Law, which now makes up over half of the legislation affecting their daily lives. The battle against tax evasion (to mention a crucial policy following the onset of the economic crisis in 2007/08) reveals the inefficiency of state controls and the need for a common approach (the European Commission, 2013). In keeping with the subsidiarity principle, it is counter-productive to hinder or limit the self-government of sub-state political communities. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to expect legitimation of Europe unless there is a redistribution of incomes among its component regions (Ferrera, 2008).

Whether decentralisation restricts the redistribution of incomes and solidarity is a moot point. Scholarly debate on the subject continues to rage. There are also no clear-cut empirical findings supporting the idea that positive outcomes from redistributive measures would detract from the macro (European or state) levels. Meanwhile, the policies should be managed at the micro level (municipalities and regions). With regard to public spending in multi-tier systems of government, there is a body of research covering influencing factors and their redistributive effects, such as in the case
of social and welfare programmes or services (Hicks and Swank, 1992). There is a long track record of this literature, which has often argued that decentralisation usually limits growth in public spending. Following this argument, major regional and government rescaling may lead to greater negative effects than any other institutional variable, whether because of corporatism in decision-making or due to the features of the electoral/presidential systems involved. Yet federal countries such as Australia and Canada, with a long history of public sector involvement, show a positive correlation between public spending and income redistribution (Obinger, et al., 2005). Nevertheless, one should always distinguish between redistribution and distribution when it comes to public resources.

In addition to the structure of the state—or union of states, as in the EU’s case—redistribution can also be conditioned by internal diversity. In this respect, it has been argued that there is less redistribution in a state with a highly diverse society. Public decision-making and spending that recognise and accommodate internal diversity may destabilise composite, plural policies. The consequences may be: (a) crowding-out, with money, time, and energy spent on recognising diversity and the legitimisation of asymmetries; (b) the sowing of distrust between citizens living in different places or social settings; (c) mistaken diagnoses that highlight inequalities that particularly affect certain groups or regions within the polity.

The causal relationship between public spending and income redistribution has not been empirically demonstrated. Multiculturalism and the welfare state, for example, have been positively correlated in Canada’s case (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). In reality, empirical studies bearing on the links between ethnic diversity in states, the production of public goods, and the maintenance of social cohesion have proven fairly inconclusive. About half of the studies conducted either confirm or refute the hypothesis that diversity has a negative impact on social trust (Schaeffer, 2013). Following the same line of argument, it has been observed that the determining factor in the legitimisation of social solidarity and redistribution of public spending (including in highly diverse, composite societies) is state institutions, ability to create social trust (Rothstein, 2015).

For middling political communities in composite states, the institutional form taken by decentralisation is a key field for political and programme evaluation. There is some evidence that sub-state authorities tend to be more spendthrift in countries where spending is decentralised but where central government controls revenue and in countries where both income and expenditure is decentralised, sub-state authorities tend to spend less (Rodden, 2003). In Catalonia’s case (which is the subject of the second part of this paper), nationalist allegations on the lines of “Spain robs us” have sought to draw attention to the disproportionate amount of revenue raised in Catalonia compared with public spending in the region. Employing this argument, demands have been made for both the raising of revenue and expenditure to be decentralised, which is what happens in Navarre and the Basque Country.

It is worth recalling that the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy special privileges vis-à-vis central government in which the two regional governments enjoy full control over all taxes with the exception of VAT (which is regulated by the EU). This fiscal pact gives these regions a great deal of say over how they spend their money and makes Basque policies much clearer and facilitates accountability. The Basque Country and Navarre are the two autonomous communities that do not contribute to the central government’s ‘kitty’, whose purpose is to ensure the provision of basic public services throughout Spain. This creates a comparative disadvantage for a wealthy region such as Catalonia, which makes a bigger contribution to Spanish centralised funds. It has been argued that this inequitable system is only sustainable because Navarre and the Basque Country make up only 8% of Spain’s GDP (Colino, 2012).

In Spain, public spending is considered by the country’s regions to be a key part of their self-governing status. Furthermore, the issue of local autonomy is a political hot potato when it comes
to sharing out revenues and expenses among the poorest and richest regions. Economic and financial adjustments are made to meet the Constitutional aim of providing a common level of basic services throughout Spain. Most redistribution systems in the world try to share out funding as fairly as possible—something that is a thorny subject and which leads to clashes between government tiers. In the case of Catalonia and Spain, the last few years have seen rising numbers of clashes and hostility.

In general, criticisms become sharper when middling tiers of government consider the redistribution criteria are too radical or arbitrary and that give poorer regions few incentives to put their finances in order. Poorer regions tend to demand higher public spending to catch up with their richer brethren. Yet redistribution of resources can also be made through large infrastructure projects, which are discretionary and may be criticised by the regions making the biggest net financial contributions. In contrast, some state spending and investment plans enjoy strong support and legitimacy, especially in those regions receiving the funds—for example social security and unemployment benefits.

After a quarter century of regional self-government following the end for the Franco dictatorship, Catalan parties agreed that reform was needed to the Statute of Autonomy granted in 1979. On September 30, 2005, the Catalan Parliament passed a bill on a new Statute. No fewer than 120 Catalan MPs voted in favour (the CiU, PSC, ERC, and ICV-EUiA parties) and just 15 voted against it (from the Partido Popular; PP) and thus, the text was subsequently steered through the Spanish Parliament. The preamble to the new Statute of Autonomy defined Catalonia as a ‘nation’. A majority of Catalans approved the Statute in a referendum held on the June 18, 2006. The PP lodged claims that some of the articles in the new text were unconstitutional. So too did Spain’s ombudsman and five autonomous communities (Aragon, the Balearic Islands, Valencia, Murcia, and La Rioja). On June 27, 2010, after over four years of deliberations, Spain’s Constitutional Court declared various articles in the draft Catalan Statute of Autonomy to be illegal. It also stated that Catalonia’s self definition as a nation had no legal effect.

The Constitutional Court’s ruling reflected a centralist bias, especially because many of its members were closely aligned with the PP. Criticism of the ruling in Catalonia boosted disaffection with Spain’s central institutions and strengthened nationalist forces in the region, especially those advocating secession. The celebration of Catalonia’s national day on September 11, 2011 featured a massive demonstration on the streets of Barcelona.

1 The voter turnout was 48.85%, of which 73.90% voted for independence, 20.76% against, and 5.34% were spoiled votes. Abstention exceeded 50% of the electorate, indicating that under a third of voters actively voted for independence.

2 As tends to happen in Spain, the figures for the number of demonstrators varied wildly, from 1.5 million according to the local police to 2 million according to Catalan government sources. Meanwhile, the Spanish government delegation in Catalonia set the figure at a paltry 600,000.
A renewed call for independence spread the length and breath of Catalonia. Nationalist parties and civil associations effectively mobilised the growing number of politically discontent Catalans. The ill-feeling was expressed in ‘identity’ terms and the notion that Catalonia was not part of Spain and did not want to belong to it either.

The economic crisis, which began in 2007/08, encouraged the PP to embark on recentralisation policies, which only heightened tensions in Catalonia. Critics argued that decentralisation policies pursued through the Spanish system of autonomous communities actually reflected administrative scattering and the use of mechanisms that had been used in a more or less hybrid form in other advanced Western democracies (Gagnon, 2009; Requejo and Nagel, 2011).

Pro-independence nationalists conveyed the idea that Catalonia would be economically a lot better off on its own. Here, one should take into account that Catalonia’s GDP (some 200,000 million) is greater than that of Portugal. With a population of 7.5 million (roughly 16% of the total for Spain), Catalonia would only be a ‘middling’ country in the EU but in economic terms, it would be one of its most advanced. The nationalist mobilisation sought to maximise the ‘window of opportunity’ presented by the economic crisis, insisting that an independent Catalonia would end exploitation by the rest of Spain. The allegation that Spain was robbing Catalonia was thrown together with the idea that independence lay within the region’s grasp.

**Dual identities and exclusive identities**

Following the Constitutional Court ruling, the percentage of citizens in the region who considered themselves ‘solely Catalan’ rose markedly. According to surveys carried out in 2013, the numbers of those placing themselves in the ‘exclusive geo-ethnic identification category’ soared in comparison with the responses to the so-called Moreno Question in the mid 1980s (see Table 1). From this, one can deduce that the huge rise in the number of the region’s citizens identifying themselves exclusively as Catalan has taken place over the last few years and is largely of a reactive nature. Many who saw themselves as solely Catalan felt humiliated by the Spanish government’s refusal to negotiate decentralisation and conferral of greater fiscal powers (Moreno, 2014).

Following Scotland’s official referendum on independence (held on September 18, 2014), Catalan nationalists decided to hold their own public consultation. Although Spain’s Constitutional Court declared the consultation illegal, the Catalan government held an informal straw poll (a referendum in all but name) on November 9, 2014. No less than 80% of those casting a vote chose independence (that is to say, those answering ‘Yes’ to the two questions on the ballot papers). However, the voter turnout was 37%.

At the end of 2015, various nationalist parties supported the holding of ‘plebiscitary’ elections. The idea was that the Catalan government would formally (and unilaterally) declare independence if the number of MPs made up a majority. Here, one should note that several parties had explicitly presented manifestos with a joint commitment to independence. The results of the elections held on September 27, 2015 were less than clear-cut. The turnout was high at 77%. While 53% of the MPs elected were pro-independence, they only represented 48% of all citizens eligible to vote. The new parliament began a process of secession (euphemistically termed ‘disconnection’), stating its intention to declare a Republic of Catalonia. A few days later, Spain’s Constitutional Court ruled the statement null and void. The election of a new Catalan president (Carles Puigdemont) was the result of two pro-independence forces in the Catalan Parliament (Junts pel Sí and Candidatura d’Unitat Popular). The picture was further complicated by elections in Spain on December 20, 2015 and on June 26, 2016. The difficulties the two pro-secession groups are having in enlisting parliamentary support suggest growing uncertainty over what may happen in the future.

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3 Formulated for the first time in the British academic world in my doctoral thesis (Moreno, 1986).

4 The sequence of the questions was: “Do you want Catalonia to be a state?” and “If so, do you want this state to be independent?”.
For from being consistent and uniform, European societies not only exhibit diversity but also have internal structures and rifts. They face challenges on how to incorporate (rather than assimilate) political communities with different collective identities. The articulation of these communities, through optimisation of political independence and inter-dependence, should avoid a unilateral approach. The challenge lies in how to foster democratic interaction between regions and tiers of government rooted in history while avoiding sterile confrontation.

In reality, bottom-up trans-nationalisation and top-down decentralisation have driven the growth of a kind of cosmopolitan localism in Europe. This reflects two (apparently opposed) social interests: (a) fostering a sense of citizen identity and ‘belonging’; (b) active participation within a global context. Furthermore, citizens have shown themselves willing to fully assume complementary identities corresponding to different political spheres (municipal, regional, national, and supra-national); (Moreno, 2004).

Paradoxically, the EU supra-state has strengthened sub-state units, which aspire to greater political decentralisation. As in Catalonia’s case, ‘partner regions’ (as the EU would have it) take a proactive approach to self-government. Both processes involve bottom-up and top-down political adjustments in Europe that have allowed the spread of a kind of cosmopolitan localism that reflects both society’s interest and fosters a sense of ‘belonging’ and taking an active role in a supra-state context. The result is growing communion between the particular and the general (Norris, 2000).

Regions such as Catalonia no longer depend on the kind of nation-building programmes pursued in the 19th and 20th centuries. Their entrepreneurs, social leaders, and intellectuals have adopted many of the initiatives and roles that in the past were undertaken and played by enlightened elites, which monopolised power and set up regional mechanisms for widening their sway from the centre to the periphery. Nowadays, the positions of influence are more widely geographically spread, allowing greater political intervention by sub-state tiers of government. Furthermore, policy-makers’ careers are no longer inextricably linked to climbing the ladder in central government, where the plum jobs carrying most influence were to be had. Today, many political representatives pursue their careers in regional posts —something that does not preclude taking on state or supra-state jobs later on.

### Table 1: Responses in Catalonia to ‘the Moreno Question’ “Which one of the following five categories would you place yourself in?” (1985 and 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985 (%)</th>
<th>2013 (%)</th>
<th>2015 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself to be solely Catalan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself to be more Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself to be Catalan and Spanish in equal measure</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself more Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself to be solely Spanish</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know / No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CEO: Centre d’Estudis d’Opinion [Centre for Opinion Surveys]
CIS: Centre d’Investigacions Sociologiques [Sociology Research Centre]

Note: Percentages have been rounded

The cosmopolitan localism approach can be seen in middling political communities—generally in those regions that do not constitute independent countries (e.g., Catalonia, Scotland, or Flanders). Here, one should note that these regions are larger than some EU member states (e.g., the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Luxembourg). There are also metropolitan areas of considerable size and importance (e.g., Brussels, London, and Milan). The latter seem to follow a pattern similar to that seen in mediaeval European political communities (the Italian city-states, the towns of the Hanseatic League, and Central European principalities. All of these, prior to the discovery of the New World, constitute a common institutional reference point in the EU and in the process of Europeanisation. This is particularly true of the common interest in maintaining social welfare, which is the cement for ensuring an ever closer union (Moreno, 2012).

One should recall that the processes described above have occurred during the period of stability following the Second World War (excluding the regional wars in the Balkans in the 1990s). That said, one cannot rule out another European war given latent rivalries among nation states and the growth of religious fundamentalism and xenophobia. Hence, civilised ways of achieving centralisation and Europeanisation to reconcile political unity and diversity through the consolidation of a new cosmopolitan localism are needed.

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**Biographical Note**

Luis Moreno was awarded his PhD from Edinburgh University. He is Research Professor at Spain’s Scientific Research Council [*Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* (CSIC)], author of *Escocia, nación y razón* [Scotland, Nation and Reason] (1995), *La federalización de España* [The Federalisation of Spain] (1997), *La Europa asocial* [Asocial Europe] (2012), and *Europa sin Estados* [Europe without states] (2014). According to *Google Scholar*, he is the Spanish politologist who is most cited abroad. His profiles can be found on: *Academia. edu* and *Research Gate*.  

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Special Issue

Cultural Changes at University Institutions: Agentification and Quality Management
Cultural changes at university institutions: agentification and quality management

INTRODUCTION

The nature of the changes and institutional arrangements that Spanish universities have undergone since the recovery of democracy are distinct and correspond to different periods. The 1980s in Spain saw a period of student social democratisation and, later, territorial expansion resulting from the promotion of autonomous communities’ higher education policies. In the 1990s, the last socialist government of Felipe González approved the creation of private universities within an international environment marked by the growing commercialisation of higher education. But at the beginning of the 21st century, universities underwent structural changes because of the creation of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). If we were to choose a concept to summarise, characterise, and explain the EHEA, it would be agentification. This phenomenon, according to Talbot et al. (2000), is based on the establishment of specialised public agencies, whose objective is to separate the role of the ‘principal’ and the ‘agent’, that is, to separate decision making from the capacity to manage, while also clearly specifying objectives and the means of achieving them. Thus, management units can become more efficient, transparent, and responsible for their actions (Serra, 2007). In the context of higher education, agencies would play the role of the principal and universities (both public and private), that of the agent.
Since the implementation of the EHEA, universities have had more autonomy over their catalogue of qualification titles, their design and timing, how these fit in with their human resources, materials, and human capital and profiles, and their reputation for research, teaching, and knowledge transfer, all with the oversight of Spanish agencies and integrated into a network of other European and international agencies. Consequently, this institutional framework impacts the governance of universities and their teachers and administrative staff. Therefore, the role of teachers has significantly transformed in just a few years, provoking a certain generational split in the ethos of the youngest versus the oldest teachers (usually qualified civil servants—tenured adjunct lecturers and permanent senior professors) in terms of their methods and abilities—especially regarding teaching skills, methods, and online teaching. In addition, agencies have contributed to polarising the reputation of teaching activity in scientific research (Requena, 2014), which has become a source of symbolic capital creation that, in turn, generates resources (for research) and notoriety in the academic field.

In my view, the cultural change within universities that we are currently seeing, has a lot to do with this agencialised environment. Here, one of the articles in this monograph, written by the sociology professor Antonio Ariño, reminded me of the work of Ortega and Gasset and their clearly accurate and current opinions about the functions of universities. Ortega stated that one of the basic objectives of universities is their crucial role as agents dealing with the great issues, challenges to societies, and global agenda in our time. Even more so if the object of this reflection and analysis is its own role in the 21st century. This monographic issue of the Debats journal arose from this desire to modestly and transcendentally, in limited Kantian terms, contribute to the dialogue on the cultural changes in the Spanish university system during this century, something that academics are, no doubt, concerned about.

The effect of the EHEA and its agencialising context are accelerating changes in the three institutional objectives: investigation, teaching, and transfer of knowledge, and has also changed their way of governing. Although it is impossible to provide a full account of the institutional pillars in a monograph such as this (which takes a theoretical and empirical approach), we aim to highlight and explain some key aspects of these changes. On the other hand, the agentification of the EHEA, has erased the historical traditions of curricular design, which have become more closed in southern European countries and more open or mixed in Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian countries. The effect of historical path dependence has been significantly weakened by the implementation of a system of qualification verification, monitoring, and accreditation (for the three levels of higher education: undergraduate, master’s, and doctorate degrees) under the conditions of quality management.
We can define the EHEA synoptically according to the following conceptual map:

![Conceptual map of the European Higher Education Area](image)

SOURCE: Elaborated by the author based on Ariño, 2014

We are aware that analysis of the complex network of relationships between the concepts forming the EHEA semantics is a necessarily limited task. However, even so, this monograph describes the new student experience in the post-EHEA-authority period.

The article by Javier Paricio analyses the consequences of this student-client centrality. According to the author, students’ evaluation of teaching quality in terms of satisfaction, via surveys or other mechanisms such as complaint or suggestion boxes, as required by quality agencies, improves their relationship with the university as a client. One of the issues related to the above, is the ability to distinguish different university student learning approaches (Biggs, 1995), because student satisfaction depends on their interest, which itself depends on each student’s preference for a deep or more superficial learning approach. In the case of the latter—i.e. uncommitted students with little intrinsic motivation—their strategic objective is only to achieve a pass-level grade for the subject and so a teacher’s demanding attitude may be poorly perceived, resulting in the paradoxical survey result of students
being dissatisfied with demanding teaching styles (Gargallo et al., 2006, Valle et al., 2000). Paricio also explains that this superficial approach adopted by some students is based on a social narrative which is very characteristic of our time, in which the immediate and direct usefulness of university degree knowledge prevails. He also presents arguments around the need to question quality management based on student satisfaction, among other things, because in many cases, due to their stage in life, students are unaware of the true need to learn certain content and its use in their professional future. It is common among university students that subjects and topics that did not seem useful or valuable at the time of their teaching, prove to be so with a few more years’ experience.

In this environment, where students are polarised as customers receiving a service and therefore demand market value, the reputation of universities is another factor in the process of cultural change in university institutions, and this simultaneously reinforces the customer and service dimension in an increasingly global market. Thus, university rankings are becoming increasingly important in the social media and political debate. In their article, Martí Parellada and Montserrat Álvarez analyse the premises of the most recognised rankings, including the Times Higher Education, Academic Ranking of World Universities, and Quacquarelli Symonds systems, in which research is considered to be more important than other dimensions of university objectives. This leads some organisations to become excessively preoccupied with encouraging activities that directly affect the indicators of these rankings, which, in the long run, can be harmful to these universities. Accumulation of citations, especially in journals in the first quartile in the Journal Citation Report or in Scopus, are research quality indicators that are easily defined thanks to bibliometrics, and are objectives shared by the rankings, professors and researchers themselves, and the university quality evaluation agencies. Parellada and Álvarez review the methods used by these three rankings and present U-Multirank, which is being promoted by the European Commission as a more holistic option that tries to overcome the limitations of traditional rankings by taking five dimensions (teaching and learning, research, knowledge transfer, international orientation, and contribution to regional development) into account in some disciplines and knowledge fields in which the humanities, arts and, to a lesser extent, the social sciences are given less weight.

Rankings have significantly contributed to the global university hierarchy and thus, to their national and international reputation. In addition, in this respect there are other indicators, related to internationalisation, that provide obvious indications about the state of the Spanish university system. Thus, this monograph also raises the issue of the lack of internationalisation among teaching staff which characterises Spanish universities. The article by Manuel Pereira-Puga empirically shows that, despite significant differences between autonomous communities, the proportion of international teaching
staff in the Spanish public university system is very low—less than 3% of the
average Spanish workforce. It is evident that these low percentages have to do
with the considerable ‘inbreeding’ among Spanish university teaching staff,
which is undoubtedly a negative factor for the country’s research quality
indicators; thus, there is ample room for future improvement in this area, if
other problems such as the autonomy and governance of public universities
are resolved. We know that a high level of international researchers in
research institutions is a key factor in making research, development, and
innovation (R&D+I) systems as efficient as possible. In this sense, the case
of Holland is a clear example.

This monograph also incorporates the vision of all of these processes of
cultural change in universities from the perspective of three researchers
who analyse and contextualise the case example of Portugal. According
to the article by Cristina Sin, Orlanda Tavares, and Alberto Amaral, a
formative assessment approach was not taken when implementing quality
management in Portugal (Monnier, 1995), and consequently, agentification
is negatively recognised among Portuguese teaching staff because they are not
yet able to recognise the positive effects it could have on their universities.
Thus, Portugal bears similarities with the Spanish case, although the
Portuguese quality agency was implemented several years after the creation
of ANECA. For example, the accreditation process has allowed universities
to eliminate qualifications from their catalogue that, a priori, do not meet
the accreditation requirements for these degrees. In the first two years of
the agency, in 2010-2011, 25% of the degree-program titles disappeared
from those on offer at Portuguese universities. This ‘sieving’ effect may
also be similar in Spain, although in this respect, we do not yet have the
relevant data for undergraduate and master’s degrees; however, the case of
doctoral studies in Spain may be very illustrative of the ‘cleaning’ effect
that the agency had in Portugal: in Spain, Royal Decree 99/2011 meant
that all doctoral programs had to pass a verification process; at the time
of its publication, there were more than 4000 programs, while at present
there are slightly more than 1000 verified titles.

Another of the most significant aspects of the article by Sin, Tavares, and
Amaral is their analysis of the Portuguese situation through ideal types (a
reactive–responsive quality culture). Thus, they distinguish universities
which adopted a culture of quality in a deep and meaningful way from
those who conceived it superficially, only in terms of the quality agency’s
formal requirements. In this respect, there is not enough scientific literature
relating to Spain to be able to analyse the extent to which the quality
systems developed inside this audit environment fulfil the function within
a culture of responsive quality. It is key that daily university organisation
practices are a faithful reflection of the internal quality assurance system
and are not merely a formal fulfilment of the quality agency’s requirements.
In the Spanish case, this interesting question will be one of the next lines of research for those interested in this monograph. Likewise, in the Portuguese case, accreditation has led to significant improvements with respect to the quality of teaching staff, although, as the authors state, the pedagogical training of teachers should be supported, as far as possible, under the guidance of the appropriate Portuguese ministry—as in the Spanish case.

The processes of accreditation, from the point of view of evaluation practice, are also analysed in this monograph by taking an auto-ethnographic approach. This institutional evaluation practice started to be developed in 2014 in Spain. Thus, the article by Rubio Arostegui uses this methodological approach to analyse the implementation of evaluation practices for the quality agency of the Community of Madrid, through his personal experience as a panellist, focussing on learning results and the value of the research produced by the human resources assigned to the degree-program title: two criteria that the quality agencies consider to be critical for the final report for a degree-program title to be favourable. Renewal of accreditation is similar to a process of peer review, although it involves different processes and dynamics compared to the traditional academic review of research projects or scientific journals. Its objective is to make the evaluation processes explicit, so as to produce evidence for aspects that can be improved upon in the renewal panels’ evaluation, when accrediting university degrees from the viewpoint of academic rigor.

Finally, this monograph includes an article looking at the cultural function of Spanish universities. Antonio Ariño brings his theoretical reflections to the discussion, but these are also based on his long experience in cultural management at the University of Valencia. His article suggests that universities’ ideas, functions, and objectives regarding culture should complement their teaching, research, and knowledge transfer activities. The culture that universities must promote and disseminate must be critical and creative: open to debate and positioned with respect to the great challenges of society as a whole. In turn, universities should propose alternatives and evidence based on their scientific activity, and assume the risk and benefits of their creativity. But above all, as highlighted in his article, and referring back to Ortega and Gasset, their work must be current. There can be no worse thing for universities as institutions, than for them to not be at the service of society, agents of cultural change, or aware of the challenges of today. It is clear that national, regional, and European public R&D+I calls all request the same thing, solutions to challenges. But it is not enough for research-derived knowledge that contributes to current challenges to remain in the academic environment of projects, journals, and conferences: it must play a prominent role in the rest of society and its immediate environment, thus linking it to one of the most recurrent concepts of today, that of sustainability.
REFERENCES
ABSTRACT
Over the last decade global rankings of universities have begun to grow in importance allowing national and international comparison of higher education institutions. In fact, they are already at the heart of public discussion about the role of universities in our societies because they provide a way of measuring and comparing the quality and results of these institutions and thereby, influencing their reputation. The most important of these rankings (such as the Academic Ranking of World Universities, Shanghai Ranking, Times Higher Education World University Ranking, and QS World University Ranking). All of these put universities into a league table where the ranking of a given institution is based on a composite score that reflects the weights of several individual indicators. This article reviews the methodology of three rankings, focusing on their limitations and weaknesses (such as over-stressing research or their subjectivity in setting specific weights for each individual indicator). Finally, we present the U-Multirank, promoted by the European Commission, which seeks to overcome the limitations of traditional rankings. It is an alternative way to rank universities, based on their performance as gauged by a wide number of indicators in five dimensions—(1) Teaching and Learning; (2) Research; (3) Knowledge Transfer; (4) International Orientation; (5) Regional Engagement—and in several subjects.

Keywords: rankings, universities, reputation, U-Multirank.

INTRODUCTION
Global rankings of universities began to emerge a little over a decade ago. Since then, they have gained considerable importance as a yardstick of higher education institutions’ performance. They also began to elicit great interest among the public, politicians, and university managers. It has now become impossible for universities to ignore the results of such rankings and the comparisons drawn with other higher education institutions at home and abroad. Given the impact that university rankings have acquired when it comes to academic reputation, it is worth understanding how rankings are drawn up and their strengths and weaknesses.
The following sections of this paper look at the rankings with the greatest worldwide media impact: the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), also known as the Shanghai Ranking\(^1\), Times Higher Education World University Ranking (THE)\(^2\), and QS World University Ranking (QS)\(^3\); we will examine their strengths and weaknesses. Next, we examine the new U-Multirank\(^4\) system ranking which was created with the support of the European Commission. Here, one should note that U-Multirank was designed to overcome some of the methodological deficiencies of traditional rankings. A brief section covering final considerations concludes the paper.

**Traditional Rankings**

Following the work of Rauhvargers (2011 and 2013), Universidad.es (2014), Sanz-Casado (2015), and Fundación CYD (2016), as well as the websites of the ranking organisations, one should note that the ARWU, THE, and QS have some basic common features. All three were conceived as general rankings to place higher education institutions in rank order, taking their performance as a whole. All three rankings were constructed on a synthetic indicator comprising a set of individual indicators, each given a certain weight. The final ranking of universities emulate football league tables.

The ARWU ranking was the first to appear and at the time it received the most media coverage. It is a world ranking of universities drawn up by the Centre for World-Class Universities at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. It was first published in 2003, when it analysed over 1,200 higher education institutions and then ranked the 500 institutions considered to be the best from those surveyed.

From the methodological standpoint, the ARWU took six indicators into consideration, namely: (1) the number of alumni with a bachelor’s, degree Master’s, or PhD degree, who had received a Nobel Prize or the Fields Medal for Mathematics (10% weight in the score); (2) the number of university professors linked to the institution when they received a Nobel Prize for Physics, Chemistry, Medicine, Economics, or the Fields Medal for Mathematics (20%)\(^5\); (3) the number of papers published by the university faculty in *Nature* or *Science* in the last five years (20%)\(^6\); (4) the number of articles catalogued by the Expanded Science Citation Index and the Social Science Citation Index during the previous year (20%)\(^7\); (5) the number of university faculty members in the 21 categories defined by Clarivate Analytics\(^8\) in its list of Highly-Cited Researchers (20%)\(^9\); (6) academic performance in relation to the institution’s size (weights of the five previous indicators divided by the number of full-time faculty members), with a 10% weight in the overall ranking score.

Apart from these indicators and weights, the ranking assigns the maximum index figure of 100 to the university which receives the best score. The index figures for all the remaining universities are then calculated in relation to the 100 index figure. Using this methodology, the top 100 universities each have their own index figure in the

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1 See: http://www.shanghairanking.com/index.html
2 See: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings
3 See: http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings
4 See: http://www.umultirank.org/#!/home?trackType=home
5 With both indicators, such prizes count for less as time goes by. Thus for every ten years that elapse, they lose 10% of their weight applying ‘straight line depreciation’. In other words, prize-winners in the last decade carry 100% of their assigned weights, those in the previous decade, 90% and so on, up until the decade spanning 1921-1930, which only retains 10% of said weight (Adina-Petruva, 2015).
6 For institutions specialising in Humanities and Social Sciences, this indicator is left out and the 20% weight is shared out among the other indicators in a pro rata fashion.
7 This scores more if it is included in the latter, in order to deliver greater accuracy for each academic discipline.
8 Formerly Thomson Reuters. At the end of 2016, Thomson Reuters sold its Intellectual Property & Science Division, which among other things, included the Web of Science brand. The division was bought by the Onex Corporation and Baring Private Equity Asia investment groups. The resulting company now goes under the name of Clarivate Analytics.
9 In reality, there are 22 categories, but the 22nd is in the multi-disciplinary field.
ranking. Other universities are grouped in alphabetical order in blocks of 50 (ranks 101 to 200) and in blocks of 100 (ranks 201 to 500).

Britain’s *Times Higher Education* (THE) has published an annual ranking of universities since 2010. It not only incorporates research indicators but also other indicators which have a bearing on teaching, technology transfer, and international outlook. That said, the key indicator is research, which carries a 60% weight in this ranking. To calculate the 13 indicators used, the ranking uses information gathered on the universities concerned by the company Elsevier (specifically, the firm’s Scopus publications database)\(^\text{10}\), and a reputation survey reflecting academics’ views on teaching and research which contributes a third of the weight in the overall index.

More specifically, there are five indicators which have a bearing on teaching: (1) the THE’s Annual reputation survey covering teaching and which reflects the prestige enjoyed by the university in this field, as judged by scholars responding to it (which has a 15% weight in the overall index);\(^\text{11}\) (2) the ratio between students registered and academic staff (4.5%); (3) the ratio between those holding a PhD and those with bachelor’s degrees (2.25%); (4) the ratio between PhD students and academic staff, by scientific discipline (6%); (5) the institution’s revenues divided by the number of academic staff and its purchasing power (2.25%).

The other four indicators are linked to research: (6) the THE’s annual online Academic Reputation Survey regarding the prestige conferred on the university by its researchers (which is given a weight of 18%); (7) revenue from research, divided by the number of academic staff and adjusted in terms of purchasing power, broken down by scientific disciplines (6% weight); (8) research productivity: number of papers per faculty member, adjusted to account for the institution’s size and normalised by scientific disciplines (6% weight); (9) citations: the number of times university papers are cited by other academics worldwide compared with the average number of citations one would expect for a paper of the same type and on the same subject, taken over a five year period (30% weight).

There are also three indicators covering ‘international perspective’: (10) the ratio between foreign students and home students (2.5% weight); (11) the ratio between foreign faculty and home faculty (2.5%); (12) the proportion of articles published by at least one foreign co-author, taking into account the volume of publications and academic disciplines (2.5%); (13) an indicator of knowledge transfers, namely—the institution’s research income from business, divided by the number of academic staff and taking into account the university’s purchasing power (2.5%).

In its 2016/17 edition, THE analysed over 1,300 universities worldwide and included 978 institutions in its ranking. The first 200 universities were listed individually, and from rank 201 onwards, in alphabetical order (in blocks of 50 up until 400, and then in blocks of 100 up until 600, then two final blocks: 601-800 and 801+).

QS is the world ranking of universities which has been published annually by the British company Quacquarelli Symonds, since 2010.\(^\text{12}\) Like the THE but

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10 Before the 2015/16 edition, such data were obtained through the Web of Science database, which is now owned by Clarivate Analytics.

11 The questionnaire is administered on THE’s behalf by Elsevier and is aimed at academics with wide experience and strong publishing track records. The views of these academics are sought on the research and teaching excellence of institutions they know well, in their respective fields. Respondents are asked to name no more than the best fifteen universities, excluding the one at which they work. Effort is made to properly weight the results by discipline and geographic scope. The 2016 survey was carried out between January and March; there were 10,323 responses from 133 countries, and the data was combined with those from the 2015 survey, giving rise to over 20,000 responses in total. See: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/academic-reputation-survey-explained.

12 Times Higher Education and Quacquarelli Symonds published a joint ranking between 2004 and 2009. This went under the name of the THE–QS World University Ranking. In 2010, the two companies went their separate ways, each producing its own ranking using a different methodology.
unlike the ARWU, apart from universities’ research, it also takes into account other aspects and sets great store by reputation surveys (indeed, even more so than the THE). The QS ranking is based on the following six indicators: (1) academic reputation. This indicator is obtained through a global online survey of academics which asks them to identify institutions they consider to be leaders ones in their fields (40% weight); (2) reputation with companies, which is also obtained through a global survey. Companies are asked to say which universities (in their view) are turning out the best graduates (10% weight); (3) the number of academic staff in relation to the number of students enrolled (20%); (4) citations per faculty member: the number of citations made in the last five years for papers published by the university in relation to the total number of faculty members, based on Elsevier’s Scopus database, broken down by academic disciplines (20%); (5) the proportion of international faculty members as a percentage of the total (5% weight); (6) the proportion of foreign students as a percentage of the whole student body (5% weight).

In its 2016/17 edition, QS evaluated almost 4,000 institutions throughout the world and published results on 916. The first 400 universities were individually classified, and from 401 onwards, in blocks of ten, in alphabetical order, from 401 to 500, and in blocks of 50 from 501 to 700, the last block extending from 701 to the end of the series.

Traditional rankings have sparked criticisms and controversies (Aguilló, 2010; Rauhvargers, 2011; Van Vught and Ziegele, 2012; Federkeil, 2013; Parellada, 2013; Sanz-Casado, 2015, 2016). The ARWU ranking is easy to calculate and objective but it refers almost solely to university research. Thus, while it can be taken as an overall indicator of universities, it is based on the possibly false supposition that there is a correlation between an institution’s research capabilities on the one hand, and its teaching capabilities and transfer of knowledge to society as a whole on the other. The supposition is that a university that is good at research will also be good at its other tasks. Furthermore, the indicators used by ARWU (except one) do not take the university’s size into account. The only indicator that does only carries a weight of only 10% in the overall score. Thus, all other things being equal, large universities make a better showing in the ARWU rankings than small ones.

One of the main criticisms made of the THE and QS rankings is the relatively high weights they give to reputation surveys in calculating universities’ overall scores. The methodology used in such surveys and their reflection in the final results remains something of a mystery. The way the surveys are selected is also murky and the response rate tends to be low (roughly 5%, according to Rauhvargers, 2011). This bias leads to over-representation of American academics. Furthermore, the most prestigious and famous institutions are the ones named by everyone and this leads to remarkably similar results. In other words, as Federkeil put it: “This means that those rankings which actively influence the reputation of universities are doing this by measuring just that reputation!” (2013, p. 254).

A criticism of all three rankings is the issue of the weights attached to the individual indicators contributing to the overall score. Here, there is no objective way of knowing what weight should be given to each indicator and thus the decision taken by the ranking authors is a wholly subjective one. Furthermore, trying to sum up a university’s performance in a single score is controversial to say the least, given the complexity of higher education itself.

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13 The database is obtained from the combination of a mailing list, acquired applications, and suggestions. The 2016/17 ranking drew on 74,651 responses from scholars from over 140 countries, including votes cast in the previous five years. Participants could put forward the names of no more than 30 universities, excluding their own. In the case of an employers’ survey, this edition of the ranking drew on 37,781 replies. See: http://www.iu.qs.com/university-rankings/indicator-academic/; http://www.iu.qs.com/academic-survey-responses/; http://www.iu.qs.com/university-rankings/indicator-employer/; http://www.iu.qs.com/employer-survey-responses/.

14 This is an application of the so-called Matthew Effect, the term coined by Robert K. Merton (1968) regarding the measurement of institutional reputation. [Matthew, 25:29, King James Version]
As noted above, research is very heavily weighted in the ARWU ranking but also carries significant weight in both the QS and THE rankings. Within the research category, most stress is usually laid on publications, given that these are the easiest things to measure in a homogeneous, worldwide manner (thanks to publication statistics and databases kept by various companies). Summarising a university’s contribution, quality and performance on the basis of publications indexed by academic journals is a highly reductionist approach. That is because it does not take into account teaching or knowledge transfer into society. Moreover, certain disciplines use ways (apart from papers) to disseminate their research results—for example, conferences, books and so forth (AUBR, 2010, p. 26). In addition, the language of such journals is English by default, which may prejudice universities in countries that have ‘heavyweight’ languages in terms of number of speakers but not in terms of scientific output—Spanish [Castilian] being a case in point. This means that traditional rankings focus on measuring the performance of those institutions falling in the ‘world-class universities’, and ‘top-research universities’ categories, rather than universities following the Humboldtian model or that have other priorities and specialisations. In this respect, they cover less than 5% of the world’s universities (Rauhvargers, 2011).

The three rankings (ARWU, THE, QS), even if they were dreamt up to cover universities as a whole, have also developed some more specific rankings by scientific fields, disciplines, geographical scope, the employment prospects of their graduates, the age of institutions, and so on—changes that in many cases have been made as a market adaptation to the criticism they have received. Thus, there is an ARWU-field ranking and an ARWU-subject ranking, a THE-subject ranking, a QS ranking by faculty, a QS ranking by subject, and the QS Graduate Employability ranking. In the cases of THE and QS, there are special rankings by geographical areas, such as Asia and Latin America, and for universities less than fifty years old. There is also THE’s World Reputation Ranking which lists the 100 universities with the strongest world brands as determined by reputation surveys. The methodology followed in drawing up these specialised rankings is similar to that followed in compiling the general institutional ones, with minor variations in the indicators used, their weights, and procedures (for greater detail, see Universidad.es, 2014 and Sanz-Casado, 2015).

Lastly, one should note that the ARWU methodology can be disentangled and replicated to obtain the rank of any university in the world (Docampo, 2013). However, the same cannot be said for THE and QS, whose results are largely based on reputation surveys and confidential data provided by universities themselves (Sanz-Casado, 2015).

**A NEW KIND OF RANKING: U-MULTIRANK**

Following Van Vught and Ziegele (2012), Krüger and Federkeil (2014), Federkeil (2013, 2015, and 2016), and the U-Multirank web site, one can say that this a system of performance indicators for higher education institutions worldwide. This system has been promoted and funded by the European Union and drawn up by a consortium led by the Centre for Higher Education (CHE) in Germany, and the Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) in the Netherlands. The consortium works closely with various linked entities that help in drawing up the ranking system. In Spain’s case, the CYD Foundation plays this role and acts as an intermediary between U-Multirank and Spanish universities and draws up the ranking for Spain. The CYD ranking and U-Multirank share the same methodological principles and most

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15 THE’s ranking shifted from using the Web of Science database to Scopus. The latter features more publications in languages other than English (especially in Spanish) and more publications with a small circulation. Both factors led to some improvement in the rankings of Spanish-speaking universities.

16 See: http://www.rankingcyd.org/
of the same indicators. However, in CYD’s case, there are also indicators that are better suited to the Spanish university system.17 Both rankings were first published in 2014 and come out each year.

U-Multirank differs from traditional rankings and tries to overcome their most glaring shortcomings. The ARWU, THE, and QS rankings, as mentioned earlier, present results in the form of league tables based on an overall score that is the sum of various weighted indicators. In contrast, U-Multirank gives a whole set of indicators, which, are not only more numerous but are kept separate rather than mixing them up in an overall score. This avoids the need for weighting (which, by its very nature, is highly subjective). These indicators —up to 31 at the institutional level (see Table 1) in the 2016 edition, are classified into five dimensions: (1) Teaching and Learning; (2) Research; (3) Knowledge Transfer; (4) International Orientation; and (5) Contribution to Regional Development. The system is thus a multi-dimensional one. U-Multirank shows the results obtained for the participating universities in each of the aforesaid dimensions, and is placed in one of five groups ranging from A (very good) to E (weak). The performance groups are determined by the distance of a university’s score in relation to a given indicator, taking into account the mean score of all the institutions for which it was possible to calculate said score.

In this respect, U-Multirank analyses university data and builds indicators at both the institutional level (updating these each year) and in terms of fields of knowledge (updated every 4-5 years). The first three editions covered thirteen such fields: Business Studies; Physics; Electrical Engineering; Mechanical Engineering (2014 edition); Computing; Medicine; Psychology (2015 edition); Chemistry; Biology; Mathematics; Sociology; Social Work; and History (2016 edition). The fields of knowledge are based on consistent groups of education programmes. Thus, right from the outset and unlike traditional rankings, U-Multirank accounted for the need to cover all fields of knowledge, because while it is unusual for universities to excel at all disciplines, they often shine in one or more on the world stage. The multi-dimensional nature of the index means universities can be considered centres of excellence in a way that may not be captured by the crude classification of world-class universities. It also reflects differentiation, whether this be in research, teaching, or regional contribution. U-Multirank therefore, in contrast with traditional, media-friendly rankings, better reflects the diversity of higher education institutions and the variety of concepts that can be taken into account in measuring their quality in an international context.

The data used by U-Multirank to draw up its system of indicators come from various sources: universities themselves; international bibliography databases (the Web of Science from Clarivate Analytics is used), the patent database—PATSTAT (the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database) from the European Patents Organisation (EPO)18 and the results of surveys of over 100,000 students, measuring their degree of satisfaction with: the university; the quality of its courses and teaching; programme organisation; contact with faculty; classrooms; computer equipment; labs; and libraries.19 U-Multirank, on its web site, gives users the option of drawing up their own personalised rankings by selecting the indicators they are most interested in. Stakeholders may have varying needs and priorities and so, U-Multirank caters to these.

17 An example is the so-called six-year rule (sexenios) in relation to Spanish researchers. This is an important feature of the Spanish university system but not of higher education elsewhere.

18 The Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) at Leiden (the Netherlands) is a partner in the U-Multirank consortium. CWTS is in charge of drawing up the bibliographic data and calculating the related indicators. Another partner —The International Centre for Research on Entrepreneurship, Technology and Innovation Management (INCENTIM) at the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)—deals with the section dealing with patents.

19 These indicators stem from a survey of students who have been taking a given course for at least a year. The survey results are only used in connection with U-Multirank fields of knowledge, not within institutions. The results yield additional dimensions which have a bearing on teaching and learning.
Table 1: List of U-Multirank indicators (2016 edition) at the institutional level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEACHING AND LEARNING</th>
<th>Graduation rate (bachelor’s degree)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduation rate (master’s degree)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normalised graduation (bachelor’s degree)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Normalised graduation (master’s degree)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Normalised impact of publications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Highly-cited publications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inter-disciplinary publications</td>
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<tr>
<td>RESEARCH</td>
<td>Publications (absolute, normalised number)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Art-related output</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Outside research funds</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Post-Doctoral qualifications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Publications with companies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Private funds</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patent applications with private companies</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER</td>
<td>Patents granted (absolute, normalised number)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spin-offs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Publications cited in patents</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Income from continued training</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Degrees taught in a foreign language</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Masters’ degrees taught in a foreign language</td>
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<td>Student mobility</td>
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<td></td>
<td>International faculty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Doctoral theses by foreign students</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International scholarly publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION</td>
<td>Bachelor degree graduates working in their region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master degree graduates working in their region</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intern students in companies in the region</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional scholarly publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income from regional research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Elaborated by the author, based on U-Multirank data

Thus, a potential student may set greater store in teaching or learning, or on an international orientation, whereas a company may be more interested in universities’ research performance and knowledge transfer. This ranking system takes account of these differences and caters to them. Likewise, one can choose which institutions one wishes to compare. Thus U-Multirank offers ‘like-with-like’ options for comparing universities with similar profiles, with filters for sifting institutions by size, foundational year, or a set of variables that indicate the institution’s research orientation, international positioning, and contribution to regional development.

The U-Multirank web site allows users to order institutions in alphabetical order, or by their score for a given indicator. Furthermore, it allows institutions to be ordered according to the overall result of a set of selected indicators. This ordering takes the form of a medal table with the universities with the most indicators in the top performance group (Group ‘A’) are shown at the top of the table. Should there be more than one institution with the same number of indicators in group A, these indicators are applied in the second group B to establish the order. Should this lead to a draw, the number of indicators in each successive group is taken into account to determine the rank.

In the 2016 edition, U-Multirank included over 1,300 higher education institutions drawn from 90 countries, which means over 3,250 faculties and 10,700 programmes were analysed. The third edition of the U-Multirank–Ranking CYD included 66 Spanish universities. In comparison, only 39 Spanish universities took part in the first edition.

U-Multirank, as one might expect, has also been criticised. However, one of those criticisms, namely that the project promotes European universities is a little unreasonable, bearing in mind the funding comes from the EU. Here, one should note that in the 2016 edition of the ranking, of the more than 1,300 universities on which information was given, 57.3% were European and 47.9% were within the EU. This presence was even more marked in the case of universities which actively provided data over and beyond that gathered from bibliographic sources. Of the more than 780 universities actively taking part in the 2016 edition, no fewer than 80.8% were European (CYD Foundation, 2016).

Another criticism is of the fact that the U-Multirank requires universities to provide a large volume of data and detail on its fields of knowledge. In some cases, gathering such information may be both expensive and time-consuming and will thus put some institutions at a disadvantage. Thus, universities that perform poorly but are managed efficiently or that have simpler organisations will likely have a better ranking than those where the converse is true. There is also a risk that universities may provide inaccurate or inconsistent information that does not reflect the true state of affairs and may thus, produce misleading indicators. In this respect, the information requested may not be fully specified or, even where it is, each institution may have a different idea of what is being asked for. This may be especially true where universities are based in countries with very different cultures (Federkeil, 2015; Sanz-Casado, 2016).

In addition, given that there are so many indicators for both institutions and fields, and that one can choose among them in making comparisons, all universities have the chance of excelling at something. Thus, it may be possible for universities to use U-Multirank solely to promote themselves in the disciplines in which they do well.

Another criticism levelled at U-Multirank concerns the set of indicators proposed. In this respect, some indicators may be unsuitable for measuring a given aspect of university quality. Thus, for example, in the

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21 Sixty-four universities took an active part in furnishing data and two universities solely provided bibliographic and patent data.

22 This criticism is also applicable to traditional rankings and, in some cases, data has been falsified (Rauhvargers, 2011, p. 15).

23 Aguilló (2010) noted that U-Multirank is hard to interpret and that it can be configured as one pleases to yield the results wanted by the user.
teaching and learning dimension, students taking much longer to graduate than the usual term may be more common in countries with a greater tradition of part-time study. Furthermore, it is hard to say whether a shorter time to graduate really indicates quality or is merely a response to student demands (Rauhvargers, 2013). One also needs to incorporate other dimensions affecting the way universities work, such as how easily students find jobs; universities’ corporate social responsibility and their willingness to open up their facilities and services to society as a whole and to publicly disseminate their knowledge (Parellada, 2016). Sometimes, the problem is the availability of the right information to build indicators that reflect a broad range of universities.

It is much more alluring for the media—and for political and university leaders for that matter—to reduce comparison to a simple overall score and to rank institutions than it is to use a more complex system of indicators. Thus, U-Multirank thus makes it easy to receive a ‘top-performing’ university ranking (even though this was not its initial aim). This is doubtless a response to the need to boost the ranking’s media impact. The end result is that U-Multirank now yields a kind of league table that is similar to those produced by traditional rankings.

**FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The rankings that are most successful and have the greatest impact are precisely those that simplify the presentation of results using an overall score to draw up a ‘league table’ of universities (the ARWU, THE, and QS). As we have seen, there are grave methodological shortcomings in attempting to summarise such a complex subject as university quality and performance in such a simple manner. Furthermore, the weights place too much emphasis on research and controversial ‘reputation surveys’ (the THE and QS, among others). The general view is that university rankings are here to stay. Yet the importance given to rankings by media, politicians, and university managers alike seems excessive. Furthermore, the rankings that have the greatest impact are precisely those that simplify their results the most—that is to say, a simple overall score and league table (i.e., the ARWU, THE, and QS). We have already seen the methodological defects that summarise complex issues such as university quality and performance in a too simplistic fashion. Moreover, the weight given to each indicator to obtain the overall score is wholly subjective. Here, one should note the over-emphasis on research and the introduction of controversial reputation surveys (i.e., the THE and QS) among other factors. In this respect, the U-Multirank approach explores the complex profiles of universities rather than producing hard-and-fast overall rankings and this subtle philosophy does not endear it to the media, which seek headlines rather than analysis.

In any case, the obsession with university rankings is having a pernicious impact on decision-making, leading managers to focus on getting their institution into the top rankings and to push them up the ladder at the expense of everything else. This explains why universities desperately seek collaboration with frequently-cited institutions and researchers in order to boost their own place in the rankings, with scant regard to either the field or the reasons why. The habit of writing papers with a long string of authors has become commonplace for the same reason. Advancing knowledge in a given field has become a purely secondary consideration. Furthermore, the importance given to the reputation stemming from these rankings has reached such a fever pitch that in some countries, students only get grants for foreign exchanges if these programmes are at universities listed among the ‘top’ 100 or 200 institutions in the traditional rankings (Fernández de Lucio and García, 2014; Mora, 2016).

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24 Two of the factors highlighted as key to restoring the notion of university reputation are: (1) greater competition among universities; (2) the availability of tools to measure such reputation. Rankings play a notable role here. Hence the importance of the methodology used to build the various rankings and their impact on universities’ reputations (Mora, 2015).

25 These consequences have led to some observers arguing that most of the world’s universities should simply stop heeding rankings. Here, one should note that the so-called top 100 universities only make up 0.5% of higher education institutions and only 0.6% of the world’s university students. Those falling outside this charmed circle tend to be universities that are one or more of the following: medium-sized, specialised, regional in scope, recently founded, or smaller (especially in developing countries). Such institutions make up the vast majority of the world’s universities (Altbach and Hazelkorn, 2017).
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BIOGRAFICAL NOTES

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Human resources in the global higher education market: the presence of foreign professors in Spanish universities

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ABSTRACT
Despite the existence of a global higher education market in which universities compete to attract talented academics from all over the world, most higher education institutions hire very few foreign researchers. Indeed, in Spain, only 1 in 40 academics are from abroad. This article focuses the Spanish case in order to deepen our understanding of the factors affecting the internationalisation of academic staff in the higher education sector. The analysis is based on data from the European Register of Tertiary Education Institutions and Spanish Higher Education Statistics data, collected by Spain’s National Statistics Office. The main results of this exploratory analysis show that there are differences between Spanish regions in terms of the proportion of foreign staff they hire. Moreover, at the institutional level, the most internationalised universities are relatively new institutions, and most of them are located in Catalonia. The political and economic framework in Spain discourages the hiring of international academics. However, in this context, two important insights should be highlighted: On the one hand, the differences between Catalonia and the rest of the Spanish autonomous communities show that sub-national policies may have a strong impact on internationalisation processes in decentralised countries like Spain; on the other hand, divergence between universities shows the importance of the strategic behaviour of actors facing environmental pressures.

Keywords: higher education, academic profession, academic careers, organisational change, internationalisation.

INTRODUCTION
Universities play an important role in the creation and dissemination of knowledge and over the last few decades, higher education institutions (HEIs) have become crucial in the generation of economic growth and social wellbeing in both developed and developing countries. In 1996, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coined the concept ‘Knowledge-based economy’ (OECD, 1996). This term refers to a type of productive system where the creation, organisation, and transfer of knowledge are key for economic success. Implementation of this model requires a range of conditions, including: allocation of a significant share of gross domestic product (GDP) to research and development (R&D) activities, establishment of R&D funding programs
(e.g. Horizon 2020), creation of innovation-based companies, proliferation of innovators and entrepreneurs, and training of a large number of highly skilled workers who are willing to learn over the course of their lifetime (lifelong learners), among other factors.

In this context, universities are being put under increasing pressure to improve the outcomes of their main objectives: training future professionals (teaching-learning), knowledge creation (research), and knowledge transfer (patents, public-private collaborations, start-ups, etc.). Examples of this are the implementation of performance-based funding systems (Jongbloed and Vossensteyn, 2001; Liefner, 2003; McLendon and Hearn, 2013) and the growing competence among universities to attract students and academics (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2001; Altbach et al. 2009; Pereira-Puga, 2014; 2015), as well as the growing importance of achieving a high placement on university rankings (Salmi, 2009; Hazelkorn, 2011; Wang et al., 2013; Enders, 2014), meaning that national governments now compete with each other to get their HEIs ranked as high as possible.

The higher education sector has changed a lot over the past 30–40 years and one of the most important changes is academic internationalisation (Scott, 1998; Altbach and Teichler, 2001; De Wit, 2002; Enders, 2004; Mazzarol and Soutar, 2012; Altbach, 2015). In this sense, internationalisation refers to a wide range of policies and strategies implemented by governments and universities and is aimed at attracting more foreign students, academics, and research funds from supranational bodies, as well as improving institutional performance in terms of international publications and collaborations with foreign institutions, among other factors (Altbach, 2015, p. 6).

Focusing on the internationalisation of human resources, it must be noted that academic mobility has a long tradition which commenced in the Middle Ages (Musselin, 2004; Byram and Dervin, 2009; Kim and Locke, 2010; Bauder, 2015). However, encouraging international mobility among academic staff only more recently became a goal for HEIs (De Wit, 2002). Within the European Union (EU), several public policies implemented relatively recently have aimed to promote international mobility (Musselin, 2004, p. 56). For example, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Program for postdoctoral mobility. Nevertheless, most of the national labour markets still remain local and just a few countries and institutions dominate the ‘global scientific systems’ in terms of attracting foreign professors and researchers (Altbach, 2015, p. 6).

Taking into account that human resources policies in academia are a strategic element of knowledge production (Bauder, 2015), it is important to deepen our understanding of the factors underlying the differences between universities in terms of the outputs of their hiring models. As we know, the hiring processes carried out by HEIs are affected by factors such as their level of autonomy from the state (Olsen, 2007; Dobbins and Knill, 2009; Whitley, 2012), existing laws (Bosch, 2006; Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2015), and cuts in public budgets (Griffith, 1993). Given these constraints, insight can be gained from analysing how and why universities located in the same country (and thus, with a similar degree of autonomy from the state, a common regulatory framework, and the same funding system), significantly differ in terms of their levels of academic staff internationalisation.

This current article describes an exploratory analysis of the internationalisation of the 48 Spanish public universities with the objective of analysing differences in terms of their share of international academic staff, both at the regional and the university level. This should deepen our understanding of the factors affecting the internationalisation of human resources in academia. Moreover, the Spanish case is especially relevant for two reasons: Firstly, the university landscape in Spain is very diverse, e.g. consolidated universities coexist alongside several HEIs which are less than thirty years old, thus allowing the different types of environmental adaptation patterns adopted by these diverse institutions to be explored. Secondly, Spanish universities largely depend on regional rather than central government funding, meaning that the effects of different policies on hiring-process outcomes can be examined.
This article is structured as follows: The first section contains the theoretical framework guiding the analysis, the second section describes the most relevant characteristics of Spanish HEIs and their implications in university hiring processes, the third section presents the data and ratio calculation methods, the fourth section analyses the results and discusses their implications for the future of the higher education sector in Spain, and the final section provides some conclusions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The political and economic environments have changed dramatically over the last four decades and as a result, universities have developed many different types of institutional responses. In this regard, more than twenty years ago Clark Kerr (1993) stated that the changes taking place in universities are more revolutionary than evolutionary. The changing world has produced major transformations in the institutional management of universities as well as in the nature of the higher education industrial sector (Peterson, 2007).

One of the major changes was the creation of a global higher education market in which universities are expected to attract and retain the best international students and academics. This situation is consistent with the dynamics of other knowledge-intensive sectors where the attraction of outstanding workers is a strategic aspect of the competition between companies (Grant, 1996). Indeed, the OECD (2008) dedicated a full report to the international mobility of highly-skilled workers. In this respect, it is interesting to note that some of the most important university rankings, such as that in the Times Higher Education (THE) supplement, include the percentage of international academic staff as one of its indicators.

However, the global higher education market involves just a small group of countries and universities, while in contrast, most national academic labour markets remain local (Altbach, 2015). Thus, it is important to understand why some universities attract significant numbers of international professors while others still have large proportions of national staff and ‘inbred’ academics (Godechot and Louvet, 2008; Sivak and Yudkevich, 2009; Yudkevich et al., 2015). Notably, organisational behaviour is the product of external pressures exerted by environmental actors, additional constraints (such as normative frameworks), and organisations’ active responses to change or stability (Pfeffer, 1982; Oliver, 1991; Gornitzka, 1999). In other words, there are factors affecting universities that are not managed by universities themselves (e.g. the existing labour laws and the country’s economic development). Nonetheless, universities play an active role in other aspects of their management, such as their organisational response to environmental demands.

The literature on higher education argues that one of the key variables determining organisational behaviour is autonomy from the state. Indeed, Whitley (2012) classifies universities based on their degree of autonomy, from more to less autonomous, as: Private-portfolio, State-chartered, State-concentrated, and Hollow. Highly autonomous universities are free to establish their own hiring and promotion processes and to negotiate salaries and benefits, etc., while there is less room for manoeuvre in more dependent institutions. Therefore, one would expect to find very dissimilar hiring decisions in countries with a high degree of university autonomy and, on the contrary, more homogenous hiring and promotion processes in HEIs in countries with very state-dependent universities. Another relevant factor explaining international academic mobility is the attractiveness of the country, and this significantly effects the appeal of institutions. Indeed, Lepori et al. (2015) recently found that factors linked to universities’ home country play an even more important role in academics’ choices than the quality of the university itself. This connects with research on international migration suggesting that the characteristics of the destination country are good predictors of migration decision-making (De Jong and Fawcett, 1981; Ritsilä and Ovaskainen, 2001).
The aforementioned factors directly influence the hiring-process outcomes and are beyond universities’ capacity to intervene. However, HEIs are still active rather than passive actors; they can respond to their external constraints in different ways. In her classic work, Oliver (1991) asserts that organisations can adopt a range of strategic responses to their environments. For our purposes, two of these are particularly relevant: organisational avoidance and conformity. In this context, neo-institutionalist theories suggest that organisations tend to accept the norms, values, and rules already existing in their environment in order to survive (Gornitzka, 1999). Hence, given the scarcity of incentives to hire foreign academics, it is not surprising that most of universities hire mostly local candidates. Nevertheless, as Oliver (1991) argues, universities which avoid conformity may exist and thus, this possibility should not be excluded. At the same time, the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1982) submits that the greater a HEI’s dependency on environmental resources, the higher the likelihood that the organisation will adapt to its social and economic context. In other words, organisations change when not doing so jeopardises the flow of their external resources.

In countries like Spain, only a very small proportion of the university funding system is based on performance and so there is very limited economic incentive for them to compete for talented researchers in the global academic market. Moreover, attracting international academics is also influenced by university-level factors, such as campus facilities and infrastructures, potential for attracting research funds, and institutional reputation (see Lepori et al., 2015 for a complete review of the factors determining academic mobility).

HIRING ACADEMIC STAFF IN SPAIN

We must also understand how the factors mentioned in the previous section affect the hiring processes in Spanish universities. In terms of university autonomy, Spain’s public HEIs only have limited independence in terms of their human resources policy. The selection process for academic civil servants is based on a two-step model. In the first stage candidates must be accredited by a public foundation called ANECA (the Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación, translated as the National Agency of Quality Assessment and Accreditation Evaluation). There are two types of accreditations for academic civil servant positions: Profesor Titular (tenured junior professors) and Catedrático (tenured full senior professors). ANECA determines the requirements that candidates must fulfil in order to obtain accreditation (i.e. they establish the evaluation criteria) and also undertake the evaluation of all the candidates (Pereira-Puga, 2016b).

Once a candidate is awarded an accreditation they can apply for open positions at the university level. Thus, universities have some autonomy in their hiring processes in that they make the final decision on which candidate is awarded the position. However, they can only select a candidate that has been previously accredited by ANECA, making it difficult to attract foreign candidates because most international academics do not hold the required accreditation. Moreover, the process of obtaining this accreditation is very bureaucratic and takes several months. Additionally, candidates holding a PhD awarded by a foreign university must get their diploma ratified by the Spanish Administration, another process which takes months or even years and discourages foreign academics from moving to Spain (Grove, 2016). Likewise, although there are some insignificant regional differences, wages in the Spanish higher education system are fixed by law (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2015; Pereira-Puga, 2016b). This means that universities cannot negotiate salaries with potential candidates and reduces Spain’s competitiveness as a research destination (Pereira-Puga, 2016a).

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2 This system was established in 2007. The process is basically the same as for other types of non-civil servant positions. However, it must be noted that ANECA (see text body) have a series of regional counterparts that are allowed to provide accreditations for non-tenured positions and for tenured positions without civil servant status.

3 Nevertheless, according to the law, foreign candidates can apply for positions without holding an ANECA accreditation, depending on their seniority.
Regarding the attractiveness of the country, the situation is ambivalent. Spain is part of the EU, thus allowing the free circulation of workers from any member state, and is a member of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and the European Research Area (ERA). It also participates in all the European programs devoted to higher education, science, technology and innovation, including the European Commission’s frameworks (e.g. Horizon 2020), Erasmus, Erasmus Plus, etc., all of which can bolster Spain’s inbound mobility therefore making it more attractive to foreign academics. However, according to the main rankings, no Spanish university has yet achieved a world top 100 ranking (Grau i Vidal, 2013; Grove, 2016), making the country less attractive to outstanding researchers. Similarly, other reasons such as language barriers (Musselin, 2004) may also negatively affect Spain’s attractiveness.

Finally, institutional factors including HEIs’ responses to change, reputation, infrastructures and facilities, competitiveness in terms of attracting funding, etc. are also very important, and Spanish universities significantly vary in this respect. The Spanish higher education system is the result of a combination of old universities, some of them established in the medieval era (e.g. Complutense University of Madrid, Salamanca, Valencia, and Zaragoza Universities, and the University of Santiago de Compostela, among others), and new institutions, most of which opened in the 1990s. Some of the latter are located in global cities (Sassen, 2002), such as Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona) and Carlos III University (Madrid), while some others were established in peripheral cities and towns. Therefore, these and other factors account for the significant differences between HEIs.

**METHODOLOGY**

This article aims to deepen our understanding of the factors affecting the internationalisation of academic staff in the higher education sector. The analysis is based on data from the European Register of Tertiary Education Institutions (ETER) database, the most comprehensive and up-to-date database on the European higher education sector. ETER is an open-access database sponsored by the European Commission which contains data on students, staff, research activities, funding, etc., from almost 3,000 universities in 36 European countries. Some additional data used for the analysis come from Spain’s most current database and reliable source of data on the Spanish higher education sector, the Higher Education Statistics (Estadística de la Enseñanza Universitaria) produced annually by Spain’s National Statistics Office.

The data for the total academic and international staff for the 48 Spanish public universities were used to calculate internationalisation ratios: specifically, the percentage of foreign professors (including non-tenured and tenured positions) included in the total academic staff. In addition, the percentage of foreign professors in the 17 Spanish regions and in every Spanish public university was calculated in order to generate macro-level (regional) and micro-level (university) information. Furthermore, details of the Catalonian science system, based on secondary data obtained from different bibliographic and statistical sources, are given in order to outline why many of the most internationalised Spanish universities are located in that region.

**RESULTS: INTERNATIONALISATION OF ACADEMIC STAFF IN SPANISH UNIVERSITIES**

Comparisons of the ratios of foreign academic staff in Spanish HEIs should be taken in the context of internationalisation in the European higher education sector. Graph 1 shows the percentage of foreign academic staff in 10 European countries; the Netherlands and the United Kingdom lead the table, with 33.9% and 27.3% of staff in their universities being foreign, respectively, whereas Spain has the

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4 The graph includes all European countries whose figures on international academic staff are available in the ETER database. The data include both public and private universities.
lowest levels of internationalisation of any country in the sample at 2.5%. In other words, the Spanish higher education system is not competitive in the context of the global academic market.

Focusing on Spain, Graph 2 shows the share of foreign academic staff present in public universities, organised by region. Here, we can see significant differences between autonomous communities, although the ratios of foreign staff present were low in every region. According to the data, the most internationalised region is Catalonia (where 4.7% of academic staff are foreign), followed at some distance by the Canary Islands (2.9%), the Balearic Islands (2.6%), and Madrid (2.6%). In contrast, there are four communities in which the percentage of foreign academic staff does not even reach one percent: La Rioja (0.5%), Navarra (0.8%), Castile and León (0.9%), and Aragon (0.95%). These numbers indicate that openness in terms of recruiting foreign academic staff is poor in these regions. Additionally, it is surprising that some of the most economically developed autonomous communities, such as Navarra, the Basque Country, and the Valencian Community do not seem to have adopted successful internationalisation strategies.

Moving from the regional to the institutional level, Graph 3 shows the percentage of international staff present in Spanish public universities. Firstly, four out of the five most internationalised universities are located in the same region: Catalonia. In addition, most of the Catalan HEIs performed above the Spanish average (2.2%). Here, it is important to remember that Spain is one of the most decentralised countries in Europe: Spain’s regions have a wide degree of autonomy in areas such as educational policy and autonomous governments are responsible for every level of education (from primary to tertiary), even though central government still maintains power in terms of some key legislative issues (Puelles, 2002; Bonal, 2005).

In this sense, Catalonia is an interesting case study. Located on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, Catalonia is the country’s second most populated region (with some 7.5 million inhabitants in 2016) and the largest in terms of its foreign population (accounting for 1.0 million inhabitants in 2014). Its GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power standards is the highest in the Country, making it one of the most developed regions in Southern

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6 Source: Spanish Statistics Office: http://www.ine.es/jaxi/Tabla.htm?path=/t20/e245/p04/provi/10/&file=0ccaa002.px&L=0
Europe. The Catalan government has also used its authority to promote research excellence, especially in science. One of its most notable initiatives was the establishment of the Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (abbreviated as ICREA in Spain). This foundation, supported by the Catalan government, aims to hire and retain world leading-researchers. ICREA hires outstanding academics in order to fill positions in Catalan universities and research centres and offers salaries much higher than those fixed by the Spanish law, markedly improving the attractiveness of Catalonia as a research destination. There are currently 258 ICREA research professors (from 28 different countries) and these represent 1.5% of all academics in Catalonia. ICREA members have attracted 288 million euros in research funds over the last five years and it is estimated that each fellow has maintained an average 6.5 full-time academic jobs (for more information on ICREA see its 2016 Annual Report).

Along with the establishment of ICREA, the Catalan government also promoted the creation of excellence research centres (such as the Institute of Chemical Research of Catalonia, the Institute for Research in Biomedicine, the Centre for Genomic Regulation, and the Institute of Photonic Sciences) which play a very relevant role in attracting research funds as well as in hiring and retaining outstanding researchers. Additionally, the Catalan government has challenged the Spanish traditional scheme of professorships based on civil servant positions by creating non-civil servant full professorships (Catedrático contractat), which aim to make the human resources structure more flexible.

The antithesis of the Catalan case is Andalusia. Both regions are similar in terms of population and the number of public universities. However, as shown in Graph 3, only one of the Andalusian universities has an above-Spanish average number of foreign academics (Pablo de Olavide University). Madrid falls intermediate between these two cases: there are six public universities in the region, three of

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7 Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2016: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistical-atlas/gis/viewer/?year=&chapter=06&mids=2,52&o=1,1&center=50.36441,15.65899,3&nutsId=ES51

8 For more details on academic careers in Catalonia see: http://www.aqu.cat/doc/doc_45839814_1.pdf
No data were available for the universities of Almería, Burgos, Huelva, Jaén, or La Rioja.

*Graph 3. Percentage of international academic staff by university (2013)*

SOURCE: Author's own elaboration from data from the ETER database
them ranked in the top 10 (Carlos III, Rey Juan Carlos, and the Autonomous University), while two others are in the middle of the table, and one is at the bottom (Graph 3). Interestingly, 8 out of 17 Spanish autonomous communities have only a public university (Aragon, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, Cantabria, Castile La Mancha, La Rioja, and Navarra). Graph 3 illustrates that all these universities performed below the Spanish average, with the exception of the University of the Balearic Islands.

Previously published work (Pereira-Puga, 2015) showed that there is generally very little competition between Spanish universities to attract students, staff, and funding. Indeed, their resources come mainly from public sources and the funding system is only cursively based on performance. Around 90% of their students are from their own region and in many of them the ratios of inbred academics are exceptionally high. Thus, a hypothesis for future research is that low levels of competition between universities discourages the recruitment of external candidates. Lastly, the vast majority of institutions that rank highly in the ratio tables presented here are newly-created universities. One might expect that older HEIs would be more attractive to foreign researchers because of their history and reputation. However, in the Spanish case it seems that new ideas and styles of leadership in younger institutions are helping to attract foreign talent.

In summary, this data highlights the fact that the ratio of foreign academics in Spanish HEIs is very low. This is probably related to the bureaucracy of the current national system of hiring and promotion, based on accreditations awarded by ANECA and its regional counterparts, which discourages international candidates from applying for positions. Additionally, academic salaries in Spain are fixed by law and are not competitive compared to those in other European countries. Regarding the attractiveness of the country, the fact that some universities have very few foreign professors shows that Spanish HEIs are not maximising Spain’s potential academic attractiveness (as an EU member state, active participant in the EHEA, and ERA, etc.) to boost recruitment of talented foreign researchers. Finally, the large differences found between universities located in the same region indicates that attracting outstanding researchers is not only related to external aspects (central government laws, regional policies, etc.), but that it is also related to universities’ willingness to participate in the global higher education market.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The university sector has considerably changed over the past four decades and one of the major changes has been the process of internationalisation. Among other requirements, academics are now expected to raise funds from international funding bodies, to take part in international research projects, and to co-author academic work with foreign colleagues. Research into the internationalisation of the higher education sector has highlighted the existence of a global human resources market, where universities compete to hire outstanding academics. However, this global market only involves a few countries and institutions, while most national human resources markets remain local. In this context, this article analyses the Spanish case in order to deepen our understanding on the factors influencing hiring-process outcomes in terms of international university staff.

The data presented here shows that Spain is not a competitor in the global academic human resources market. Indeed, the proportion of foreign academic staff working in Spanish universities is much lower than that in other European countries including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. However, there are significant differences between individual Spanish regions. At the institutional level, the most internationalised universities are young institutions (aged less than

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9 The percentages of foreign academic staff at the national level include both public and private universities but at the regional and institutional level they include only public universities.
100 years) and most of them are located in Catalonia. Additionally, there are significant differences between universities located in the same region: HEIs belonging to the same autonomous community perform dissimilarly in terms of attracting foreign academics.

Spain is an interesting case example for explaining how environmental (normative frameworks, funding systems, wages, bureaucracies, etc.) influence university hiring-process decisions. Nevertheless, the differences found between universities (even between universities located in the same region) show that HEIs are not passive players. They are able to make decisions either to increase their share of foreign professors or to hire mainly local staff. Additionally, this article also briefly discusses the Catalanian case—the most internationalised region in Spain. Taking advantage of its autonomy, the Catalanian regional government has established a range of policies aimed at increasing the internationalisation of its universities. Some examples of this are the creation of non-civil servant professorships, the implementation of more flexible hiring procedures, and the establishment of the ICREA foundation. These initiatives show that, in decentralised countries, regional polices may generate a significant change in universities’ degree of openness and internationalisation.

Although this work highlights some interesting points, it is an exploratory study and so further research should be carried out in this area, both to quantify the effects of different factors on universities’ hiring-processes decisions and to improve our knowledge of the institutional factors (e.g. leadership, organisational structures, etc.) that determine universities’ degree of participation in the global higher education market.

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BIOPGRAPHICAL NOTE

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Students as customers: a paradigm shift in higher education

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ABSTRACT
Increasingly, higher education students are being considered as customers or clients. But this new way of seeing students implies a substantial change in the traditional notion of the student. The idea of student–customers goes beyond the demand for proper attention to the student: it is part of an entirely new paradigm in higher education, which also includes other factors, such as the idea of higher education as a competitive market, public reputation as an institutional priority associated with a greater capacity for attracting and satisfying students, study programmes conceived by the students as an important personal and economic investment, curricula designed with a clear professional development orientation, quality systems centred on the value of customer satisfaction, and a new way of understanding educational relationships between students and faculty. This paradigm is the everyday way of thinking in some countries, while in others, such as Spain, it is slowly breaking through only now. This paper analyses this paradigm via an extensive bibliographical review of the research on the different factors that characterise it and its impact on the quality of the learning processes and the social function of universities.

Keywords: higher education, students, quality, learning processes, student–faculty relationships, customer satisfaction.

THE STUDENT–CUSTOMER CONCEPT
Recently, a senior executive at the London South Bank University, mediating on the intense British debate about students as customers, said, “Students are customers, and I would challenge anyone to suggest otherwise. We are charging our customers nearly £50,000 over three years, and for that cost, they deserve to know that they will receive the very best service” (Mehrtens, 2016).

The progressive transformation of higher education into a competitive market has placed the issue of attracting student–customers at the centre of university management. Marc C. Taylor, from Columbia University, emphasised that “To deny that higher education is a product and students are customers is to duck the tough questions we should be asking.” (New York Times Editors, 2010, para. 8).

Heather Rolfe confirmed this shift in the conception that lecturers have of students: “We increasingly see them as customers and, as customers, we should give them good service, which I think is a good thing” (testimony of Lecturer B6, Rolfe, 2002, p. 178); “And I find myself telling them that if they want to come to see me, which is partly what they pay
me for, they are the customers and have rights” (testimony of Lecturer C7, Rolfe, 2002, p. 178). The transformation of students into customers, although recognisable in almost all countries, seems particularly established in university systems set up as competitive markets, such as those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

Without doubt, high tuition rates encourage students to adopt an attitude of demanding value-for-money and thinking more like customers than as members of the university community. As customers, they demand what they think they need from their provider, in a concrete and specific way. Indeed, a comprehensive report about student attitudes commissioned by the British Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) pointed to the emergence of a consumerist ethos, relative “to the value attributed to their educational experience and the value they expected to receive as a return for their investment” (Kandiko and Mawer, 2013, p. 22). Getting ‘value for money’ is the motto underlying the student conversations gathered in this study, where an “overwhelming majority” valued their university experience in terms of an economic investment, often referring to high fees.

The annual report of the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) shows a trend of uninterrupted growth of the idea that students are investors over decades in North America. In this context, there is a growing number of students who state that they go to college with a view to earning more money (74.6% in 2012 versus less than 50% in 1976; Pryor et al., 2012). Consistent with this finding, the 2014 study undertaken by the Lumina Foundation and a Gallup poll recorded that 95% of students believed that the purpose of studying for a university degree was to “get a good job”. “There is no greater financial investment in one’s future than a college degree”, claims Lowe (2014) in The Huffington Post and, like his, a myriad of similar articles analyse which degrees and universities provide a better return on investment.

In Spain, ‘Ensuring a living’, ‘Getting a good job’, ‘Making money’, or ‘Being successful’ are also clearly students’ top reasons for going to university (Boza and Toscano, 2012; Suriá et al., 2012).

This instrumental vision of higher education, as an investment in time, effort, and money from which a return is expected in the form of economic dividends and social prestige, certainly generates a fertile climate—necessary, but not sufficient—for the idea of the customer–student to thrive. To think of the student as a customer also implies thinking of the university as a provider—of services, a qualification, a social brand—creating a relationship in which the customer is in a position to demand, a characteristic of any client in a competitive market.

The increasing number of complaints and claims made by students in the British and Australian ambit is a valuable indicator of the growth of the idea of the customer–student who demands value for their investment. Glyn Jones, director of the Kingston University Student Affairs Office, highlighted the subject thus:

As students now have to pay more for their education, they are becoming more demanding in their expectations about what universities should provide. In recent years, the relations between institutions and students have shifted from the traditional academic relationship to a more contractual type of relationship taken from a consumer’s perspective (Jones, 2006, pp. 70–71).

In fact, the number of complaints received by the Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA), the centralised UK office that deals with final stage of student claims, grew from 586 in 2006, to 1850 in 2015 (OIA, 2015, p. 9). Australian Anita Stuhmcke (2001) points out how the configuration of the university system as a competitive market with high enrolment rates, has generated a very significant increase in the number of complaints, which increasingly frequently end up in the courts. This has forced universities to write down
their commitments to students very carefully and to create complaints offices with professional experts on the subject.

From the academic point of view, this new student–customer and university–provider scenario, which is especially typical in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia (whose higher education systems have been transformed into a competitive market with high enrolment rates), raises very relevant issues, to the extent that it can mean a profound transformation of the relationships between students, faculty, and institutions, which has redefined academic culture.

Herein, we extensively review the research available in these countries with a view to systematising the transformations that are taking place in two aspects:

(1) Institutional academic priorities in this student–customer and university–provider scenario to ask: Where are academic resources and effort being invested?

(2) The academic implications of converting student–customer satisfaction into a new priority institutional objective to ask: How these changes affect the academic offer and educational activity? How are roles and attitudes transformed?

Finally, we present a global vision of what this new scenario represents from the point of view of universities’ academic policies and educational activities. The ultimate objective is to anticipate the possible threats that a transformation of this nature represents to the traditional university model in countries like Spain.

**INSTITUTIONAL PRIORITIES IN A CUSTOMER–PROVIDER SCENARIO: REPUTATION, SELECTIVITY, AND SATISFACTION**

Correct functioning of the market in a competitive university environment requires the potential customer to have sufficient comparative information about the different institutions and their academic offer. University systems have thus invested a great deal of effort in implementing public indicators, from the degree of job placements for each degree or university or the dropout and academic success rates, to information about the qualifications of teachers or the agreements with companies and training available. However, nothing is more decisive in the enrolment decision than the reputation or prestige of the institution, the level of entry selectivity, and student satisfaction reports: three factors that reinforce each other and that strongly determine the perceptions, attitudes, and actions of student–customers.

The institution’s reputation is a key factor that provides it with a great competitive advantage. Classical marketing literature has always emphasised the importance that reputation has on intangible products and services, and which cannot be measured, tested, or verified before purchase and which therefore requires a kind of act of faith by the purchaser (e.g. Zeithaml et al., 1990; Fombrun, 1996). As Litten states, “They cannot be shown directly or photographed; they cannot be handled, examined, compared to each other on a shelf or on the shop floor, nor can they be tested in the same way as physical goods can” (Litten, 1986, p. 18). US studies at the time also confirmed this general principle in the higher education market: “Academic reputation has a powerful influence on students, greater than professional counsellors’ advice or relatives’ influence”, concluded McDonough et al. (1998, p. 533).

Reputation is a complex concept, built upon the aggregation of multiple dimensions, but university rankings are a simple way to showcase them publicly. The analyses by Bastedo and Bowman (2010) show a strong correlation between the overall rankings results and those of peer reputation surveys, as well as little variability in the time of these valuations. This conclusion is not a surprising if we consider that some of the most important world rankings make reputation surveys one of their most decisive assessment sources (accounting for 50% of the valuation in the QS ranking, 33% in the Times Higher Education (THE)
This virtuous cycle protects the major university brands (Diamond and Graham, 2000), i.e., their reputation leads to good results in the rankings, which, in turn, reinforces their good reputation. As Craig and Lombardi (2012) point out, the only evidence of reputation is reputation itself, which makes the rankings alien to the true qualities of the institution.

Reputation is presented as a key factor in attracting students, particularly those with better academic records or those in advantageous economic positions (McDonough et al., 1998; McDonough et al., 1997; Kotler and Fox, 1995) and, likewise, attracting students with higher academic qualifications is considered to be one of the determinants of a university's reputation (Astin, 1970; Volkwein and Sweitzer, 2006). Reputation is also, according to Eskildsen et al. (1999), the variable that exerts the strongest influence over student fidelity. The concept of fidelity shows students' disposition to recommending the institution to other students and to discuss its positive aspects, as well as their intention to continue attending its study programs or other educational activities.

Undoubtedly, the satisfaction of students and graduates is just as an important factor in the public construction of reputation, as long as there are mechanisms that allow this to be advertised beyond mere personal communication. It is precisely the countries that have openly opted for a competitive system that have implemented a survey of student satisfaction among institutions. In the United States there are several widely–used instruments, such as the Student Satisfaction Inventory (Noel-Levitz, n.d.), but in countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, or the Netherlands, governments implement only one survey—the National Student Survey (NSS)—for all universities, and provide rankings that have a strong impact on both universities' reputation and demand. Universities that obtain the best positions in the NSS (implemented in the UK since 2004) or in the NSE (Nationale Studenten Enquête, applied in the Netherlands since 2010) advertise their results with great fanfare, including outdoor advertising on billboards and buses.

The factors contributing to student satisfaction are highly diverse and extraordinarily variable, according to different university contexts. Decades ago, Astin (1977) foretold that student satisfaction could not be clearly attributed to any specific educational quality, and subsequent studies have done nothing but confirm the enormous complexity of the phenomenon, and the difficulty of decisively attributing satisfaction results to any particular factor. Thorough studies such as those by Wiers-Jenssen et al. (2002), Hill et al. (2003), Douglas et al. (2006), Alves and Raposo (2007), or Duque and Weeks (2010) all yielded very different definitions of the factors that determine the degree of student satisfaction. Student satisfaction is continually shaped by the very diverse experiences of life on campus, both inside and outside the lecture hall (Sevier, 1996) and strongly depends on specific contextual factors that fashion their expectations. As Elliott and Shin concluded (2002, p. 198) “Student satisfaction is a subtle and complex phenomenon”.

One particularly interesting result of these studies is that they demonstrate a close bidirectional link between reputation and satisfaction. Empirical investigations such as those of Eskildsen et al. (1999), Alves and Raposo (2007), or Brown and Mazzarol (2009) demonstrate a strong correlation between the two factors. Alves and Raposo conclude that in terms of total effects, if the institution's image increases or decreases by one point in terms of assessment, satisfaction levels proportionally increase or decrease by 0.86 point (2007, p. 81). This strong dependence could be due to the supposed better educational quality of universities with a better reputation; however, the data do not seem to support this hypothesis (educational quality is usually a relevant factor, but not as important as the prestige of the university). Nor do specific studies on the educational practices of the most prestigious universities confirm this supposition (Dale and Kreuger, 2002; Kuh and Pascarella, 2004).

Thus, we must resort to the idea that, for students, the prestige of their university is valuable in itself—to the extent that employers consider it as a mark of
their qualifications (Regev, 2007). Regardless of the educational quality per se, attending a prestigious university does mark a difference in future opportunities (Kingston and Smart, 1990; Clarke, 2002; Dill, 2003; Montgomery and Canaan, 2004). In this respect, Binsardi and Ekwulugo (2003) pointed out that students do not ‘buy’ qualifications as such, but rather the benefits that a title can provide them in terms of employment, status, and lifestyle, among other things. On the other hand, the fact of belonging to a highly selective university predisposes students to have a more positive attitude and greater satisfaction with the university experiences they live.

The classical studies by Fombrun already warned us that “reputation affects the probability that all involved show favourable behaviour” (Fombrun and Riel, 2003, p. 4). The image and reputation of an institution can be even more important than the quality itself, because it is the perceived image that really influences the choices and attitudes of students (Kotler and Fox, 1995). Not even the high fees of many of these universities seem to penalise student demand or levels of satisfaction, because they perceive the high price to be a sign of higher quality and prestige (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999).

On the other hand, studies have shown there is a link between a university’s reputation and better rates and quality in its graduates’ employment. We should consider this information together with the fact that the universities with the best reputations and employment rates are those often attended by the best students, from the academic point of view, among which a medium-high or high socio-economic level predominates.

Taken together we have drawn the key virtuous circle of the potential to attract the student–customer: better students (higher selectivity), better reputation, greater satisfaction, and better rates of employment, factors that feed each other and that make a university attractive. In other words, if one manages to attract the best students from the best socially positioned families then, logically, one obtains the best academic results and employment outcomes.

**STUDENT–CUSTOMER SATISFACTION: THE NEW PRIORITY FOCUS OF POLICY AND ACADEMIC ACTIVITY**

“If customers like it, then it’s a quality product” (Doherty, 1995, p. 3).

According to Kanji and Tambi (1999) in higher education, student–customer satisfaction is the goal and measure of quality: “Satisfaction means being better at what matters most to customers and this changes over time. To be in touch with these changes and to give satisfaction to the customer now, and in the future, is a basic part of the integral management of quality” (1999, p. 152). In a competitive environment, in which students are customers, the quality of qualifications and institutions tends to be identified with the degree of satisfaction of their students. High satisfaction levels not only improve retention and fidelity rates and increase universities’ ability to attract new students, but also enable the creation of collaborative networks of graduates with huge potential and which are highly instrumental in improving the organisation’s reputation and position in the market. From this perspective, how students feel during their university experience is an important focus of an institution’s attention (Munteanu et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2003) i.e., they are “an avenue through which a competitive advantage can be gained” (Elliott and Shin, 2002, p. 199) and are the focal point for the university’s quality strategy.

Satisfaction can be understood as “a psychological state or a subjective judgement based on the client’s experiences compared with their expectations” (Helgesen and Nesset, 2007, p. 43). In other words, customers are satisfied when the service conforms to their expectations and are very satisfied when the service exceeds their expectations (Petruzzellis et al., 2006, p. 352). Thus, for academic university directors, what is important for students, i.e., their priorities and expectations, becomes the benchmark of quality on which to model and reorient the institution’s activity. In this respect, López Rupérez asserts that the students’ perspective is “becoming a fundamental reference point when it comes to establishing what is of quality and what is not” (2003, p. 44). The focus
does not encompass what is best for the students but rather their perceptions of what is best (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 393). In conclusion, if the objective is their satisfaction, it is the student–customer who defines what quality means in relation to the academic offer and teaching quality (Houston, 2007, p. 9).

It is difficult to infer to what extent the level of student satisfaction reflects the quality of education. Among the many factors that contribute to satisfaction (including academic, social, personal, administrative, financial, material, and environmental aspects), which are diverse and shift according to the context, there is no guarantee that the quality of the learning processes or of the curriculum play an important role (James and Coates, 2006). What can be inferred from the conclusions and models of empirical studies—such as those mentioned above—is that, given the strong contextual nature of what we call satisfaction, everything related to the quality of teaching and learning can strongly influence some circumstances but may be little relevant in others.

Faced with the increasingly widespread trend of making students’ satisfaction the focal point of university academic quality, many authors (e.g., Sirvanci, 1996; Bay and Daniel, 2001; Carlson and Fleisher, 2002; Clayson and Haley, 2005; and for a review on the controversy see Eagle and Brennan, 2007) have called into question the idea that the student is a customer, and that their satisfaction, values, and interests should be the main objective of the educational effort made by universities.

It is not the same—or at least not necessarily—to focus on students’ learning and development as it is to focus on their perceptions and satisfaction. The search for student satisfaction can be useful from the point of view of marketing, but could be detrimental from an educational point of view. The arguments put forward can be synthesised in three main points:

(1) It is debatable whether the customer in higher education is always right (Mark, 2013). Clayson and Haley argue that students can have a short-term vision or one based on incomplete perceptions: “If a student believes that a high rank is something desirable in itself, then opting for the easiest subjects or least demanding lecturers to ensure maximum gain with minimum effort would a wise choice” (2005, p. 2). Empirical studies, however, disprove the widespread belief that students place a greater value on whatever requires less work (Clayson and Haley, 1990; Marsh and Roche, 1997, 2000; Marsh, 2001; Centra, 2003), reporting that students “value learning and achievements that involve substantial levels of challenge and involvement” (Marsh, 2001, p. 185). However, as Rolfe points out (2002), students fundamentally consider their studies as a path to a better professional career and are generally shown to be indifferent to issues related to the level of an academic title. Wiers-Jenssen et al. (2002) highlight how this vision of an academic title as an object that is useful in the labour market could jeopardise highly appraised values, such as an individual’s intellectual, social, and personal development or the enjoyment and cognitive stimulus of challenging academic goals. From a perspective merely of usefulness, the desirability of manageable and orderly learning processes is imposed, which ensure success at an acceptable level of investment in time and effort. Another point to consider, as Bay and Daniel point out, is that while in other sectors customers know what they need, in the field of higher education students may lack clear ideas about the knowledge and skills they will need when they come to form part of the labour market. Moreover, “they may not realise whether their education suited their needs until years later” (2001, p. 3). In other words, there may be a significant distance between what students want and what they need (Mark, 2013, p. 4).

(2) This perception of students as customers may negatively alter the relationship between students and lecturers. On the one hand, they may transfer responsibility for their results to the education
providers (Clayson and Haley, 2005), increasing the demands on resources and teachers, “as if education could be simply and passively consumed” (Eagle and Brennan, 2007, p. 51). This would imply a major setback in quality, to the extent that the implication and degree of autonomy of the student are key factors in good learning outcomes (see, for example, Biggs and Tang, 1999 or Ramsden, 2003). On the other hand, students may feel that they have the right to determine how they should be taught or assessed: “I’m not going to pay someone who expects me to learn all this stuff by myself” was the recent response in our institution to a lecturer who asked students to go to the computer lab to become familiar with a program (Bay and Daniel, 2001, p. 6). The educational relationship is very special, and much different from the relationship between provider and customer (Hall, 1996), starting with the fact that it is the teaching staff who demand effort from their students and evaluate them, and may even stop them from continuing (Sirvanci, 1996). Students are the main architects of what they achieve during their passage through a course or degree and they have an impact on the quality of their peers’ education and “contribute directly to their own satisfaction and perception of quality and value” (Kotzé and Du Plessis, 2003, p. 186). In this respect, Bay and Daniel (2001) propose the notion of the student as a collaborating partner. When it comes to thinking about the educational process, introducing the customer–provider paradigm can alter it both profoundly and undesirably (Houston, 2007, p. 9). Houston (2008) argues that the foundation of education is the concern for the development of students and this moral dimension is lacking in a customer–provider relationship, motivated only by payoff.

(3) Prioritising the student’s perspective can negatively alter the curriculum. As stated above, studies show that most students’ goals are related to achieving a better position in their future career, and they believe that this immediate advantage forms the key quality criterion of their qualifications (Eagle and Brennan, 2007). This pragmatic perspective, linked to this immediate advantage, implies that the student–customer pushes to obtain good grades, regardless of the effort they invest (Clayson and Haley, 2005; Carlson and Fleisher, 2002). But students are not the only customers, as society as a whole finances a large part of higher education and it is the future employers who will welcome these graduates and that may express their satisfaction with the education received (Bay and Daniel, 2001). Prioritising student satisfaction could lead to a fall in demand of standards, something that is unacceptable from other perspectives. Furthermore, the pressure exerted by students to obtain returns on their investment in tangible and immediate education can lead to curricular shifts towards excessively practical and technical learning. Such education neglects the fundamental aspects of the student’s intellectual and personal development, which is so essential in advanced democratic societies (Rolfe, 2002; Ballard, 2004). In short, “social needs may not be properly considered if students are seen as the sole clients of the institution” (Bay and Daniel, 2001, p. 3).

A PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE ACADEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDENT–CUSTOMER AND UNIVERSITY–PROVIDER SCENARIO

The student’s conversion into a customer is not simply their claim to being the centre of educational activity. From any perspective, both students and learning are at the centre of educational activity and are a fundamental part of what the university represents. Students do not have to be thought of as customers to conceive the curriculum from the perspective of their needs, and to provide a stimulating environment and appropriate learning processes. The important thing is that the idea of the student as a customer is part of a whole new way of understanding the university concept. If the student is conceived as a customer, it
is because the institution is understood to be a service provider, competing in an environment alongside other providers. In this scenario, strategic institutional priorities include becoming a high-ranking and prestigious brand on the market; to offer a product able to attract more customers, as well as to make them loyal to the brand, and, in short, to orientate the organisation’s decision-making and academic and organisational activities and resources, to achieving that end. This is a new way of understanding universities that would be characterised by the following guiding principles:

(1) Student–customer satisfaction as new way of conceiving the quality of educational activity. Regarding the idea that principles and good practices supported by educational research constitute the reference of quality teaching, we must recognise the role played by customer expectations and perceptions: something is of quality if the client says so, and what the student–customer considers to be good does not necessarily have to coincide with what research concludes. For example, in-depth learning that advocates educational research requires slow learning processes and challenging academic goals from a cognitive and personal point of view, something that the student does not always understand or share. From the most immediate and pragmatic perspective of many students, offering them what they have to learn in a clear and well-organised way facilitates achieving their goal of academic success. Students may prefer the rapid consumption of ‘knowledge pills’ rather than complex challenges and processes of conceptual change that the scientific literature demands.

(2) A new range of institutional academic priorities: an organisation’s management strategy aims to attract more students, select the best, and obtain their satisfaction and loyalty. This, in turn, places the institution’s reputation and prestige as a strategic objective. This reputation attracts the best students, which allows for a high degree of selectivity, and at the same time consolidates the reputation, promotes student satisfaction and improves the rates and quality of graduates’ employment, thereby consolidating the reputation. Becoming an elite university and capturing elite customers, offers huge advantages. Situating the triangle of reputation–selectivity–satisfaction at the pinnacle of university priorities obliges one to rethink the values that define an organisation, to redirect its efforts and resources, and to redefine its function within society.

(3) A new way of understanding what a degree is and what its value is. University studies are a student–customer investment, from which payoff is expected in the form of future economic and social gains. As a product moulded by these expectations, the qualification is not only defined by a certain initial competency profile, but it also maximises the claims on the advantages of the investment in that qualification. Thus, one observes the proliferation of academic titles in collaboration with or supported by companies or professional associations. Emphasis is placed on internships and work-place training as well as on the presence of professionals of prestige among the teaching staff. There is a proclamation of a pragmatic understanding of the curriculum, aimed at ‘what is really needed’ and plagued with ‘real cases’, in which the student will act as a future professional; or the presence of extensive student orientation and support services for their incorporation to the labour market. Thus their future qualification is not conceived as an immersion in the questions, knowledge, and methods of a certain scientific field, but as a vocational training, training for success in the working world. This new orientation and curricular meaning substantially alters the formative impact that the qualification has on the student: technical and instrumental capacities predominate over the development of scientific thought per se in the discipline; effectiveness and efficiency values tend to be
imposed over intellectual rigour and critical thinking, specific and practical problems gain ground over criteria issues and challenges of substance; in short, getting the right answer to the question reigns.

(4) A new way of conceiving the relationship between students and the institution. Paul A. Trout stressed that, on the market, “consumer desires represent the supreme mandate”, but that “when this sovereign-customer model is applied to higher education, it not only distorts the mentoring relationship between teacher and student, but makes nonsense out of traditional notions such as hard work, responsibilities, and Standards of Excellence” (Trout, 1997, p. 50). The customer demands a solution to their needs, and value for money. From the provider–customer perspective it may seem that education is something that is ‘given’, a packaged product that the customer receives. In fact, this aspect is mirrored in the evolution of higher education through information technology and online training. This vision transports the responsibility for the results and the effects of the education received to the institutions (hence rankings proliferate that compare the success of graduates from various universities), empowering students to see themselves as passive consumers, rather than as active and responsible participants in their own education (Jennings and Angelo, 2006). This conception contrasts vividly with the idea of a university community, in which the student participates actively, forming part of the decision-making bodies (something unthinkable for a customer) and participating in the organisation, quality, and development of its activities. This also contradicts conclusions drawn by educational research, which place the active involvement of the student as a key factor in learning. Students are ultimately responsible for their learning and assuming this responsibility means not only to adopt an active and autonomous position in the face of learning, but to engage with their peers and teachers in a process of continuous improvement of the learning experience (Ramsden, 2008). It is in this respect that research findings refer to students as active partners and members of a learning community. This image sketched by research, founded on an enormous amount of evidence, contrasts vividly with the image of a customer who receives something from a provider.

Figure 1. Summary of the characteristics of the academic offer in terms of educational performance in a student–customer and university–provider scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN ACADEMIC TRAITS CHARACTERISING A UNIVERSITY MODEL IN WHICH THE STUDENT IS CONCEIVED AS A CUSTOMER</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Students as customers who demand what they think they need: value for money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. An academic degree as an investment in a social brand that will provide payoff through a better professional future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. High tuition fees justified by the future personal economic value of the investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The higher education system as a market in which institutions compete for student–customers and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Student–customer satisfaction and loyalty as an institutional strategic goal: quality as equivalent to satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Satisfaction as a brand: reputation and selectivity as strategic advantages for attracting customers. The brand is seen as a valuable qualification for the student–customer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The institution as a provider (of the product that best satisfies the customer): curriculum is conceived as preparation for professional success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Role of the student as a recipient. Responsibility for the results is transferred to the institution. Relationship between the student and the institution (including the teaching staff) is of a contractual nature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSIONS

The student–customer idea follows the logic of a transformation of higher education into a competitive market and, ultimately, a very lucrative business. The student–customer idea goes far beyond an emphasis on student rights and the obligation of universities to provide them with the best educational experience possible. A customer is someone who pays for a product or service that meets their needs and demands a payoff. A provider in a competitive market seeks to survive by building a prestigious brand, trying to attract more and better customers, and designing products in line with their customers’ preferences and expectations. The customer–provider relationship differs greatly from the teacher–student relationship.

There are, of course, many attractive and interesting aspects of this new student–customer paradigm. But it also encompasses many disturbing nuances and raises no doubt about its impact on the quality of the student’s educational experience as well as the social function of universities, their values and priorities. From the educational perspective, students’ self-perception as customers changes their attitude and puts them in a very different position in terms of their relationship with their lecturers and their university. We should ask ourselves whether this is the best attitude from the educational perspective. The idea of students as active partners in their own learning experience—as consistently supported by research—does not seem to fit in well with their image as customers. From the educational point of view, the conclusion drawn by Lee Harvey and Peter Knight seems much more convincing: “Education is a participatory process. Students are not products, customers, consumers or users of a service: they are participants. Education is not a service provided for a customer (and less so as a product to be consumed) but a progressive transformation process of the participants” (1996, p. 7).

Notwithstanding, Figure 1 endeavours to characterise the paradigm as a finished process, although there are, of course, multiple formulas for reaching a compromise between a traditional university–student concept and the emerging vision of higher education system forming part of a competitive market at any cost. However, we must emphasise that, even in countries where the idea of a competitive market is still incipient, such as Spain, a progressive shift in the latter direction can be observed. The emergence of the student–customer concept within universities is little more than a manifestation of this shift and is clearly reflected in what some have called the ‘complaints culture’, and entails a different attitude towards lecturers and the curriculum. Of course, as Clayson and Haley pointed out, from the faculty’s point of view, “the conceptual approach within which students are defined also defines who we are, what we do and what we think about what we do” (2005, p. 1). Not only should academic qualifications aim to enhance graduates’ professional profiles, but they must also actively appeal to potential students, who are increasingly concerned about their future professional success and for whom investment in higher education is increasingly expensive. Increasingly, university management boards think in terms of ranking and reputation. The system as a whole is transformed, ideologically moving away from the concept of a university community that gives shape to its institutions. We should ask ourselves whether this newly emerging university is better, and how we can preserve the best of our university tradition within this new context. We should also wonder how we can reconcile the conclusions of educational research with the positions and attitudes that emerge from the new educational paradigm. The question, in short, is how to maintain and strengthen the value of universities in terms of personal development and social wellbeing in an environment where higher education is increasingly seen as an economic investment and as a business.
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**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

The author holds a Bachelor’s degree in the History of Art and a Doctorate degree in Education, both from the University of Zaragoza. He is a tenured Lecturer at the University of Zaragoza and specialises in educational quality and innovation processes in higher education.
Expert-panel accreditation evaluation-practices: an autoethnographic case study of the Community of Madrid

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ABSTRACT
Accreditation is defined by the European Higher Education Area quality-assurance agencies as a key element in quality management and continuous improvement in university teaching-learning processes, and is an institutional practice that started to be developed in 2014 in Spain. This article illustrates the case of the Community of Madrid Quality Agency, as case study analysis through my experience as a panel member for the accreditation of higher-education qualifications. Methodologically, it is based on an autoethnographic approach and uses the theory of symbolic interactionism to reveal and analyse the evaluative process and culture. For this purpose, two analytical axes were drawn: student learning-outcomes and the value of the human resources assigned to the degree in terms of their academic research, both criteria which the quality agencies consider to be critical for a favourable final report. The interactions of the expert panel at the different stages of the accreditation consideration-process, based on these two criteria, are presented with the aim that future case studies will test them in the context of collaborative learning, helping to achieve the greatest possible academic rigor in the accreditation process.

Keywords: accreditation, agentification, evaluative cultures, peer review, learning outcomes.

INTRODUCTION: ACCREDITATION AS AN AXIS IN THE PROCESSES OF CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT
Accreditation is one of the axes upon which quality management at most universities pivots. Coming from the Anglo-Saxon culture, accreditation first appeared at the beginning of the 20th century in the United States, is characterised by the open-curriculum model, and is largely unregulated. It contrasts with the historically closed and strongly regulated curricular models in the geographical environments of continental Europe. Accreditation has been implemented by the European Higher Education Area since the beginning of the 21st century, disruptively so in the university culture, thus producing one of the most prominent changes in this system in recent history.
The agentification of universities has some very specific effects depending on the geographical and institutional environment in question. For example, in Great Britain accreditation also deepened the stratification of higher education institutions, reinforcing university hierarchies through their reputation, which in turn, is based on research indicators (Brennan and Williams, 2004). The evaluation culture that became part of degree-program accreditation is better suited to the British arm’s length principle in which the academic and political are differentiated, than the Spanish or French institutional context—as previously studied in the case of cultural policies and public cultural facilities (Rius Ulldemolins and Rubio Arostegui, 2013, 2016; Rubio Arostegui, 2016). From this comparative institutional context, this manuscript aims to provide details about the practices implemented in academic-environment evaluation cultures and accreditation styles in Spain, a phenomenon that began in the Community of Madrid, as well as in the rest of Spain, in 2014.

The author’s own experience as an evaluator inside the accreditation process is the leitmotif of this work, which aims to improve these evaluation processes and to contribute to the debate about how to best carry them out; the work starts from the premise that this can be achieved through collaborative learning in an institutional environment of transparency. It is clear that, through higher-education program accreditation, public administrations are allocating human and financial resources with the aim of creating constant improvement in university degrees. Therefore, the goal of this article is also to publicly promote the value of accreditation both within the university community and in society in general. This is because in more institutionalised contexts such as that of the United States, among other factors, the lack of rigor in the process is frequently criticised (Ewell, 2015; Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder, 2010; Dickeson, 2006).

Methodological approach
Ethnography, as discussed by Pabian (2014), is not a predominant research tool in higher education, even though there is growing academic interest in the potential of the ethnographic approach in education. This is reflected in the newly emerging scientific literature and in the organisation of conferences linking ethnography and education—most recently in Spain in 2013 in the Spanish National Research Council headquarters. However, the autoethnographic perspective, in terms of the everyday academic practices of evaluative cultures, does have some precedent (Meneley and Young, 2005). Using this approach here, I try to highlight the processes involved in evaluative decision-making, based on the evaluator’s own subjectivity and interaction with other panel members.

One of the purposes of this article is to expose the routines and practices of peer review through my experience as an undergraduate and master’s degree-level accreditation-panel member for the Community of Madrid Quality Agency and the Knowledge Foundation Madri+D (abbreviated as FCM in Spain). Therefore, one of the goals of this paper is to present the characteristics of peer review as an interactive process between evaluators and to show how, within this dynamic, the initial expert assessments of degree-level qualifications are transformed during the course of the negotiation, finally reaching the end of the process with the drafting of the panel’s report. This process is concluded when the final report (taking the expert panel’s original opinion as an essential reference), is prepared by a branch committee and is published on the FCM and the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport’s Registry of Universities, Centres and Titles (abbreviated in Spanish as RUCT) websites.

Thus, autoethnography as a self-reflection exercise (Garfinkel, 1967), helps to reveal the procedures, feelings, attitudes, and values of panel members during the assessment process, while trying to mitigate and shorten the distance in discursive practice between claims of what will be done and what actually is done. This article aims to tackle the subject

1 https://cieye.wordpress.com/

2 Self-reflection is understood in the same way as when we reflect upon our own research processes in the spirit of criticism, and where strategic use of one’s meta-cognitive capacity can accommodate emotional dimensions.
matter by taking a symbolic interactionism approach, under the pretence that this contributes legitimacy, both to the process of reaccreditation and to the agentialised context of the Spanish university system itself. Regarding other types of academic evaluations such as academic journal peer-review assessments or even certain competitive calls for research projects, the accreditation-process evaluation involves interaction between the expert panel members.

Under the premise of symbolic interactionism we can analyse the dynamics created by the interaction between different social subsystems (academics, students, and employers, among others) involved in the evaluation process. These are represented by the panel secretary, academics, and students at the visits that take place at the university centres presenting their qualification-programs for reaccreditation. In accordance with Lamont (2015), we understand that degree-program accreditation, specifically the peer-review phase of the assessment, is an emotional and interactive process: consensus building is fragile and requires emotional and rational effort on the part of the panel members.

The practice of degree-program evaluation, another variation of academic peer review

What values and criteria are considered when evaluating the accreditation? In academic peer-review evaluation, key values such as creativity and innovation—and how, in turn, these are defined in different ways according to the field of knowledge and the discipline in question (Lamont, 2015)—do not carry the same weight in the accreditation as they may have in journal or research project peer-review assessments. Notwithstanding, as discussed in other work (Mahoney, 1977; Smith, 2006; Bocking, 2005), although an assessment-rubric similar to that of academic journal reviewers is applied in the accreditation evaluation-process, in practice, emotional and extracognitive factors with affiliations and phobias towards certain focuses or lines of investigation, are also considered. In short, in every academic evaluation, a contextual interaction process occurs in which academics are inserted into a position of power, endowing them with disproportionate symbolic ‘capital’ (Bourdieu, 2008). Thus, the evaluator’s habitus, which is necessarily tied to their position in the academic field, determines the results of the peer review, in which the concept of objectivity, at least as understood in the sciences, is difficult to sustain.

According to the FCM Evaluation Guide (whose full title is translated from Spanish as: Evaluation guide for renewing the accreditation of the official undergraduate and Master’s degrees, 2014) the goals of the official university degree-program accreditation essentially refer firstly to testing if the qualification program was developed according to the stipulations set out in the certified report, secondly, to provide transparency and to disseminate information about the degree, thirdly, to make recommendations and suggestions based on continuous improvement, and finally, to implement the accreditation process as a key moment within the framework of university agentification.

The objectives, features, and values associated with these expert panel functions are defined and sequenced according to the FCM guide, and can be summarised as: (a) understanding the criteria for the reaccreditation; (b) preparation of an individual report that must be shared with all of the panel members prior to the visit; (c) depending on whether the member’s role is as a contributor or president, taking responsibility for producing the final visit report from the visit for its subsequent use by the accreditation branch committee. Once these axiological and functional premises have been defined, we enter into the panel evaluation process, establishing the following phases:

1. Reading the degree-program self-report prepared beforehand by the degree coordinator.
2. Evaluation and analysis of any other documents and evidence associated with the qualification.

The quality of reports produced for the different degree-programs is very disparate and this determines the evaluator’s position regarding the qualification at the start of the panel member’s individual-report
writing process. In our case, this document, notoriously, influences the initial perception of the degree-program. Therefore, a well-written report that understands and recognises the strengths and weaknesses of the course, and that provides a coherent discourse based on evidence and data, predisposes the evaluator to like it, even before assessing the other required documentation such as the certified report, previous monitoring report, and any other data, ratios, and indicators. Given the disparity in the quality of the coordinator self-reports, they should be evaluable. This is because in certain cases not even the minimum requirements are met and it appears that their authors are unaware of the university normative environment. Here, I give the following example (individual report on an undergraduate-degree course, 2016):

In the introduction, this individual report states that the necessary modifications were not requested because: “the law for educational reform (Spanish Organic Law 8/2013, of 9 December), which allows for a three-year undergraduate degree-course structure, restrained the proposal in order to provide more time for reflection on the desirability of these changes in one direction or another.”

Based on their own evidence, this statement is erroneous and serious on two counts: on the one hand, the law that they refer to (LOMCE) does not apply to universities, and so it does not affect how these institutions should plan their studies. On the other hand, the Spanish Organic Laws are not an obstacle to requesting a modification during the verification of these degree courses. Ignorance of the basic legal architecture of university education in Spain and its articulation in the European Higher Education Area is a very negative factor which is evident in this individual report.

(Individual report on an undergraduate degree program, 2016).

Another key document for consultation is the certified report, the changes that are made to it over time, and the monitoring report produced by the Quality Agency. Given the volume of the documents included in the certified reports, the most difficult task is to get a clear general idea of the degree-program and its development. To do this, I try to apply this conceptual map:

**Figure 1: The centrality of the graduate profile and of the learning outcomes in the development of degree programs**

![Diagram of the centrality of the graduate profile and learning outcomes]

*MECES; Qualifications Framework for Spanish Higher Education

SOURCE: Rubio (2014b). Taken from: Workshop on the assessment of learning outcomes in the process of university degree-program accreditation (Universidad Antonio de Nebrija).

This scheme allows us to link the graduate profile to the degree program in question, aligning with the Qualifications Framework for Spanish Higher Education (MECES; Marco Español de Cualificaciones para la Educación Superior in its original Spanish) and the basic skills required for the degree course, and beyond these, with subject-specific skills and learning outcomes. This is a theoretical written approximation that can be used by the panel member to draft their report. It can also be contrasted at the subsequent centre-visit when evidence in the form of coursework, exams, virtual-campus content, or training activities recorded in an audiovisual format, from three or four selected subjects comprising the course, are made available to the panel.
In this article it is impossible to cover all of the many assessment-process dimensions and criteria that the evaluator must complete according to the standardised reference model. Therefore, here we will focus on only two dimensions of the degree-program that are considered by the quality agencies as ‘critical criteria’: learning outcomes and the value of the human resources teaching the course based on their individual research profiles. If these criteria receive a negative evaluation it could lead to closure of the degree-program as the result of an unfavourable report. In terms of the learning outcomes, there is usually a lack in theoretical alignment with the work proposed in the degree course, and this must subsequently be underpinned in teaching practice and student learning. Table 1 shows an example of such an alignment for the work proposed in a degree course; I constructed it when writing the coordinator self-report for the FCM when applying for reaccreditation of the Performing Arts degree at the University of Antonio de Nebrija in the first call for accreditation renewal in 2014.

In this case, the undergraduate end-of-degree coursework was taken as a reference model because it was impossible to perform this exercise with all of the work undertaken for every subject comprising the course curriculum. Moreover, panel members are usually grateful for the conceptual development of a selection of degree-course topics so that they can visualise the alignment between the common framework MECES skills and the degree course’s learning outcomes. This alignment could also be shown with the specific skills which are necessarily tied to the course graduate profile.

Regarding the value of the human resources teaching within the degree program, as measured by their research profile, we try to examine the relationship between the academic researcher ‘capital’ and their links with the degree course. In some degrees this is very obvious and the links are sufficiently explicit, for example given the number of six-year-terms completed by the degree’s academics, links to the field of knowledge, or lines of research with a similar profile to the degree. On other occasions insufficient evidence is provided or the researcher capital simply does not exist. This can be seen in the example below (undergraduate course assessment report, 2016):

The university teaching-staff research activity requirements are not included in the certified report, its amended version, or in the coordinator self-report. Nor is there any evidence to allow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL SKILLS EVALUATED IN THE UNDERGRADUATE COURSE/LEARNING RESULTING FROM THE PROGRAM</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP TO THE BLOOM TAXONOMY</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP TO MECES SKILLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for analysis and synthesis</td>
<td>ANALYSIS-SYNTHESIS</td>
<td>A/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to manage information</td>
<td>KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td>A/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to apply knowledge in practice</td>
<td>APPLICATION</td>
<td>A/B/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to solve problems</td>
<td>APPLICATION</td>
<td>B/C/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical ability and capacity for self-criticism</td>
<td>EVALUATION</td>
<td>C/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity in approach or development of the work</td>
<td>EVALUATION</td>
<td>D/F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: taken from the accreditation coordinator self-report for the Performing Arts Undergraduate degree at the University of Antonio de Nebrija (2014).
The research activity of the teaching-staff to be evaluated at the individual level (in the case of [...] and there is a lack of experience: none of the research staff at [...] have completed terms of more than six years, either at the group level or at the institutional level. Similarly, there was no evidence for teaching-staff research activity (their performance in terms of publications at different levels in indexed scientific journals or their impact in their research-activity fields) mentioned in the course coordinator’s self-report.

The issue of the research activity undertaken by the teaching-staff affiliated with the course has recently been rescaled by other Spanish quality agencies following the experience of the first accreditations in the Spanish university system. Therefore, as discussed by the Quality Agency of the University System of Catalonia (AQU; in Catalan, the Agència per a la Qualitat del Sistema Universitari de Catalunya) in a 2016 review of additional factors in the accreditation of qualifications, the interaction between research and teaching activity should strongly influence the process of reaccrediting the degree-program: “the interaction between investigation and teaching in the training program benefits student learning; specifically, how research activity in the discipline is used to reinforce teaching and student learning” (AQU, p. 25).

Therefore, we understand that research activity should be referenced within the following criteria:

– Organisation and development of the degree (Criterion 1):
  • Highlighting undergraduate/master’s degree coursework derived from research activity in the research groups linked to the degree course or if they are related to research lectures in disciplines connected to the degree.
  • If there is evidence that the undergraduate/master’s course has emerged within the framework of research projects or research activity consultancy contracts.

  • For master’s degrees with a research orientation, it is understood that the course is obliged to relate the degree work to the group’s research activity or with that of teaching groups, and this should extend to the doctorate-level, if there is one.

– Academic staff (Criterion 4):
  • Synthetic indicators of academic staff research activity: experience measured as the number of six-year-terms completed, H-index, i-10 index, or other indicators normally used in the research domain, even though these give a numerical value that encompass all of the scientific production of a professor. However, this must be contextualised within the scientific discipline of the degree being evaluated.

  • Research results publications or participation in innovative research or consulting projects that could impact the teaching of the degree.

– Learning outcomes (Criterion 6):
  • In many cases, innovation in teaching is a consequence of a prior research process.
  • Involvement or participation of students in research projects, according to their level of training at different stages of their undergraduate or master’s formative trajectory is an indicator of links to the university’s research and teaching activity.

This scheme allows criteria 1, 4, and 6—all critical to the reaccreditation process—to be checked a priori from a research activity focus, beyond the other indicators recommended by the FCM Guide such as the percentage of doctors per research group teaching in the degree.

INTERACTION DURING THE VISIT AND NEGOTIATION OF THE ASSESSMENTS

Every panel member must prepare a report prior to their campus visit, however, we could call the process of constructing this report ‘the rubbish-bin model’ (Lamont, 2015) because the decisions made
by different panel members can be so contradictory. In fact this also usually occurs even in the critical dimensions, even though the final report may achieve a high degree of consensus between panel members. Incidentally, the panel normally comprises two academics and one student, although in the case of artistic degrees a professional from the field in question is added—whether a professor in higher arts education or not. The panel secretary is responsible for compiling all of the panel members’ assessments into one document which can then be refined to reach agreement among the panel, even though the final word on the draft goes to the president, who concludes the visit by reading an oral report and signing the final visit report.

The dimensions for managing the degree are assigned beforehand in agreement with the FCM Guide, thus establishing that the critical criteria must be the academic staff, the learning outcomes, and performance and satisfaction indicators. However, some other dimensions can trigger an unfavourable assessment of the degree-program, such as the organisation and development of the course or the material resources. The agreements and disagreements between panel members are also exemplified in the different assessments that are given according to the standardised criteria on a qualitative A, B, C, and D scale that graduates from excellence to non-compliance with the required minimum. At the visit to the campus the panel members meet face-to-face, different assessments are exchanged, and each member tries to argue their vision of the degree-program both in general and in terms of its dimensions. This is also where the degree-program indicators are contrasted.

Limiting ourselves in this article only to analysis of research activity and learning outcomes, interviews conducted with the teaching staff and management team at the centre and the university should clear up any doubts there may be about the research indicators. If the degree assigns professors and research groups

### Table 2. Evolution of the research activity assessment in the Human Resources criterion through the three reports comprising the degree-program accreditation phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of the report</th>
<th>Reference to the research activity deficits of the teaching-staff affiliated with the undergraduate course (Human Resources)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual panel member report</td>
<td>States: “The university teaching-staff research activity requirements are not established in the certified report, its amended version, or in the coordinator self-report. Nor is there any evidence to allow the research activity of the teaching-staff to be evaluated at the individual level (in the case of […] and there is a lack of research experience: and none of the staff at […] have completed terms of more than six-years, either at the group level or at the institutional level. Similarly, there was no evidence for teaching-staff research activity (their performance in terms of publications at different levels in indexed scientific journals or their impact in their research activity fields) mentioned in the coordinator’s self-report.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel final report</td>
<td>States: “Implementation of a tool for assessing the merits of individual and group research activity is recommended.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch committee report</td>
<td>There was no reference to the research activity in the human resources criterion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: produced internally
with plausible activity, they will be able to provide specific answers to any questions the panel members may ask, for example about the lines of research, level of international research activity, and research projects being carried out. Another very different matter is how much this evidence is valued by the panel, who have different perceptions about the value of different research activities. Thus, as shown in Table 2, the described degree-program assessment (which was evaluated in 2016) started out with one very negative individual panel-member report on research activity indicators, which evolved during the accreditation process, gradually losing this negative evaluation at each stage of the assessment until it practically disappeared in the final branch committee report.

Finally, so all of the panel members would approve it, we insisted on once again mentioning the aforementioned deficit by enclosing the following as a comment in the final report: “In the case of [...] the research activity indicators (in terms of experience measured as six-year research terms served, research groups, and publication performance) are very weak and should feature in some way [in the final panel report].” In this case there is no doubt that the panel president did not share the same opinion on the assessment as the academic contributor when gauging the research activity. Consequently, this negative dimension disappeared in the branch committee report because of the weight of the president’s opinion. In the final corrections proposed for the panel report, and even after its finalisation, panel members sometimes make their disagreement clearly known, as discussed by another panel member in an e-mail written after the report was finished:

The Report includes everything that we agreed upon for the summary. However, I remain deeply concerned because the Spanish university system is proposing undergraduate degree courses as poor as this one and Assessment Agencies are validating them. It is reasonable to allow degree-program coordinators time to implement improvements to these courses, especially because they do not yet have the experience of having concluded the first year of graduation from the program. However, they are being granted a vote of confidence in order to test if, in the next 6 years, they are capable of normalising something that started out chaotically. (E-mail sent by a panel member to the rest of the panel).

With regard to learning outcomes, at the visit the panel members can gauge the learning of the students enrolled in the course resulting from them following the subjects the panel had previously approved as part of the program. Paradoxically, when the evidence of learning outcomes in the form of coursework, exams, or other supporting material is available, it is difficult to get an idea of the training by using the MECES framework. Some panel members have no knowledge of the qualifications framework or the learning-outcomes standardisation process, both at university and non-university teaching levels. Ignorance of the cognitive frameworks, or disagreement between panel members in terms of the beliefs and values regarding learning outcomes, leads to a scenario of disorientation between those without this knowledge or who do not believe in it. This makes it difficult to assess if the activities evaluated are in line with those described in the certified report, and consequently with the undergraduate or master’s degree MECES framework.

Thus, in the debates at the visit the fact that one of the members does not start from the premise of MECES means that the assessment can become quite difficult to agree upon because there is no framework to use as a reference model or rubric prior to evaluating if the activities match those established in the certified report. This is a very difficult matter that, as noted by Ashwin (2009), goes beyond the accreditation itself because, even in our own teaching practice it is very difficult to distinguish differences at the level of MECES between undergraduate and Master’s degree courses on similar subjects (e.g. the bachelor’s degree course in Primary and Secondary Education and the Master’s training course for Secondary Teaching at Universidad Antonio de Nebrija). The
Pedagogy suggested by Sin (2015), which yields to the utilitarianism of learning outcomes with a view to possible employability, has not yet reached academic fields. Moreover, in some cases of artistic degree courses applying for accreditation, we have found that the degree-course subject student-assessment methods implemented are insufficiently rigorous—for example, only a sheet with a written review or commentary of film may be submitted instead of coursework or exams as evidence of learning.

**Conclusions**

This manuscript provides details about the practices implemented in academic-environment evaluation cultures and accreditation styles in Spain, a phenomenon that began in the Community of Madrid, alongside the rest of Spain, in 2014. Through the author’s experience as a panel member, it tries to apply rigor to the process of evaluation practice so that in the future it can be contrasted with other panel practices and thus, used to improve the quality of university evaluation. Academic peer-review creativity and innovation in the process of accrediting undergraduate and master’s degrees plays a secondary role to the values generated during peer interactions. Similarly, the culture of agentification that pivots upon key concepts such as skills, learning outcomes, continuous improvement, and use of indicators of student satisfaction with the teaching, has not spread equally among different panel member types, especially among the generation of lifelong teachers that usually form part of these expert panels.

**Table 3. Evolution of the learning outcomes evaluation through the three degree-program reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to the Learning Results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual panel member report</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| States: “Therefore, the following is required: a) an ad hoc definition of the learning outcomes, linked to the skills associated with the degree program and its subjects or materials and b) a relationship between the learning outcomes and the six MECES skills for the course level.”[...]
| “It is crucial that teaching must accomplish the ultimate objective of seeking and achieving deeply focused and committed student learning.” |
| The panel member’s comment at the end of the report document also states: |
| “Some of the evidence we saw, as in the case of the work we observed for the [...] course, was clearly insufficient to meet the requirements of MECES undergraduate framework.” |
| Panel final report                |
| States: “The evidence shown in the case of [...] demonstrates that the performance level could be increased...” |
| “Work must be done, both at theoretical and practical levels, to increase the level of some of the material which produces poor learning outcomes.” |
| Branch committee report           |
| States: “The evidence shown in the case of [...] demonstrates that the performance level could be substantially increased...” |

**SOURCE:** produced internally
Quality agencies’ emphasis on testing whether degree programs have been developed in accordance with the stipulations set out in the certified report can become a factor that impedes the identification of better and more innovative ways of developing and managing university courses, as Ewell (2015) points out in the case of the United States. In the same way, in some cases, educational innovation has resulted from the digital transition of teaching-learning processes. It is very probable that certain types of educational innovations will go unnoticed by panels where the president and/or the academic contributor are unfamiliar with digital training environments. In this respect I tend to agree with Ashwin (2009) that only very few European countries (for example, Sweden and Great Britain) have a strategy and policy in place with public resources to support higher education teaching.

The two criteria selected for analysis in this accreditation case study—learning outcomes and the value of the human resources in terms of their research activity—highlight the differing logic between the panel members. In the first case, as noted by Ashwin (2009) and Sin (2015), the difficulty results from moving from abstract to tangible learning outcomes and the tensions and problems that the panel members struggle with to reach an agreement. This is especially the case if these members do not share a common attitude to the processes of learning standardisation and the MECES framework. In this sense, the quality agencies’ efforts to standardise learning outcomes have not yet had the desired effect on the degree-program coordinators or the evaluators themselves. On the other hand, the trend towards gauging learning outcomes by their measurability and employability as one of the main values of education, is detrimental to acknowledging the educational experience (and thus, satisfaction) of students, as shown by Eisner (2004) in the dynamics of education teaching practice in the United States.

Regarding the contribution of research activity to developing the degree course and its innovation, the assurance of a minimum quantity of academic capital, makes it much easier to contrast and compare learning outcomes. Although the tendency (or at least that expressed by the AQU in Catalonia) is to give greater weight to researcher capital in the accreditation of undergraduate and master’s degrees, on certain panels there is a lack of agreement between the academic panel members on the value of the activity, and so the panel president’s opinion eventually prevails.

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**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

Juan Arturo Rubio Arostegui is a senior professor in Philosophy and Education Sciences. He has a Master’s degree in Cultural Management and has a doctorate in Political Science and Sociology from Universidad Complutense, Madrid. He has taught in the fields of cultural management and educational and cultural policy at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos since 2002 and at the Universidad Antonio de Nebrija, since 2009. He is the main researcher of the group Comunidades académicas y artísticas (Artistic and Academic Communities) at the same university and he is also director of its Doctorate School. He is also a member of the Centre d’Estudis sobre Cultura, Poder i Identitats (Center for the Study of Culture, Power and Identity), at the Universitat de València.
Taking stock of changes in quality assurance in Portuguese higher education between 2007 and 2015

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ABSTRACT
This article documents the changes that occurred in Portugal after the adoption of the new higher education quality assurance framework in 2007. The most obvious results of the new higher education evaluation and accreditation agency’s actions can be observed primarily at the level of teaching-program provision. Accreditation activities resulted in a 40% reduction in the supply of the courses on offer between 2009 and 2015 (Sin et al., 2016). This reduction was felt mainly in private institutions, which confirms that substandard programmes were more common in the private sector. Another consequence was that institutions started to take a more formal and systematic approach to quality by implementing internal quality assurance systems. These systems were driven by a logic of accountability rather than by genuine self-reflection aiming to engage all those involved and which would have led to improvement. Therefore, it appears that most academics perceive internal quality assurance to have had negative effects on teaching and learning, mainly because of increased bureaucracy, while the positive effects are still perceived as being relatively modest.

Keywords: quality assurance in higher education, accreditation, internal quality assurance, accountability, teaching improvement.

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INTRODUCTION

Quality assurance in higher education became very important in Europe with the implementation of the so-called Bologna Process, far-reaching higher education reform designed to both create the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and to aid the convergence of national higher education systems in Europe. The “promotion of European cooperation with respect to quality assurance in order to develop comparable criteria and methodologies” was one of the six initial lines of action proposed by the Bologna Declaration (1999). It was understood as an “absolutely essential element in the construction of the European Higher Education Area” (Haug, 2003, p. 230). European Standards and Guidelines (ESG) for Quality Assurance in the EHEA (Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area, 2015) were developed as a reference point to guide the work of European institutions and quality assurance agencies in the implementation of quality assurance and accreditation policies (ENQA, 2005). Portugal, in a similar way to many other European countries, used Bologna as a frame of reference for reforming its higher education system, and reorganised its quality assurance systems according to the ESG proposals.

Based on research carried out over the last four years (Cardoso et al., 2015a, 2015b; Sin et al., 2016; Tavares et al., 2016a, 2016b), this article documents the changes that occurred in Portugal after the adoption of the new higher education quality assurance framework in 2007. First, we explain the context that determined the evolution of quality assurance in Portugal, paying special attention to the most recent developments, since 2007, in the quality system restructuring. Next, we analyse the main outcomes resulting from the activities of the accreditation quality assurance agency, from its creation, and look at the strengths and weaknesses of these internal quality assurance systems in relation to their implementation in Portuguese institutions. Following on from this, we consider Portuguese academics’ perceptions of teaching and learning improvements resulting from the implementation of these internal quality assurance systems. Finally, we present our conclusions regarding the changes that have occurred in Portugal so far, the impact of the new quality framework, and routes for future development in this area.

REFORMS RELATED TO QUALITY ASSURANCE IN PORTUGAL

To understand the evolution of quality assurance in Portugal, we must first briefly describe the transformations the Portuguese higher education system has undergone over the past four decades. The system consists of public and private institutions, universities, and polytechnic colleges. Although participation in higher education was low before the 1974 revolution and was a privilege of the elite (Amaral and Teixeira, 2000), access to higher education grew enormously after the political and social changes brought about by that revolution. The speed of the higher education expansion—initially elite, then massive, and finally universal (Trow, 1974)—especially between 1985 and 2000, made Portugal ‘exceptional’ compared to other countries in Western Europe where participation grew more gradually (Neave and Amaral, 2012). As a result, by the end of the 1990s, participation in higher education reached 50% in Portugal (Amaral and Magalhães, 2007).

Growth in participation was sustained mainly through a substantial private sector expansion (from about 20,000 students in 1987 to almost 100,000 in 1995). The government stimulated this strategy because it allowed an increase in enrolments without...
requiring the investment of public funds (Amaral and Teixeira, 2000). But, little attention was paid to the quality of education during this expansion, a problem also observed in other contexts where the demand for higher education dramatically increased in a short period of time, for example in China (Cao and Li, 2014), Eastern Europe (Galbraith, 2003), and Chile (Espinoza and González, 2013). Given that the generation of profit is of the utmost importance for the private sector, institutions aimed to maximise enrolment by investing more in infrastructure than in teaching, learning, or staffing, which affected overall academic quality (Espinoza and González, 2013, Cao and Li, 2014, Sin et al., 2016). In Portugal, for example, there is still a significant difference in the academic qualifications of teaching staff employed at public and private institutions: in 2005, 72.6% of teachers had a doctorate in public institutions compared to 55.3% in private institutions. Even so, the percentage of professors with a doctorate in private institutions is relatively high now compared to the situation ten years ago (Sin et al., 2016). It should also be noted that the offer of cheap or popular education courses and the low level of research carried out at private Portuguese institutions (because these primarily focus on education) also contributed to discrediting the private sector (Teixeira and Amaral 2007; Teixeira, 2012). Furthermore, lower entry grades are required for applicants who want to study at private institutions, and the association between the level of these students and the quality of institutions further damages the image of private institutions in society (Tavares, 2013).

Portugal, like other countries (Cao and Li, 2014, Espinoza and González, 2013), resorted to quality evaluation practices to try to resolve these problems. In the 1990s, a system was established that entrusted institutions with guaranteeing their own quality, which was coordinated via their representative body, the Portuguese Universities Foundation. Initially, the system only covered public universities, but in the year 2000 it was extended to public polytechnics and the private sector, while it simultaneously began to operate under the Consejo Nacional para la Evaluación de la Educación Superior (CNAVES—the National Council for the Evaluation of Higher Education). Access to higher education had already massively increased because of the governmental policies prioritising it at the expense of the overall quality of the system (Amaral, 2008; Tavares et al., 2016a). However, the evaluation structure coordinated by CNAVES was unable to preserve the quality of education because no consequences were defined for poor evaluation outcomes. In other words, although many low-quality degree courses existed, no decisions were ever taken to close any of them. In addition, the decision regarding accreditation belonged to the government rather than CNAVES. A new law enacted in 2003 (Law 1/2003) aimed to specify the consequences of the evaluation, but unfortunately complementary supportive legislation was never passed alongside it.

Portugal's commitment to the Bologna process gave a new impetus to higher education reform, including that of quality assurance. In 2006, at the request of the Portuguese government, the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) reviewed the national quality assurance system and made a series of recommendations. These included using the ESG as the main reference structure, increasing the independence and transparency of the system, expanding its internationalisation, promoting student participation, and ensuring that the scheme produces effective results (closure of programs with low-quality teaching). Thus, the government approved a new law that completely reformed the system (Decree-Law 369/2007). The Agency for Evaluation and Accreditation of Higher Education (A3ES) was created under this new legal framework, as a private foundation to operate independently from the government and higher education institutions (Amaral et al., 2013), and was given a mandate to accredit the quality of institutions and their teaching programs. A3ES’s activity began in 2009 when it started to accredit teaching, and has recently begun to certify the internal quality assurance systems of institutions. In addition, it will soon present its official processes for institutional accreditation.
ACCREDITATION RESULTS

Given the poorly controlled growth in the supply of higher education programs in Portugal since the 1990s, teaching accreditation was the first step required to ‘clean’ the system of courses which did not meet the expected quality standards. In addition, after creating new teaching programs according to the Bologna process guidelines, accreditation was seen as a valid process for ensuring that curricular renewal was complying with legal requirements and thus, avoiding erosion of the quality of academic practices. Institutions are now only authorised to offer existing or new courses which are accredited. As such, the Directorate-General for Higher Education, a body of the ministry which supervises higher education, receives information about A3ES’s decisions and maintains a register of accredited programs. It is illegal to offer non-accredited programs and doing so is subject to penalisation by the Education Inspectorate.

This new quality evaluation system, whose role in the initial phase was mainly teaching-course accreditation, has had visible consequences. There have been significant improvements in the quality of teaching staff, although there is still considerable room for improvement (see Sin et al., 2016). The criteria for teaching staff quality are stipulated in Decree-Law 74/2006 (modified by Decree-Law 115/2013 and Decree-Law 63/2016). For example, 60% of undergraduate teaching staff must be employed full time by the institution, a percentage that rises to 75% for postgraduate programs. In addition, different criteria are established for universities and polytechnics for the proportion of their teachers who must have a doctorate degree. In universities, at least 50% of the teaching staff in undergraduate programs must have a doctorate, a proportion which rises to 60% for master’s programs, and 100% for doctoral programs, according to Decree-Law 74/2006. For polytechnics, this proportion is 50% for all degree-levels, but in addition to staff with doctorates, these institutions can also contract ‘specialists’. The latter are teachers who hold a higher-education degree and who have ten years’ professional experience and a very relevant résumé. In addition, they must be recognised by a panel of internal and external institution members comprising both academics and professionals in the area in question.

When the new agency began operating in 2009 there were 5,262 degree-programs on offer that had to be evaluated and accredited (Sin et al., 2016). First, A3ES invited institutions to submit digital documentation for all their programs in operation and to demonstrate compliance with the clearly-defined quality criteria. A total of 4,379 programs delivered this information, while the remaining 883 programs were withdrawn by the institutions themselves. Because exhaustive evaluation for so many programs was impracticable, A3ES began a preliminary accreditation exercise that evaluated the programs presented according to three predefined indicators: the faculty staff and their degree-level qualifications, research activity in the field at the institution, and the number of students enrolled in the course. This phase resulted in 3,930 accreditations, 335 programs that were voluntarily discontinued by the institutions, and 114 courses that were denied accreditation. Thus, in the first two years, 1,332 programs from the initial 5,26 disappeared, corresponding to 25% of the courses that were on offer in 2009 (Sin et al., 2016). In the academic year 2011/12, after this preliminary accreditation period, the agency began a 5-year periodic accreditation cycle, approving programs from specific disciplinary areas each year. Because of accreditation commission visits in the first four years of this regular cycle, 190 programs were denied certification (representing little more than 8% of the total), while another 19.9% were withdrawn by the institutions themselves (Sin et al., 2016).

The distribution of programs by sector (public vs. private), institution type (university vs. polytechnic), and education levels are shown in Table 1. Concerning the distinction between public and private institutions, most programs with preliminary accreditation are in public institutions (2,308 programs, representing 80% of the courses available). According to national statistics, in the academic year 2009/10, the public sector offered 71.2% of the available degree programs compared to 28.8% in the private sector. This meant
that the public sector obtained higher rates of preliminary accreditations. In contrast, the percentage of discontinued programs was higher in the private sector (28% compared to 17.9% in the public sector). The difference between the sectors was even more noticeable for denied accreditations (2.3% in the public sector compared to 35.6% in the private sector). Therefore, these data suggest that quality deficiencies were more common in the more poorly controlled private sector.

There were no major differences between the universities and polytechnics regarding non-accredited and discontinued degree programs (Table 1). This suggests that the quality of the courses on offer was primarily determined by the sector type rather than the institution type and its respective mission.

Most of the preliminary accreditations were granted to master’s degree programs (Table 1), reflecting the explosion in the range of these programs on offer after the Bologna reforms. Decree-Law 74/2006, which required the structure of degree courses to be adjusted to the Bologna proposals (up until 2009/10), also meant that pre-Bologna undergraduate degrees could only be replaced by post-Bologna undergraduate degrees, while this limitation did not apply to master’s degree programs. Therefore, there was massive growth in the range and availability of master’s degrees, while their quality was not always simultaneously monitored, thus explaining why these courses also later had the highest voluntary discontinuation rate (24.4%). Doctoral programs (9.8%), followed by master’s degrees (9.0%), had the highest percentage of denied accreditations. Law 62/2007 established that, in order to maintain their status as a university, institutions had to offer at least three doctoral programs. This meant that some private universities had to create doctoral programs, with less regard for quality in some cases. Moreover, postgraduate education is subject to more demanding conditions in terms of research activity and teacher qualifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: The distribution of teaching programs in the first four years of regular accreditation, by sector, institution type, and education level: preliminarily accreditations, discontinued courses, submissions for regular accreditation, and courses denied accreditation</th>
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<td>Doctorate degree</td>
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SOURCE: Agency for Evaluation and Accreditation of Higher Education (A3ES)
During the period under review, which includes the preliminary accreditation phase and the first four years of the regular accreditation cycle, 40% of the courses initially offered (2,095 programs from 5,262) were withdrawn (Sin et al., 2016). This occurred either because A3ES denied accreditation (304 programs) or because of institutional decisions to withdraw or discontinue the remaining degree courses, possibly because the institutions in question did not believe these courses would have met the agency’s quality standards. Some programs may also have been discontinued for other reasons, such as reorganisation of educational provision as a result of the Bologna process reforms, or because there were insufficient numbers of student enrolments. At the same time, some 2,100 new programs were submitted for A3ES accreditation during the same period, of which, about 1,300 were accredited and started to operate. In July 2015, a total of around 4,500 degree-courses were on offer (Sin et al., 2016).

A qualitative analysis of the reports available on the process of legal degree accreditation (Sin et al., 2016)—the discipline with the highest percentage of denied accreditations—revealed common factors that triggered rejection. These reasons were usually related to insufficient numbers of teachers with full-time contracts, teaching staff without academic qualifications and with poor research activity track-records, unclear or vaguely-defined program identities, and teaching, learning, and evaluation failures (for example, curricular inconsistencies or lack of rigor). These problems are similar to those affecting the Portuguese private education sector in general (Sin et al., 2016).

These data provide evidence that the Portuguese higher education system ‘cleaning’ process was a success. The voluntary withdrawal of a large number of programs suggests that higher-education institutions have become more aware of quality requirements. Portugal is currently completing the first phase of its quality assurance program, which is dominated by teaching accreditation. Because A3ES has already started internal quality assurance system certification, the country has entered a second quality assurance phase which is more focused on promoting awareness of quality among institutions (for a description of the different phases in quality assurance evolution, see Jeliazkova and Westerheijden, 2007).

### Certification of Internal Quality Assurance Systems

As mentioned above, reorganisation of the quality assurance system in Portugal was based on the guidelines formulated by the Bologna process. For example, when it defined its procedures, A3ES consulted the ESGs. Portuguese institutions appear to have interpreted the European and, especially, the national reference guidelines very similarly within their specific contexts, thus leading to very similar internal quality assurance systems. Contrary to the initial expectations, each institution’s assimilation of these guidelines did not result in a wide range of structural/administrative components specific to the institutions’ own particular characteristics. Their margin for interpretation and freedom to design systems according to their own situations and organisational culture seems to have been limited—most probably by the evaluation model proposed by A3ES (Cardoso et al., 2015a). Therefore, despite the Agency’s insistence that its references to quality assurance are not prescriptive, they clearly still determine institutional behaviour; this is likely because institutions are aiming to limit their risks, and perhaps also because they lack a tradition of dealing with quality in a formal way and they may have limited capacities to innovate in this sense.

A qualitative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of internal quality assurance systems was recently carried out based on internal and external evaluation reports (Tavares et al., 2016a). This research assessed whether these strengths and weaknesses were associated with procedural and structural issues or if they were associated with cultural changes manifesting themselves as values and attitudes. Because A3ES wanted to promote a culture of improvement when it introduced its systems for certifying internal
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quality assurance, this research sought to ascertain whether institutions were committed to continuous improvement rather than only accountability itself. The work also aimed to understand the culture(s) of quality at the institutions it analysed.

The strengths and weaknesses identified were mainly associated with the organisation of quality assurance and information management systems, that is, with formal structures and procedures rather than with quality in a transformational sense (Harvey and Newton, 2007). In other words, aspects such as the professional development of teachers or the participation of those who might be implicated or involved in quality assurance, received less attention than formal aspects, suggesting that procedures were prioritised over improvements themselves. It seems that institutions’ motivation to implement internal quality systems and request their certification was mainly determined by their desire to avoid complex accreditation processes in the future. While A3ES intended to encourage improvement, it appears that accountability has remained a more pressing concern.

The institutions analysed seem to have quality cultures that vary between reactive and responsive (Harvey and Stensaker, 2008). A reactive culture is characterised by being strongly influenced by external rules and is motivated by compliance and accountability imposed by and built around external factors. This raises doubts about the possible positive results of the quality evaluations it performs. In a reactive culture, there is little or no sense of individual responsibility for quality because it is delegated to a specific unit (quality office). For academics, it amounts to a compliance exercise. The intensity of external quality rules is also strong in responsive cultures. Although external imperatives are important motivations for these institutions, they also take advantage of this opportunity to plan internal improvement programs looking towards the future, but without losing sight of accountability and compliance. However, this culture fails to link institutional activities related to guaranteeing quality to academics’ daily activities. Analysis of external reports seems to indicate that polytechnics are weaker in terms of stakeholder participation and more concerned about procedures rather than improvement in itself. Thus, this research suggests that while polytechnics seem to be more reactive, universities appear to be more responsive.

This analysis was limited to twelve institutions who were pioneers in the implementation and certification of their internal quality assurance systems. Because only a limited number of Portuguese institutions have so far requested certification, it is not yet possible to draw general conclusions about Portuguese institutions as a whole.

**PERCEPTIONS OF HOW QUALITY ASSURANCE REFORMS HAVE IMPROVED TEACHING AND LEARNING**

The extensive quality assurance reforms in higher education, which has hitherto manifested itself in the processes of teaching accreditation and the implementation of internal quality assurance systems, has not yet had the desired impact in terms of improvements in teaching and learning.

A survey of teachers working in Portuguese higher education institutions found that the main impact of implementing internal quality assurance systems is a greater demand for them to dedicate time to non-academic tasks which, in fact, is detrimental to teaching and learning (Tavares et al., 2016b). This bureaucracy has been consensually identified in the literature as an unwanted side effect of quality assurance which diverts academics’ time and energy away from teaching and research (Cartwright, 2007; Newton, 2002; Harvey and Newton, 2007). However, academics did acknowledge that internal quality assurance has contributed to a greater awareness of the problems related to teaching quality, as confirmed by some previous studies (Brennan and Shah, 2000, Baldwin, 1997), showing that this guarantee translates into greater attention to teaching.

On a less positive note, to date, this increased awareness does not seem to have led to real appreciable improvements or to a wider platform for innovation.
and experimentation in teaching and learning. A previously identified weakness (Cardoso et al., 2015a) was the near non-existence of pedagogical training in institutions, a situation which academics report has not improved after the implementation of internal quality assurance systems; this could at least partly explain the lack of tangible or visible results in teaching and learning practices. In fact, pedagogical training is the only issue related to teaching and learning that academics clearly feel has not improved. In other words, internal guarantees of quality have not led to improved pedagogical teacher training. In the context of the recent emphasis on teachers’ pedagogical development in European higher education policies (Sin, 2015), which was reinforced in the revised version of the ESG (Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area, 2015), pedagogical training is an area in which institutions could invest, especially given its importance to the quality of teaching and learning. Therefore, these results once again indicate that internal quality guarantees in Portuguese institutions, appear to be more strongly associated with an increase in bureaucracy and formalisms and not with substantial improvements in teaching and learning. However, this research also found that teachers consider their participation in the development of internal quality assurance systems, and the use of information collected by the institution, to have had a positive impact on teaching and learning (Tavares et al., 2016b).

Although no significant difference has been observed between teachers in universities and polytechnics, the public–private variable is clearly noteworthy. Private sector academics consider the impact that internal quality assurance has had on various aspects related to the improvement of teaching and learning to have been much higher than those in the public sector do. This includes a greater awareness of the importance of teaching quality, improved focus on innovation and experimentation in teaching and learning, more pedagogical teacher training, and improvement of the quality of teaching and learning in general. Because private institutions in Portugal have traditionally placed less importance on quality, especially during the years of rapid expansion (see above), they have received an additional incentive to improve teaching and learning by establishing stricter and more demanding quality systems than they have had in the past. This may also explain why academics from private institutions have more positive perceptions of the impact that internal quality assurance has had on teaching and learning.

This impact represents a poorly researched area (Harvey and Williams, 2010) that has generated diverse results. In this context, this paper provides useful empirical evidence about Portuguese academics’ perception of these changes. The results suggest that there are a number of relevant topics that could be considered by higher education institutions to achieve their pedagogical improvement objectives; these include streamlining administrative processes and procedures to avoid overloading academics, investing in pedagogical training, formally or informally involving teachers in quality assurance to increase their commitment to quality (Horsburgh, 1998), and using the information collected to improve teaching and learning.

CONCLUSION

Transformations in higher education policy at the European level, stimulated mainly by the Bologna process, are also reflected in Portugal’s reorganisation of its quality assurance system from 2007 onwards. The most visible change, and the one that has had the greatest impact on higher education institutions, was the creation of A3ES. The most evident results from this Agency’s operations can be observed in the range and types of degree courses now on offer. Its accreditation activities led to a 40% reduction in the original range of available teaching programs, a reduction which was mainly felt in private institutions, confirming that substandard teaching was more common in this sector (Sin et al., 2016).

Another consequence of the creation of A3ES was a change in the way institutions approach quality assurance. Institutions became engaged with a more
formal and systematic approach to quality, a practice that was once relatively uncommon. Institutions were encouraged to establish their own internal quality assurance systems based on several non-prescriptive guidelines developed by the Agency. However, most of the institutions that have already implemented internal quality assurance systems replicated these systems without necessarily adapting them to their specific objectives and contexts, thus, establishing very similar formal structures to each other (Tavares et al., 2016a).

In addition, implementation of these internal systems was driven by a logic of accountability and compliance with A3ES guidelines rather than by genuine internal reflection involving all the interested parties and which could lead to improvement (Tavares et al., 2016a). This reveals a unilateral and underdeveloped view of quality, probably explained at least in part, by the initial phase of the internal quality assurance system implementation in institutions. In fact, the main issues identified in relation to the implementation of these structures are associated not with values and attitudes towards quality, but rather, with formal and organisational structures and procedures. Therefore, academics seem to perceive the main effect of internal quality assurance on teaching and learning as being negative, because it entails an increase in bureaucracy, while the positive effects are still perceived as being rather modest.

On the one hand, this bureaucratic burden is the consequence of the way institutions have interpreted the implementation. But, on the other hand, it is also the result of a complex accreditation process which was required to eliminate sub-par teaching programs from the system (Tavares et al., 2016b). In order to ease the burden of bureaucracy, quality assurance in Portugal is moving towards a new phase—institutional accreditation. This aims to implement a more flexible evaluation regime which, for institutions that have proven themselves able to manage their own quality, may include the evaluation of only a sample of the educational courses on offer along with an annual monitoring process based on a set of predetermined indicators.

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Taking stock of changes in quality assurance in Portuguese higher education between 2007 and 2015


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The cultural mission of universities

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ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, there has been a wide debate about the so-called third mission of the University. Two discourses have occupied the proscenium: the transfer and innovation of knowledge and corporate social responsibility. In this article we postulate that both these ideas respond to approaches that do not fully take the history and status of universities as a public service into account. In contrast, we argue that the third mission, both in terms of history and in terms of the normative and pragmatic statutes, instead corresponds to culture.

Keywords: university mission, culture, corporate social responsibility, knowledge transfer, innovation.

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INTRODUCTION
Here we discuss universities as historical institutions and as organisations that are undergoing change. Beyond their initial function originating in the Middle Ages, involving the transmission of the main branches of knowledge (theology, law, medicine, and the arts), other roles relating to the needs of different social structures (e.g., bourgeois, democratic or, knowledge society) have been incorporated and institutionalised into universities. This complex relationship between universities and society has been the dynamic force driving their ongoing transformation.

The first generation of universities revolved around the teaching function, i.e. ‘preservation of the knowledge repository’. The second emerged with the incorporation of the scientific method and the research function. The third, a more complex generation, took shape recently through the institutionalisation of cultural functions (i.e. ‘university extension’) and of a sense of commitment to the society to which it belongs (including in terms of scientific development and innovation, social responsibility, and sustainability). By differentiating these three generations we do not

You cannot discuss the ocean with a frog if it has never left its pond.
You cannot discuss ice with a summer insect as it knows only its own season.
You cannot discuss life with a sage if he is imprisoned by his doctrine.
(The Way of Chuang Tse, 4th century BC.)
intend to argue that the cultural dimension of universities did not exist before, but rather that it has been institutionalised in the later stages and that the social organisation called the University continues and will continue to change, though it may be difficult to predict how.¹

Having established this interpretative framework, we will focus on the cultural function of universities in Spain, in its origins, its normative and organisational status, its current ambivalent situation and its possible future directions.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CULTURAL FUNCTION OF UNIVERSITIES

Background
This year, 2017, the Universitat de València commemorates two events which, although not of great importance, have special symbolic relevance from a cultural perspective.

The first marks the date when the painting, the Virgen de la Sapiencia (Virgin of Wisdom), painted by Nicolás Falcó in 1516, was hung in the university chapel. Both the painting and the chapel on the university campus oblige us to adopt a realistic view of the origin of universities, even those, as is our case, promoted by the city rather than the monarchy or the church. The main mission of medieval universities was not the search for new knowledge, but rather, preservation of the dominant knowledge, which always had to be expressed in religious terms. In the 16th century, the Christian religion furnished and provided all the symbolic references with which the world was to be interpreted; indeed, theology reigned from the tower of knowledge.

Secondly, the Universitat de València was created following a model that was already present in other universities, the Saturday lectures or discussions—known as Sabatínas—can be seen as a remote antecedent of our conferences, discussion forums, and round-tables. All the professors were obliged to participate in these activities (failure to do so was penalised by fine), and citizens could attend these sessions in order to test the level and dedication of the faculty to the studies funded by the city.

In the late 18th century, students were also required to perform this exercise. "Everyone—in accordance with the Faculty meeting of June 6, 1778—will give a lecture in the hall and attend the Academia pública (Public Academy) assigned to them, and defend their conclusions during the Sabatinas when requested to do so". Indeed, the expression ‘Public Academy’ harbours the seed of the concept of disclosing knowledge to society, which constitutes a fundamental component of the cultural mission of universities. These two elements, examples taken from the Universitat de València, were also present in many other universities and in all likelihood there are other manifestations and activities that also exemplify this facet.

Cultural extension and enlightened intelligence
The cultural function of universities was first institutionalised in the form of a university extension. The underlying idea, in other words, the mission to disseminate universal knowledge, is ancient. Among the precedents we can cite is the work undertaken by Sir Thomas Gresham or William Dill in the 17th century which aimed to promote popular education. But the term ‘university extension’ itself was coined in the last third of the 19th century, in the context of a growing cultural divide between university elites and the working classes in the first industrial and bourgeois revolution. In principle, awareness of this educational fracture did not question the

¹ We adopt Wissema’s idea of generations of universities (2009), although our historical vision diverges from it in terms of 19th and 20th century universities. Wissema (2009) distinguishes three generations according to the process whereby functions are incorporated: the second generation corresponds to the scientific or Humboldtian universities, whereas the third refers to the knowledge society and entrepreneurship universities (e.g., MIT, Stanford, Harvard, or Cambridge).
access of minorities and elites to universities, but rather, the need to disseminate knowledge beyond the faculties and lecture halls.

Thus, this university initiative—to take knowledge from the lecture halls to the street—cannot be detached from the phenomenon known as the ‘social question’ and within the framework of the great accumulation of wealth that occurred at the end of the 19th century (the first Golden Age of Capitalism; Ariño and Romero, 2016). Within the context of that great social divergence, small sections of the faculty of professors became aware of the need to bridge these gaps and to promote an incipient democratisation of knowledge. Thus, in 1871, university extension was created by Cambridge University. This was soon followed by Oxford and other universities, and the first University Extension Journal was published. In the United States the Philadelphia American Society for Extension of University was founded in 1890 while in France this function was undertaken by the popular universities.²

In Spain, this movement officially began at the Universidad de Oviedo in 1898, on the initiative of Rafael Altamira, and was inspired by the one in Oxford (Altamira, 1949, p. 177). Its objective was very clear: “all social classes should enjoy the benefits of education” and all genders; indeed there was large female involvement right from the start (Altamira, 1949, p. 185). In the collection of texts by Rafael Altamira entitled Cuestiones Obreras (Workers’ Issues) we can read a justification for this approach:

The starry sky is without doubt a magnificent thing, which almost everyone admires and finds appealing; however, it holds greater beauty and offers more enjoyment and entertainment for the enlightened spirit than for the ignorant. Just as the lighter the horizon the more our eyes see, so enlightened intelligence sees more, and can envisage materially more things than the mind closed to culture as a whole. Truly, they do say that it is not the farmer—although he lives in the country—who most enjoys the landscape he sees around him, but rather the city dweller, who appreciates the lines and colours, the mounds and geographic accidents, the eyes of the soul are open and brimming with images (Altamira, 2012, p. 18).

Rafael Altamira believed every human being had the right to enlighten his gaze and promoting this idea was the obligation of what he called ‘post-school institutions’. Like many who promoted university extension, he was influenced by the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (free teaching institution). Its path of action was clear: on the one hand, to promote the democratisation of knowledge, ingrained in the social movements of the time, and especially the workers’ movement; and on the other, to defend the universal conception of knowledge, because anyone—even someone with a university education—is always “more than just their profession”: the chemist also has human knowledge.

This idea came to fruition and spread from Oviedo to other Spanish universities, and retained certain validity until the mid-1920s. At the Universitat de València this movement can be traced to 1902, and took a foothold in Barcelona and Granada shortly thereafter.

The scope of university extension

In 1930, in the context of the protests against the law decreed on May 19, 1928 by Primo de Rivera, related to a somewhat authoritarian reform of universities, Ortega gave several lectures, at the behest of the Federación Universitaria Escolar (University School Federation), on the mission of universities. We should bear in mind both the historical context and the conference audiences. The former concerned the creation of student associations and demonstrations against the dictatorship while the latter made an extraordinarily modern proclamation of the centrality of University students (Ortega y Gasset, 2015 [1930]). These conferences addressed how the people attending lecture halls were to be trained and what universities should contribute to society.

² This trend was very successful in France, indeed in 1902–1903 over 177,000 lectures were given for an audience of three and a half million (Altamira, 1949).
In parliament, Ortega attacked the reforms for being an ‘imitation’ of those instated in other countries (England or Germany) and the ‘idealistic beguinage’ that ignores the real uses of institutions. Ortega’s opinion was categorical and clear: universities should be at the ‘service of society’ and must serve three functions, the first and foremost being the transmission of *culture*. This function, as we will see, is played out both inside (as *universal* training of educated people) and outside (as civic *leadership*).

Ortega goes straight to the point when he says that the “university means a privilege that is hardly justifiable and sustainable” because the workers are excluded. In this respect, university extension failed to achieve the ‘universalisation of universities’. But, the most serious problem is not related to access, but in the inability to assume the inherent functions. At that time, two functions were an indisputable priority for Ortega: teaching intellectual professions and training researchers, although the latter has lacked steady implementation in Spain. Universities produce professionals, specialists, and scientists. However, although they may be very ‘wise’ or experts in their field, they may also be totally ‘uncultured’ or even ‘uncouth’ in regard to the system of ideas of their time. Ortega states:

To be successful in the jungle of life you have to be educated, you have to know its topography, its paths or ‘methods’; i.e., you have to have an idea of the space and the time in which you live, your *current culture*. Nonetheless, that culture is received or invented. Only one daring enough to invent it alone, to do what has been done in thirty centuries of humanity, would have the right to deny the need for the University to deal primarily with teaching culture. Unfortunately, the only being that could oppose the foundations of my thesis seriously would be a madman.

Consequently, professionalism and scientism must be compensated with culture, encompassing the vital system of ideas of each epoch. “In the engineer is engineering, which is only one part and one dimension of the European man; but this, which is an *integrum*, is not found in the *engineer* part. And so it is in all other cases”. Laying aside his vitalist philosophy and his idealisation of the origins of the University as an entity (Muñoz, 2007), Ortega’s conclusion on its mission is clear: it encompasses three functions, which are (in this order) the transmission of culture, the teaching of professions, and the undertaking of scientific research.

What was Ortega’s definition of culture? “A constituent dimension of human existence and an indispensable necessity of life”. That said, one might suspect that Ortega shared an anthropological view of culture and entertained a purely descriptive concept: the way of life of a people. However, he reiterates that this constituent dimension is embodied in the system of *living ideas necessary to live up to the epoch in which he lives*. It is not, therefore, a question of a repertoire of ideas and beliefs, nor of knowledge as a whole, but of a selection of ideas, beliefs and knowledge that enables us to rigorously tackle the problems faced by society at a given time. Thus the importance of the qualifier *current* is manifest in five basic disciplines (physics, biology, history, philosophy, and sociology) because, through them, mankind manages to squeeze its existence into the requirements of its time. Thus, university culture allows the comprehensive education of professionals, and this is what Ortega proposed to his audience.

But the mission of universities does not end there, internally. It also has an external ‘enlightening function’ which, given its inoperability, has been taken over by the press and journalists:

*Today’s University should intervene as this type of University, dealing with the hot topics of the day from its own perspective: cultural, professional or scientific. In this way, it will not be a student-only institution, nor indeed a closed space *ad usum Delphini*, but, set in the midst of life, its priorities, its passions, must be imposed as a ‘spiritual power’ superior in standing to the Press, representing serenity as opposed to frenzy, serious sharpness as opposed to frivolity and frankness as opposed to stupidity (Ortega y Gasset, 2015 [1930]).*
The press and journalists—as Ortega knew only too well from his own experience—deal with the instantaneous, with shocking events, or the resonant and the noisy. Conversely, universities must focus on current culture, in other words dealing with the great and profound issues of the time enlightening amid chaos and disorder, leading the way on the fronts where society’s progress hangs in the balance. This is the ‘radical’ university task, which is rooted in life and time.

In 1933, Fernando de los Ríos, Minister of Education of the Republic and friend of Ortega, announced the University Reform Act. The explanatory statement includes the Orteguian reformist argument and the distinction of the three functions. However, the coup d’etat by General Franco and the establishment of a national-Catholic regime aborted all expectations and hopes of reform and therefore ended with the institutionalisation of the cultural function of universities. With the return of democracy, the new University Reform Act LRU (Ley Orgánica de Reforma Universitaria, the LRU hereon) regained its university extension policy and denomination, with culture clearly listed as its third function—albeit with inconsistent and confusing language—and specific vice-rectorate management positions were created to manage the university extensions, cultural extensions, and cultural activities, and to meet the needs arising from an increasingly complex society.

NORMATIVE STATUS OF THE CULTURAL FUNCTION

Quite frequently, people working in the field of culture at their respective universities have the feeling their work is undervalued, in as much as the programmes and activities they run are considered somewhat complementary or ‘ornamental’ if the economic and financial environments turn bad. This vision is widespread, as reflected in a study on University Social Responsibility (USR) in Spain, coordinated by Margarita Barañano (2011), which obtained very low scores for both university extension and cultural initiatives. However, this reality could not be further from the spirit of legislators.

The LRU (1983) and the Ley Orgánica de Modificación de la Ley Orgánica de Universidades (the Organic Amendment Law to the Organic University Regulation Law) (LOMLOU, 2002 and 2007) refer numerous times to culture either directly or indirectly (the ‘system of living ideas’ of an epoch) to highlight the objectives, functions, and missions of universities. These texts imply, without any doubt, that ‘culture’ constitutes the third function and/or mission of universities in Spain and is one of their main objectives.

Thus, the explanatory statement of the LRU begins by pointing out the need to reform universities. What is this need based on? Two new phenomena: firstly, the democratisation of university education, which has arisen both from a demand for vocational training and “from the growing and laudable interest in culture in its various forms” and “the foreseeable incorporation into the European area” with the consequent mobility of the skilled workforce (LRU, 1983).

Secondly, the democratisation of studies, is but the last stage of a secular process of democratization of education and culture that has proved to be the strongest foundation underlying a stable, tolerant, free and responsible society. This is because science and culture are the best legacy adult generations can offer younger generations and the greatest wealth a nation can produce, without a doubt, the only wealth worth accumulating (LRU, 1983).

Therefore, the paragraph concludes that “scientific development, vocational training and the extension of culture are the three basic functions facing the 21st century, which must be fulfilled by that old and currently renewed social institution, the Spanish university” (LRU, 1983). Indeed, the LRU starts by mentioning the word culture four times in the second paragraph.

3 Anonymised concerns shared with the author in a meeting held in Cádiz, 2017.

4 The LOMLOU is expressed in the same way when it describes the functions of the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo (UIMP): the third supplementary provision 3 states that the UIMP will enjoy autonomy in the exercise of its teaching, research, and cultural functions, within the framework of its specific legal regime.
In the explanatory statement of the LOMLOU, it says that “improving quality in all areas of university activity” is a fundamental goal of training the professionals required by society and, to do so, it is necessary to develop research, conserve and transmit culture, enriched by the creative contribution of each generation and, finally, to constitute a critical and scientific instance, based on merit and rigour, which is a reference for Spanish society.

Furthermore, this law includes a novel aspect of lifelong training and points out that universities are obliged to make a ‘cultural offer’ available to anyone wishing to use it.

In both laws, article 1, paragraph 2, of the preliminary remarks specifies these reasons, explaining the “functions of the University at the service of society” (see the comparison in Table 1). Article 33, paragraph 1, of the LOMLOU (title IV) should be interpreted similarly. Speaking of teachings and titles, it argues that “teaching professions requiring scientific, technical or artistic knowledge and the transmission of culture are essential missions of the University”.

One might complete this picture by evoking articles 92 and 93 of the LOMLOU. The first deals with international cooperation and solidarity, and points out that the University must promote activities and initiatives “that contribute to promoting the culture of peace, sustainable development, and respect for the environment, as essential elements of furthering social solidarity”. The second cannot be more explicit and is entitled ‘University Extension’. It states that:

it is the responsibility of the University to connect university students with the system of living ideas pertaining to their time. To this end, universities will arbitrate the means necessary to enhance their commitment to intellectual reflection, creation, and dissemination of culture. Specifically, universities will promote the rapprochement of humanistic and scientific cultures and strive to convey knowledge to society through the dissemination of science.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1: Legislation regarding university culture regulation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bill of reform, Fernández de los Ríos, 1933</strong></td>
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<td>(a) The vulgarisation or public dissemination of what</td>
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<td>constitutes a cultural body.</td>
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<td><strong>LRU, 1983 (preliminary remark, article 1, paragraph 2)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Creation, development, transmission and critique of</td>
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<td>science, technology, and culture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Preparation for the exercise of professional activities requiring the application of scientific knowledge and methods or of artistic creation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Scientific and technical support for cultural, social, and economic development, in both the national and autonomous regions (comunidades autónomas) of Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Extension of university culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOMLOU, 2007 (preliminary remark, article 1, paragraph 2)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Creation, development, transmission and critique of science, technology, and culture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Preparation for the exercise of professional activities requiring the application of scientific knowledge and methods or of artistic creation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Dissemination, assessment and transfer of knowledge to the service of culture, quality of life, and economic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Dissemination of knowledge and culture through university extension and lifelong learning.</td>
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</table>

*Source: Elaborated by the author*
The latter LOMLOU article can only create confusion, since it mentions *ad intra* activities for university students under the heading university extension, rather than *ad extra* activities for those who do not have access to university education. The purported recovery, in this article of law, of the Orteguian philosophy (i.e., ‘living ideas in time’) is carried out without the slightest understanding of the approach taken.

A quick look at these legislative texts makes it possible to draw three conclusions:

(a) Culture is the third mission or function of universities.

(b) University cultural policy has two different recipients: the university community and society.

(c) It is not exactly clear what the cultural function or mission consists of, because these normative texts move loosely among a semantic plurality without a coherent meaning or the implications derived from emphasising one or the other. There is a lack of legislative diligence in terms of consistency and language use.

A first examination enables us to draw, at least, the following meanings of the term *culture*. It designates:

(a) A sphere of society and life, together with science and technology or economics and politics, which can be preserved, created, developed, transmitted, and criticised, or any of the external ‘environments’ related to the University;

(b) A result of all university activities—knowledge—including lecturers and researchers, which must be ‘spread’, popularised, and disseminated to society;

(c) Specific activities, together with representative, charitable, and sports events that can gain ‘academic recognition’, promoting student participation. When talking about university colleges, it also refers to the obligation of universities to offer this type of activity to schools;

(d) A subtype of activities, such as those related to raising awareness of values such as peace and sustainability, solidarity, and equality;

(e) A specific type of offer for those who have lifelong learning needs or anyone who wishes to take advantage of this type of learning;

(f) A way to address an understanding of the world, stating that “humanistic and scientific culture” must promote dialogue therein;

(g) A selection, based on criteria of excellence, of certain types of activities. Hence, when discussing the functions of the Menéndez Pelayo International University, it is argued that it must deal with ‘higher culture’. Thus, semantic confusion is increased, although the importance of culture to the university remains unchanged—an inescapable function, and an essential mission—regardless of its form.

So, can we draw to a close our synopsis of the normative statute of culture in universities? Not at all, as this institution is also directly and specifically affected by the *Ley de Patrimonio Histórico Español* (the Spanish Historical Heritage Act, herin the LPHE) of 1985 as well as regional legislation on the matter. As the preliminary statement, in article 1, paragraph 2, states:

Spanish historical patrimony encompasses buildings and objects of artistic, historical, paleontological, archaeological, ethnographic, scientific, or technical interest. This heritage also

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5 A meaning we could not find in the LRU or LOMLOU, but is used in reports on the social commitment of universities is that derived from a branch of sociology, referring to the ‘culture of the institution’ as a set of ideas and shared values that identify the characteristics of the organisation (the ‘organisational culture’). See *Influencing the institution’s culture so that academic staff and students are motivated to engage with society* (EU, 2001, p. 21). In this regard, Sennett says: “The culture of a company, like any culture, depends on the meaning that ordinary people associate with an institution rather than the explanation decreed by its higher levels” (2006, p. 65).

6 Explanatory statement, LOMLOU, 2007
includes the documentary and bibliographic patrimony, the archaeological sites and areas, as well as nature spots, gardens, and parks that have an artistic, historical or anthropological value.

Universities own the aforementioned types of heritage; moreover, in many cases they are in themselves a cultural patrimony of society, given their origin and trajectory. Furthermore, Spanish universities possess the vast majority of scientific patrimony pertaining to Spanish society and thus constitute an important part of Spain’s documentary and bibliographic heritage. In addition, the law recognises the capacity of universities as interlocutors and as consultative institutions, and the ability of their research centres to study and research all areas of heritage.

This approach defines the functional and cultural mission of universities and its normative statute demonstrates the specificity of university culture within a context where other instances (public administration or the market and the service sector) assume tasks of creation, diffusion, and programming. The policy and management of university culture does not (or should not) compete nor collide with the undertakings of public administrations. Indeed, as for education, health, or employment, it must provide cultural goods and services to society as a whole. Nor does it compete with private-sector programming or the promotion of cultural goods which generate direct economic benefit for the companies involved. However, universities can and should collaborate with such organisations, as well as with those in the service sector, provided they are framed within or subordinate to their own mission.

In this respect, ‘university cultural’ policy is anchored in teaching and research and has specific characteristics. Despite the implications of an ahistorical and elitist vision of culture, this is not a product per se, a *commune bonum* but a fact of human nature and social reality: human beings are constituted, as such, by symbolic systems. But many of these symbolic systems bestow meaning to human and social life, which is completely debatable from a university perspective. The mythical visions of the world, warlike or racist, anti-democratic ideologies, and so on, are cultural forms and expressions, but their dissemination and promotion cannot form a part of university cultural content. Universities are the seat of science and reason; therefore, the culture created, disseminated, and promoted by them must be:

(a) Critical, in that it submits ideas and practices to the scrutiny of reason and public debate, based on the search for the best reasoning or argument. The *mythos* gives way to *logos*.

(b) Scientific, in that it places the method by which truth is sought above any principle or faith. It undertakes to examine pre-judgement and only accepts the data from evidence and experimentation as a provisional truth.

(c) Creative, in that it is founded on the conviction that improvement is possible through appropriate innovation and the cultivation of imagination (Wright Mills, 1999).

(d) Academic, or integrating knowledge, both on a personal and social level. As Altamira states, those who have a university degree are also people. Also, Ortega claimed “the man of science ceases to be what sadly he often is today: a brute who knows a lot about just one thing”. In the face of this bias it is necessary to promote the *cives academicus*.

(e) Current. Ortega’s contribution also deserves to be restated today given its significance in that the University has to deal with the most relevant problems of its time and context such as climate change, intercultural coexistence or global inequality.

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7 “Our best teachers live with a spirit fifteen or twenty years behind but are up-to-date in every detail of their science” [Ortega, 2015 (1930)].
But, the cultural policy of universities, understood in all their complexity, does not finish there. It responds to a core mission of the institution which is not usually explicit in law, although it is in its statutes and this spirit is latently synthesised in all its activities: civic-political representation and moral leadership, in that universities embody the values cherished by society.

THE PRAGMATIC STATUS OF CULTURAL FUNCTIONS

After this synopsis, which strongly emphasises the legal status of cultural functions, we will now explore what actually happens in terms of culture at universities, or to be more precise, what has actually been done in recent decades. We consider three aspects: discourses, organisational forms, and the fields of activity encompassed under the umbrella of culture.

Discourses

Although the current legislation clearly states that the third function or mission of universities is culture, the last 20 years have witnessed other discourses of a purposeful nature. The latter have supplanted this third purpose and have moved to several areas of university activities under pressure to produce regional economic development in a globalised world when faced with cuts in public funding. In this context, two new areas of competition, as well as the redefinition of the university model, have emerged from the same origin: knowledge transfer and technological innovation ("third-stream mission of economic growth", Lester, 2007a) and corporate social responsibility (CRS) or ‘social commitment’ (E3M, 2012). All the authors who take this approach share an opinion on one of the great myths concerning universities: they must leave their ivory towers. The other myth is the claim that universities have become commodified.

Transfer and innovation

The function of performing research was introduced by Humboldt in German universities when a new model (or second-generation) of universities emerged. This function became increasingly important after the industrial and bourgeois revolutions, and further grew from the 1980s with intensified globalisation and a boom in the knowledge economy.

Until the digital revolution changed their historical physiognomy, in the context of intense and extensive transnational flows, universities became established in this territory and had two fundamental sources of development: a highly qualified population and new ideas (Lester, 2007a). They became, therefore, fundamental players in local economic development.

Universities and their internal research groups have been motivated by project funding agencies (European, state, and autonomous regions) to create and launch institutes and science-technology parks. These have become hubs of knowledge transfer (in the form of patents) and innovation, research groups, traditional companies, and start-ups. Thus, research and technological development (known as RTD in the European Union) has now become the magic formula that expresses the development of the research function. It could be said that we are faced with a logical corollary, were it not for the fact that this process has been interpreted as the birth of the third mission and thus also of new generation of universities: ‘university companies’, based on the entrepreneurial spirit (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Jongbloed and Goedegebuure, 2003; Wissema, 2009). This process has generated tensions and confrontations within universities, because it necessarily raises issues such as the possible loss of autonomy and academic freedom, although, as Lester asserts, the underlying trend towards a greater commitment to economic development is very clear (2007, p. 12). But does this imply that all universities should inevitably be reconsidered in company-like hues and that this third function—economic knowledge transfer—has to be implemented in all of them? Lester’s vision, founded on research into innovation systems in 23 different
environments, is much more subtle: success stories in this field are well known but are in the minority and are atypical (e.g., Stanford, Cambridge, or MIT). Furthermore, the creation of companies or filing of patents in the university environment is very limited (of the 150,000 companies registered in the US in 2001, only 3,700 were by universities and many had little or no economic return). Also, the possibility of universities making a profit from this mercantile dimension is very low. Finally, patenting and registering licenses is only one way to transfer knowledge. In conclusion, we need a broader perspective of the role universities play in local economies. Those Universities are creators, recipients, and interpreters of innovation and ideas, sources of human capital and key components of infrastructure and social capital (2007, p. 14).

The imperative that universities should be committed to their environment has too often been restricted or inappropriate for the prevailing economic environment. The word technology is understood outside its social dimension (for instance, the welfare state and the internet are social technologies) but the term innovation applies exclusively to technological innovations (OECD, 2005).

In addition to a reductionist view of transfer, this approach also adopts a mistaken view of innovation. As shown by the evidence gathered by the Local Innovation System Project at the MIT, directed by Richard K. Lester (2005): “universities can play a central role by providing a public space to promote dialogue on the dilemmas of the future of society”. This can take the form of meetings, conferences, forums, etc., where ideas may arise and provide novel ways of dealing with social problems; however, the report also states: “all too often, the importance of this university role as a public space and its contribution to local innovation has been underestimated”. This conclusion is fully aligned with the cultural function and in this respect universities can represent a public space relevant for socio-cultural innovation.

But what is innovation? As with culture, just invoking that word generates positive resonance: it is something desirable and beneficial per se. In which case, should subprime mortgages, atomic weapons, tax havens, artificial intelligence, or new methods of global terrorism not also be considered innovations? Central problems are still normative (differentiating between what is good, correct, acceptable, etc., and what is not), prospective (what is possible or impossible), are organisational (how to generate operational structures and cognitive and relational resources to cope with them), or in last resort, political, social, or cultural problems. Deciding which innovation to green-light and which should be subject to discussion by universities is multidimensional, and should entail the systematic application of human creativity and knowledge to search for solutions to social problems (Lester, 2017).

University social responsibility
A second discourse which refers to universities’ social commitment to their environment has more recently come to light. This can be likened to corporate social responsibility (CSR) but has been redefined as university social responsibility (USR; Ariño and González, 2011; E3M, 2012). The surprising success of this discourse in Spain could well be related to a compensatory reaction to the emphasis on business transfer as a third mission. It has gained so much importance that there are already universities that presume to be pioneers in the introduction of specific vice-rectorate management positions charged with this role. Furthering this aim, there have been reports, publications, PhD theses, and meetings called by central government, the Conferencia de Rectores de Universidades Españolas (CRUE, the Spanish Universities Rectors Conference), or Social Committees. Some universities have published specific reports while others have included

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9 The reader can consult a large number of publications on this topic at [http://compartiendoexperienciauniversitaria.blogspot.com.es/p/articulos-sobre-rsu.html](http://compartiendoexperienciauniversitaria.blogspot.com.es/p/articulos-sobre-rsu.html). Also see E3M, 2012, where it is explicitly recognised that there is no clear ‘third mission’, even though this is the title of the report (E3M, 2012, p. 6).

10 The following conferences on university social responsibility have been held in this respect: I Jornada Iberoamericana sobre la Responsabilidad Social de la Universidad (23 October 2008, Úbeda), organised by the UNED and MAPFRE; II Jornadas de Responsabilidad Social de la Universidad (Universitat Jaume I, 24–25 May, 2010); and III Jornadas que se celebraron en la Universidad de Zaragoza on 24 and 25 May 2011. Regarding theses see Gaete, 2012.
USR in their statutes\(^{11}\) and have delegated this task to their vice-rectorates. The 2015 the university strategic plan argued that it was “essential to strengthen this function” and at some point, apparently without applying much consideration, it was called the third mission (Estrategia Universidad 2015, p. 27).\(^{12}\) The Social Committee Forum of the Universidades Públicas de Andalucía organised an international conference where it announced the creation of the first overview of USR.\(^{13}\) We can conclude that the last decade has witnessed a proliferation of USR-related actions, especially in Latin America. Despite this, it is far from clear what is effectively understood by such or what its normative anchorage is.

An open-ended and confusing definition

Browsing the texts of the LRU (1983) and the LOMLOU (2007) reveals that the concept of USR does not exist in the regulatory framework of the functions and missions of universities in Spain. This has not prevented it from being enthusiastically embraced by certain areas of knowledge and university governance teams, nor its inclusion in the 2015 University strategic plan. What is it, then, and to what does it owe its success?

On the one hand, in a study by the Fundación Carolina, De la Cuesta et al. identify it with offering educational services and knowledge transfer, following principles of ethics, good governance, respect for the environment and social commitment, as well as the promotion of humanistic values, thus taking responsibility for the consequences and impacts derived from ones actions. It involves accounting to society for the positive advances and negative results regarding the commitments made with stakeholders and, in general, human rights, the environment, good governance and social commitment (De la Cuesta, et al., 2010, p. 236).

This is also the definition followed by López and Larrán at the above-mentioned international meeting (López and Larrán, 2010). On the other hand, another paper from the same forum, written from the perspective of the various social committees, states that USR considers the possibility of connecting knowledge management to local, national and global needs, promoting the social utility of knowledge in such a way as to contribute to improving the quality of life of the people and institutions concerned or University stakeholders (Gentil, 2012).\(^{14}\)

It should be noted that three different concepts are mixed here: (a) provision of a service based on principles or standards; (b) accountability of the results; (c) social utility of knowledge. On many other occasions, USR is associated in a very specific way with the university’s contribution to sustainable development.

As Barañano emphasises in the most extensive study carried out so far on the presence of USR in Spanish universities, there is in fact no clear consensus on its definition. Does it transversally affect all university functions, or is it a new function? Is it a specific area of activity (social action, cooperation, volunteerism, etc.) or

\(^{11}\) According to the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED—the Spanish Open University): “The UNED’s mission specifically aims for the university to contribute to a model of innovation according to socially responsible and sustainable social, cultural, economic, and environmental development. Social responsibility should be understood as a reconceptualisation of the whole institution, in the light of the values, its objectives, forms of management, and initiatives imply a greater commitment to society and a contribution to a new model of more balanced and sustainable development” (UNED, 2016).

\(^{12}\) It refers to the academic and social values to defend the democratic values of progress, freedom, and justice.

\(^{13}\) Basically, this overview panel consists of Spanish and Latin American universities: “Professionals agree on the need to incorporate social responsibility as a way of evaluating, regulating and improving the quality of education and Institutions themselves. It is key for universities to be socially responsible if they are to promote that same feeling and obligation in citizens.” See http://noticias.universia.es/vida-universitaria/noticia/2014/02/28/1085005/crean-primer-observatorio-responsabilidad-social-universitaria.html.

\(^{14}\) A—let us say—hearsay definition proposed in a text talking about the functions of universities, and which omits any reference to the legislation in force.
a new mission (to meet the demands of the productive system)? Is it a perspective (social commitment) from which all the functions of universities are interpreted or an instrument to measure socio-economic impact and to provide accountability to society? Or is it a new way of talking about quality and/or values or a means to gain a public reputation?

Also, all these texts agree that it is a transfer to public and private university organisations of a policy that has been implemented in business schools and large companies since 1953 and, even more so, since the 1980s.

The imposition of business university social responsibility

The introductory text of the website in the afore-cited international meeting held in February 2012 in Cádiz began by pointing out that

the new way of understanding and exercising business management of Corporate Social Responsibility is of interest to different agencies and institutions at both the national, regional and international levels [...] In this way, a regulatory framework has been created, to which the business organizations have been voluntarily subscribing [...] The development of practices of University Social Responsibility implies the reformulation of the traditional methods of university management, where the satisfaction of the different social agents has become one of the main keys for long-term success of the University.

In the classic Postcapitalist Society by Peter F. Drucker (1993), the author recalls the importance that large US business schools placed on so-called business ethics in the late 1980s and early 1990s; they were devoted to censoring shady and illegal procedures to obtain profits and promote responsible behaviour towards society: “Ethics could also be productive and beneficial”, it was said, decontextualising this principle from its relationship with trends in consumption patterns. More recently, an ISO 26000 standard has been approved for social responsibility; it requires the exploration of seven dimensions: organisational governance, human rights, employment practices, environment, justice practices, consumer issues and involvement, and community development.

Both Drucker in 1993 and Nejati et al. in 2011 argue that social responsibility is related to the relationship between an organisation and its environment, but neither of them point out that a company’s prime goal is to obtain profits.

Thus, the nature of a business organisation determines the existence of an autonomous economic logic which Milton Friedman formulated with his habitual frankness and audacity: “A company only has one responsibility, i.e., its economic results”. Bernard Mandeville had written centuries before: “Bare Virtue can’t make Nations live In Splendor; they, that would revive A Golden Age, must be as free, For Acorns, as for Honesty”.

In our consumer society with instantaneous communication and ubiquitous, democratic, and globalised information, it now seems that the conditions for doing business and for making profits have changed without transforming the ultimate goal. These are the conditions of mature, informed, demanding consumers, which lead companies to find ways of making ethics and social responsibility profitable. But, then, we should ask whether this is simply a new rhetoric for a new capitalism? Why has the reputational issue gained so much

15 What happens in other countries? Indeed, it has had a wide diffusion and impact in the Ibero-American world and, furthermore, one can find a large number of articles published over the last five years on the internet, which study USR in the main elite universities in England, Germany, India, Nigeria, Ukraine, or in Muslim universities, which insist on the need to incorporate USR into university policies. Nejati et al., 2011; Mehtqa, 2011; Brown and Clock, 2009.

16 Note, at the time of editing this article and verifying the electronic addresses, the website no longer existed.

17 Nejati et al. state that “CSR requires companies to undertake to balance and improve environmental and social impacts without damaging economic activity” (2011, p. 441).
importance, a new term to replace the classic *image*? If all this corporate social responsibility discourse had actually amounted to more than it preached, how can one explain that during its peak period of growth and splendour we have witnessed the greatest concentration of wealth over the last hundred years? This seems to have triggered a worldwide crisis with the intoxication of the system through fraudulent products, the flexibilisation of working conditions, policies of austerity and wage cuts, an increase in ecological threats. Drucker (1993) and Nejati et al. (2011) hold, almost 20 years apart, that it is not a mere reputational issue, but in this era—postcapitalist according to Drucker—“Economic performance is not the *sole* responsibility of a company” and that “an organisation has full responsibility for its impact on the community and society”. Of course, we can agree on this as an act of faith, but it is, in any case, a political responsibility not derived from its economic constitution. In other words, it is not in its nature as a business organisation and therefore will only be voluntarily embraced, by the conviction of its leaders, for strategic or tactical reasons, or by the force of legal imposition.

One of the strategic reasons why CSR is incorporated into the era of consumer capitalism is, no doubt, as we have already indicated, because product differentiation requires ‘added value’. This value can come from symbolic elements such as brands that produce identity, prestige, or distinction, but also relate to moral elements in a society concerned about environmental or social issues. But are universities companies?

There is some controversy about how to understand the concept of public service in the era of the so-called welfare mix or ‘welfare production/provision mixture’, but in the light of community law, public service is “that material activity of exclusive public ownership aimed at satisfying essential collective needs” (Moles, 2006). This notion entails ideas of utility, profit, or benefit in favour of society. The satisfaction of needs that exceed purely individual interests is pursued and respect for the principle of equality is required.

Community law has developed the concept of ‘economic service of general interest’ as a common denominator of the different European legal traditions and which includes the provision of universal service as its main obligation. In other words, it is obliged to provide service in every case, at a certain level of quality, which is oriented to the general interest and at an affordable price, regardless of the economic, social, or geographical situation of the citizen (Moles, 2006, p. 220).

Therefore, what is the social responsibility of universities? In my opinion, it is to fully develop its nature and fulfil its legal mission. However, this does not take place outside the historical circumstances and conditions of knowledge production. For example, scientific knowledge is now produced in large infrastructures and using resources which impact the environment, and in a context where this impact is better known today than it was years ago; at the same time we must be mindful of the grave problems affecting our planet and society and help to find solutions based on our specific understanding. Ortega was referring to this when he said that “universities must also be open to the present day; moreover, it must be in the midst of it, immersed in it”.

In summary, social responsibility is not an added and complementary value, but rather, an intrinsic, constitutive, and transversal one. Universities cannot overlook the social impact of their actions without contradicting their own nature, which does not happen in private businesses. But are universities capitalist companies?
Organisation of the cultural function

An important aspect to consider here is the form of structuring this cultural dimension. The teaching mission is implemented in the official centres (schools, postgraduate centres, and institutes) and is organised through a central service that has a coordination function (student, undergraduate, postgraduate services, etc.), dependent on one or two vice-rectorate officials (according to the moment in history).

The research mission is carried out by each investigator, is implemented in the departments and research institutes, and the process is coordinated by a central service, dependent on a vice-rectorate. In both cases, state legislation, autonomous regional regulations (on the creation of educational centres and institutes), and the statutory regulations of each university, regulate the organisation and implementation of the corresponding activities.

The cultural mission is fulfilled a very different way: in no man's land. There is no state or regional legal regulation. Article 93 of the LOMLOU is limited to stating that universities will arbitrate the ‘necessary means’ and universities mainly refer to university extension services, but in no case are these exhaustive, nor do they control many other cultural activities that are more or less connected with the core cultural area (publications services, sports\textsuperscript{18}, etc.).

To this we must add that some of the services provided by universities are inherently multi-dimensional and serve all three functions at the same time, and these are not easy to tell apart. Paradigmatic cases are library and documentation services or resource centres for learning and research, publications services, and student care services, some are ambivalent and have a mandate to fulfil the main, secondary, or complementary function, while others undertake cultural activities.

\textsuperscript{18} It is too easily forgotten that the word culture comes from cultivation and, with respect to sports both physical culture and culturism are derived therefrom.

Therefore, each university has regulated the implementation and organisation of this mission in a different way, although all or most of them share certain common traits:

1. The implementation of the cultural function is disperse; it can be developed, without an imperative mandate, by teaching centres, departments, institutes, higher education colleges, and individual centres.
2. In all or most of them there is a superior body (for example, a vice-rectorate official) that binds together the different dimensions of the cultural mission, especially the representative omnibus dimension. In fact, the so-called cultural outreach services, when they exist, only coordinate and manage a small part of the cultural activity undertaken by each university.
3. Even so, there is usually no single instance of coordination, supervision, or global management. Rather, different services or structures operate with a high degree of autonomy, which assume some of the sub-dimensions of the cultural function (such as physical and sporting activity, outreach activities, publications services, university summer schools, universities for older adults, sustainability, etc.), without it being clear whether these activities and services are related to the cultural dimension in all cases. They have acquired such organisational autonomy that their link to different vice-rectorate officials depends on discretionary factors rather than the functional coherence of the cultural mission. Some structures undertaking this function may even operate like ‘sunless planets’, whose autonomy is hard to justify from the viewpoint of public transparency, organisational effectiveness, or social commitment.
4. Universities have not started dialogue on how to modify this third mission in accordance with the impact of communication and information technologies, especially the cooperative applications emerging with the so-called Web 2.0.
Compared to other areas of university organisation, this situation reveals both the pragmatic weakness of the cultural function in each university and the lack of a clear vision by governing bodies and the university community in general. We might reach the same conclusion when we speak of the organisational status at the national level: there is no specific sector in the CRUE that coordinates these activities and cooperates to resolve the needs derived from this function. Moreover, this did not happen due to a lack of bottom-up endeavour, indeed the CRUE has shown great sensitivity towards this need and stated its importance since 1991. However, it has not yet received the answer it deserves.19

On the one hand, there are, of course, thematic structures such as synergies, for the coordination of university orchestras, the international university readers’ network, science outreach groups, sustainability or library networks, healthy universities, university publishers, lifelong training or universities for older adults, and theatre. However, these are initiatives that have acquired or may acquire an unnecessary functional autonomy and which offer an image of fragmentation or splintering from the cultural dimension. On the other hand, there have been several attempts at substate or trans-state territorial articulation: The G9, the watchtower network of Andalusian Universities, the Xarxa Vives of the Catalan-speaking universities, or the Gaelic–Portuguese network (3 + 3).

### Expansion of the cultural agenda

We use the expression *cultural agenda* here in its broadest sense, to designate the subjects or tasks related to culture at universities, which form part of a more or less explicit plan, in the form of a schedule or a calendar of activities. In no way do we confine it to the powers of a vice-rectorate or a specific organisational structure, because, as we have said, Spanish universities are far from such systematisation. We start from the evidence obtained by analysing the websites of several universities and of experiences, based on various regional or general meetings, in particular, the one held in July 2017 at the University of Cádiz under the title *University and Culture: Balancing a Relationship.*20 The term *agenda* comes from the Latin *agere* and designates ‘what is to be done’ because it is planned. What are the Spanish universities committing to in this field of culture? Table 2 offers an approximate scenario, without claiming to be exhaustive or systematic, based on the reflections we have presented in this article.

The items could be classified according to: their orientation, inward (university community-integral formation) or outward (extension, dissemination, or contribution to society and leadership); whether the activities belong to the field of humanities, social sciences or basic sciences; whether they consist of events, goods, or services; according to their periodicity or sequence of repetition (lectures, seminars, conferences, or congresses); according to their funding base (own, mixed, or subsidised); depending on the type of actions involving participation (creation and active production or receptive assistance), and so on. Our goal here is to show its recent expansion more than the internal systematics, be they derived or expressed.

To round off this presentation, an analysis of the contents of each area and their preferred recipients could also be carried out. However, for the moment, here we simply present a list of areas, and below we highlight some specific areas which deserve special attention.

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19 In particular, the following endeavours should be outlined: In February 1991, the vice-rectors of most public universities met at the Universidad de La Laguna. Attendees at this meeting recognised the need to establish professional technical teams to provide stable management resources to CRUE members. A university extension coordination group was set up and initiated contacts with the CRUE to become a sector within it, as well as with the Ministry of Culture and some regional councils in order to establish joint institutional collaboration channels. In 1992 and 1993 the university extension vice-rectorate plenary body met on several occasions (Córdoba, Alicante, and the Balearics) culminating in the university management conferences in Barcelona, held in November 1993. In 1998, two other events took place: in Valencia addressing a reflection on the reality of university culture at the threshold of the 21st century. This meeting served as a prelude to an international Ibero-American conference in Oviedo commemorating a hundred years of university extension. In both cases, the need to constitute a dedicated sector was raised once again. In 2002, the ‘Declaration of Alicante on University Extension’ was written and presented to the CRUE at the Rafael Altamira International Conference in Alicante.

20 See: https://celama.uca.es/68cv/seminarios/b14
First of all, it may be appropriate to highlight that research and teaching in cultural sectors, participation, and cultural management have grown extraordinarily in these years. Working groups, journals, and Masters’ degrees have been created, first as the university’s own qualifications and then as official qualifications. In particular, in 1989 the Universitat de Barcelona Master degree was created; in 1990, the association of cultural managers was established; followed by the Universitat de València Master degree in 1993. In this period, we also saw the advisory function of strategic planning for town halls or large cultural organisations.

The importance of university heritage that, as mentioned, has a simultaneous general and specific character (encompassing all kinds of items), because a fundamental part of it is the result of teaching and research activity specialised in science. Historical universities not only have a wealth of assets and real estate, as well as bibliographic and documentary assets, but they have also accrued collections of natural history, medicine, or engineering to cater to teaching and research needs which have been transformed into very singular science museums. Many of these universities may possess 20 or 30 different collections with hundreds of thousands of exhibits.

The new recipients of cultural extension. Two types of recipients should be specifically highlighted: older adults (lifelong learning) and foreign students, especially participants in the Erasmus programme. Schools or universities for the former have been created and since 2004, most of them have been integrated into a state association with 45 programmes and more than 50,000 students. Regarding foreigners, the international theatre programme Erasmus scene network is noteworthy.

Summer courses, schools, or universities. In the last 40 years all universities have experienced extraordinary growth in this type of multi-topic programme, which combines seminars with entertainment activities. Their success has partially been linked to their inclusion in the free-elective credit student curriculum. They must now reinvent themselves in a new sociocultural (digital revolution) and university (curriculum modification) context.

Innovation and social inclusion programmes. Beyond the mere cultural extension or dissemination of science, some universities are running intervention programmes for social inclusion. There, they do not merely debate social problems, but they generate ‘laboratories’ where they can discover, from the interrelation of different knowledge areas, the opportunities arising to deal with new vulnerabilities: inmates or ex-offenders, school drop-outs, female victims of violent abuse with protection orders, immigrant populations, etc. These ‘social outcasts’ are not uncultured people, but merely belong to other cultures.

In short, since the democratic transition and the university reform there has been strong growth and expansion, in several ways and for various reasons, of the university cultural agenda and offer. However, the most radical change—the incorporation of information, communication and organisation technologies or general purpose technologies—has not yet been tapped to its full potential to create think-tanks, sociocultural innovation laboratories, or mediation spaces in collaboration with society and its organisations. This will mean a change in universities’ operating scales (extension is not circumscribed to its territory of implantation) but also a transformation in how to organise that operation (networks generating: regional, state, or intercontinental synergies, such as with educational television programmes).

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21 See the state association of university programmes for older adults: http://www.aepumayores.org/sites/default/files/diptico_aepum_castellano.pdf
22 This project is run by the Universitat de València: http://www.escenaerasmus.eu/
23 See Mil formas de mirar y de hacer (UPO; A thousand ways to see and do) https://www.upo.es/portal/ime/web/contenido/7dd9ab71-08d6-11e7-8aa8-3fe5a96f4a88?channel=d3563863-2f47-11de-b088-3fe5a96f4a88
Table 2: Pragmatic field of university culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts: music, theatre, dance, artistic creation in general, and concerts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training groups or classes: reading, writing, cinema forum, and video games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibitions: based on their own sources, academic research, or external offers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debates, conferences, forums, seminars, and schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science outreach in the form of lectures, conferences, congresses, seminars, and publications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heritage, collections, and museums</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botanical gardens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publications service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library service: bibliographical heritage, documentary heritage, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer courses, schools, and universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities for older adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colegios mayores (student housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign students and Erasmus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Audiovisual and digital workshops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical and sporting activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chair in cultural affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outreach journals and magazines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Territorial projection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social inclusion programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural innovation programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values: sustainability, peace, equality, inclusiveness, and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation Lab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Elaborated by the author

24 The Universidad del País Vasco is in its 36th edition; the Universitat de València is in the 31st; UNED is in its 28th, and the Universidad Complutense de Madrid is in its 29th.

25 At the beginning of the 1980s, programmes were run at universities such as those in Girona and Lleida in the framework of university extension; in 2004, the state association was created: http://www.aepumayores.org
PUBLIC ACADEMY DEMANDS
As we have seen throughout this text, university culture is more than a specific agenda or cultural offer and is not solely concerned with the so-called cultural sector of society. Culture is objective while its mission and function are essential and transversal; it is ingrained in its other functions and is inseparable from these.

Likewise, we have found that this function is dispersed. This means that it commits everyone, everywhere, and all the time. However, 21st century universities are highly complex; they offer a diverse range of undergraduate, master’s, and doctorate degree programmes, in many areas of knowledge, and research groups. In this scenario, within the interstices of departments, faculties, and institutes, we can lose sight of the most relevant issues: (a) comprehensive training and (b) the ability to identify the challenges to be resolved based on reason and empirical evidence, as well as understanding their scope and significance.

Let us remember that Ortega said “it is hard to live up to the times and especially to the ideas of our time”. These imperatives are now even more valid if we are to achieve the advancement of knowledge and the improvement of society. Universities must be able to address the most peremptory, complex, intricate, and relevant issues, and treat them with rigour, audacity, and intrepidity alongside citizens to come up with answers within the framework of an open conversation, where the best arguments make headway. Recalling the sabatinas, or ‘Saturday schools’, the 21st-century public academy—using the contemporary means at its disposal—should be a space shared in which the problems and challenges concerning us today. The issues upon which our quality of life depends, for both those living today and future generations, should be addressed and answered by the universities through sociocultural innovation. In this way, they would simply be doing what is in their nature as public services. This is our service and commitment and our greatest social responsibility, and it should not succumb to fashionable rhetoric or other alien narratives.

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**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

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Introduction
The year 2017 is, without doubt, a milestone to keep in mind when we talk about Spanish Civil War heritage in the Valencian territory. This is the year that has witnessed the start of the process to approve the Ley de la Generalitat Memoria Democrática y por la Convivencia de la Comunidad Valenciana (Valencian Autonomous Community Law for Democratic Memory and Coexistence), and also marks a new amendment of the Ley de Patrimonio Cultural Valenciano (Valencian Cultural Heritage Act), which explicitly mentions the vestiges of the Civil War. Likewise, together with these new legislative measures taken by the Valencian government, there is also news of the creation of public subsidies by the Diputación de Valencia and the Generalitat Valenciana to preserve historical or collective memory.

Furthermore, in addition to the scenarios unfurling within this new legislative context, we should also highlight an unprecedented praxis in the city of Valencia: the study, rehabilitation, conservation, and musealisation of the air-raid shelter located in the City Hall, which has been open to the public since April 2017 (Moreno, 2017; Figure 1). However, it seems that this will not be a unique event because another shelter located at the intersection of Carrer (street) dels Serrans and Carrer de Palomino will soon be opened as part of another
municipal project (Levante-EMV, 04/06/2016) as will the Bombas Gens factory shelter, thanks to a private initiative (Culturplaza, 17/01/2017). In addition, Les Corts Valencianes (the main legislative body of the Generalitat Valenciana) has also made public its interest in recovering the shelter located in the basement of Benicarló Palace, the current headquarters of Les Corts, which hosted the presidency of the Government of the II Republic between November 1936 and October 1937 (Diari La Veu, 06/06/2017).

However, if we look at these activities from another perspective and with a critical eye, we will soon realise that they are the result of a new situation. Valencia city—capital of the Republic 80 years ago—had also remained lagging behind regarding its appreciation and dissemination of a singular part of its war heritage—its air-raid shelters. Cartagena was at the vanguard in terms of the opening and musealisation of shelters in the Spanish state, with its pioneering project back in 2004. Since then, Valencia city has looked on while other cities (e.g., Almería, Jaén, Albacete, and Barcelona) and even Valencian villages (Cullera, Alcoi, or La Pobla del Duc, among others) have started to restore and open their shelters to the public, as centres and elements of heritage and collective memory of our recent past (Besolí, 2004; Besolí and Peinado, 2008; Jaén, 2016; Pujadó, 2006). So, with 13 years’ delay, it seems that the time has finally come to remember these forgotten shelters and materialise the recognition voiced by citizens’ collectives, memorial associations, left-wing parliamentary groups, and professionals and scholars for the last two decades.

The article is structured in three sections. In the first section, we approach the transformation of Valencia as the capital of the Republican rearguard, helping us to delve into the historical context in which the
urban air-raid shelters emerged. In the second, we discuss how these unique constructions appeared as an innovative reaction to defend the civilian population and the Republican administration against the attacks of fascist aviation. Finally, we briefly explain the new situations that have opened and the issues surrounding the patrimonial management of the air-raid shelters in Valencia city at a time when we seem to have overcome the phase of censorship and administrative blockade that we had lived thus far. The time has come for reflection and, perhaps, to build claims, needs, demands and ex novo projects.

VALENCIA 1936–1939: CAPITAL OF THE REARGUARD
The city of Valencia was a symbol and a key metropolis of the Republican rearguard. In addition to hosting the state governmental capital for a year, it also embodied the state of mind of the Second Republic and the development of the conflict, perhaps, like no other city of the rearguard (Girona and Navarro, 2007; Navarro and Valero, 2016 and 2017). Moreover, the city underwent a change, both physically and emotionally, that helps us clearly analyse the stages and milestones of the war. Thus, at first, with the coup d’etat and the beginning of the struggle it remained a hyperactive city, in the most extensive sense of the word (Aznar, 2007a and 2007b; Bordería, 2007; Calzado and Navarro, 2007). However, by early 1937, with the first bombings, the city, public safety, and everyday life were transformed. Valencia saw how the fronts were advancing and approaching, and how air-planes and bombs were becoming an increasingly constant threat to city life. Valencia, the so-called happy Levante, was transformed into a city awaiting the communiqués of war, sirens, and historic cries like ¡Que viene la Pava! (Here comes the Pava).  

When we analyse the oral testimonies of war children from this era, we realise that one of the things that marked them most were the bombings, the states of alarm, and the planes (Aragó et al., 2007; Santamarina, 2009; Moreno and Olmos, 2015a; Museu de la Paraula). They used onomatopoeia to parrot the sounds of the droning plane engines, whistling projectiles, blasting bombs, as well as the wailing sirens and the cries of ¡Al refugio! (To the shelter!). This reminds us of the effectiveness of the strategy pursued by Franco and his Nazi and fascist allies, which was to frighten, punish, and undermine morale by bombing cities and civilian targets, and, of course, this strategy left its print on the life and memory of generations of Valencian people who suffered an incessant and inhumane rain of bombs for over three years (Infiesta, 1998, p. 70; Aracil and Villarroya, 2010, p. 21; Azkárraga et al., 2017).

AIR-RAID SHELTERS AND THE JUNTA DE DEFENSA PASIVA (PASSIVE DEFENCE BOARD)
When we talk about air-raid shelters, we indirectly refer to the nefarious honour bestowed on our Civil War for being one of the first global conflicts where the rearguard and populated nuclei were targets of massive bombing campaigns. From this analysis we can see interpretations that recount pioneering military methods and techniques, experimentation campaigns with new armaments and tactics, and a novel way of waging war that transcended all that known to man so far. Thus, we are contemplating a conflict that ushered in ‘modern war’, a ‘total war’, which was to embody the Second World War to a superlative degree (Sánchez, 2007, pp. 45–77; Hobsbawm, 2012, pp. 52-61).

When we talk about the city’s air-raid shelters, not only do we speak of war, bombs, and attack and defence tactics, but also of civilian populations, of

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1 La Pava was a slow-speed German two-seater (Heinkel HE-46) fighter plane that the rebels used to undertake aerial reconnaissance missions (because it was equipped with a camera that could record future targets), as well as aerial campaigns (Mainar, 2007a, p. 85). For the population, however, their presence heralded bombs, as this was the first aircraft to fly over the bomber’s targets.

2 Museu de la Paraula. Archive of Valencian Oral Memory, at the Museu Valencià d’Etnologia (the Valencian Museum of Ethnology), Diputació de València: www.museudelaparaula.es
people like us who did not fight on the fronts, who were not soldiers of an army, but women and men, young and old, who saw how their life in the city had become a priority target of the rebel army. This new way of waging war brought with it new defence strategies and, in particular, new ways to protect the civilian population threatened by air strikes. Precisely, this social and civil component of shelters marks them as distinct, a singular element of war’s heritage. The shelter is not a mere construction, nor a place of attack or of active defence by a military body, but rather, it is a space and an architecture that arises from the implementation of citizen protection measures and of civilian targets by means of Defensa Pasiva Organizada (DPO—organised passive defence).

The fortification of Valencia and its environs began early, in September 1936, before the city had been bombed. The construction of shelters and creation of the DPO were some of the measures taken by the government of the Republic to protect the population, who would see the enemy bombings arrive by sea and by air, bringing the bitter taste of the war in their wake.

Organised passive defence in the city of Valencia
Once the government became settled in the city, and as the war became more intense, so the protection efforts increased. Both construction and propagandistic activities were constant and intense, lasting from the end of 1936 until the end of the war, in March 1939. On June 28, 1937, the Ministry of National Defence, chaired by Indalecio Prieto, decreed the amendment of the previous ordinances on the DPO of the II Republic with the purpose of unifying and standardising procedures. The new decree of 1937 established the compulsory organisation of the DPO throughout the territory loyal to the Republic and established that the Dirección de la Defensa Especial contra Aeronaves (DECA—the Directorate for Special Defence against Aircraft) would be in charge of creating the general rules relating to the organisation, the preparation and implementation of the DPO (Gaceta de la República, 29/06/1937). In order to implement DPO measures, provincial and local committees and managers were constituted to implement or coordinate these measures. Implementation of the DPO in each locality or province involved the formation of teams of specialists, health workers, and other workers, who were not subject to military mobilisation (Moreno and Olmos, 2015a, p. 97).

On July 28, 1937, a new decree ordered the creation of the Junta de Defensa Pasiva (or JDP—the Board of Passive Defence) of Valencia, which was directed by the city mayor, Domingo Torres (Vera and Vera, 2000, p. 214). Its activities included the installation of 25 sirens, creating blood banks and armoured operating theatres, protecting rescue shelters, constructing anti-aircraft shelters, and establishing debris-clearing brigades and stretcher bearers. However, besides this construction and logistics management, the JDP was also responsible for the dissemination and literacy of the population in DPO-related issues (Girona, 1986, p. 340). Through the press and the radio, citizens were constantly reminded of how to act in the event a bombing: the sirens would announce the sighting of planes and the need to head directly to the shelters. Blackouts were also compulsory after nine o’clock at night, although this measure was not always respected (Safón and Simón, 1986; Abad, 1987).

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3 Lines of trenches were also built to defend the area of Valencia (XYZ, Palancia I, Puig-Carasols), fortifications of various types (bunkers, like those located in Saler, blockades, casemates, and machine-gun nests), and anti-aircraft defences with heavy artillery, batteries, reflectors for the nocturnal location of the air-planes, etc., were installed in the port, Saler, and other spots along the coast (Gil and Galdón, 2007, pp. 33-53).

4 The provincial committees comprised the chief of the DECA as President, a delegate of the civil governor, a doctor, a specialist in war gases (doctor, pharmacist, or chemist), an architect or municipal engineer, a representative of the press, and a Secretary. Likewise, the local committees had a similar structure, but the presidency could be passed onto the Mayor in the absence of a more superior DECA member.
Throughout the year, press releases, booklets, and catalogues were published by the JDP to inform and educate the citizens on how to react and to handle hazardous situations. Catalonia published a book in early 1937 that inspired the libretto that the JDP in Valencia later published in June (DPV, 1937). The document is highly educational and explains the consequences of the bombings, the types of bombs and their effects, and lists 17 preventive measures that the citizenry should keep mind to survive the bombs. Some preventive measures listed were:

All lights that shine outside buildings, in skylights or inner areas that face outward must be switched off or painted blue. The same goes for the glass covering skylights and similar structures [...] while the headlights of mechanically-driven vehicles (cars, trucks, motorcycles...) must use dipped beam or green-blue headlamps, in order to travel safely through built-up areas and outskirts.

Neither headlights nor road illumination can be lit up in a minimum radius of 5 km from the city [...] The glazing of balconies, windows, shop-windows and doors, shall be protected by sticky-paper tape, starting with its placement on door frames [...] The public must observe the preference of women, children, the old and the infirm to stay in the shelters, with other people being permitted whenever the space or room permits [...] Do not remain on the street once an attack has broken out, and those who are in the public thoroughfare must quickly seek shelter in the doorways of houses or in the nearest shelter (Moreno and Olmos, 2015b, pp. 354–355).

During the summer of 1938 the bombardments took place almost daily. The war front was approaching the city and living conditions worsened rapidly. On December 9, 1938 a decree by the Minister of
Defence, Juan Negrín, restated the compulsory passive defence and—to make it more effective—decreed the general mobilisation of citizens to cope with the air attacks (Figure 2). Based on a proposal by the Ministry of Defence, a National Board for Passive Defence was established under inter-ministerial coordination. The role of this coordinating board was to inform, advise, and propose everything concerning the general regulations and legislation regarding the DPO. Days later, Negrín’s Ministry signed an order establishing that all the bodies, centres, and entities in charge of DPO services would continue to implement their tasks as they had done up until that time (Gaceta de la República, 27/12/1938). In addition, it communicated the urgent reorganisation of the services listed under Decree 151 (Gaceta de la República, 03/12/1938).

Thus, if in the summer of 1936 the anti-aircraft defence had only eight cannons, some defence spots on the coast, and 18 officers, in 1938 the organisation became more complex with fixed groups of gunners in the city, manoeuvre groupings, and brigades on the fronts, interception networks and provincial and local DPO committees, etc.: Valencia had become the headquarters of the DECA general staff (Vera, 2008, pp. 75-99; Aracil and Villarroya, 2010, pp. 54-57). As for the shelters, their numbers increased exponentially from an initial 10 or so, to several hundred by the end of the war (Peinado, 2015; Taberner, 2016; Azkárraga and Peinado, 2017).

Air-raid shelters in Valencia city

At present, there is an interesting corpus of publications cited throughout this article explaining, in detail, the construction and singularities of the shelters constructed in the city of Valencia. To avoid reiterations, we will summarise some of their characteristics in order to assess their historical and patrimonial value.

As already stated, the tasks of the JDP in Valencia and the construction of shelters was not spontaneous. Rather, they were the result of a planned strategy with a hierarchical structure of management, supervision, and implementation agencies. In fact, in order to achieve optimum safety and habitability, the construction of shelters responded to a series of very specific architectural and technical requirements, such as the elaboration of a technical project and the payment of taxes (Moreno and Muñoz, 2011; Peinado, 2015).

A distinctive feature was the building materials and the structure of the anti-bomb constructions that were to be built. As an alternative evacuation measure, the shelters had at least two access points that were located at opposite ends or, at least, very far from each other (Galdón, 2006, p. 88). In addition, the descent by ramp or by staircase was followed by a zigzag or elbow-shaped hallway to avoid shrapnel from penetrating and to reduce the effects of a possible shockwave. In the city of Valencia the new shelters were built mainly with concrete, iron, and sand, materials designed to withstand the impacts of explosions. The interior was compartmentalised mostly in galleries and often had folding benches attached to the walls; some even had latrines. They were mostly subterranean, with vaulted galleries in an inverted U-section. However, there are also examples of shelters in the shape of a quadrangular room with columns or shelters on the surface with pyramidal or sloping roofs (Azkárraga and Peinado, 2017, p. 81). The electrical and ventilation systems were also key elements, because, being underground constructions, as they needed a complete ventilation and lighting system. In addition, in the city of Valencia, their construction also had to take into account the groundwater level (between three and four meters deep in the centre, and much less in the port area), which meant that some shelters were semi-subterranean, leaving the protection area placement mainly at the street level (Peinado, 2015, p. 123; Taberner, 2016).

Inside, the walls also had signs, usually written in blue paint, which indicated the rules of coexistence and safety. The message often depended on the population sector harboured by the shelter. Thus, in
some factories like that of Bombas Gens the messages “No smoking or spitting” or “For the sake of hygiene, please do not throw filth of any kind” have been conserved. In shelters frequented by schoolchildren, such as Grupo Balmes, the signs indicate “Capacity 1000 children” or “Keep one metre away from this door to facilitate the entry of air”. In this respect, the existence of decorative elements on the walls has also been documented in some school shelters, such as the Mickey Mouse painted in the shelter located in carrer de Ruaya (Azkárraga and Peinado, 2017, p. 82) or the use of blue and terracotta red pigments in the City Hall Shelter (Moreno, 2017). Even so, the real icon of the city’s shelters is the painted relief lettering with horizontal placement which, often accompanied by arrows, indicated the shelter access points, especially to the public, to help favour their quick identification in the event of siren warnings (Figure 3).

However, despite the existence of these common and defining elements of shelters, there are different architectural typologies that do not correspond to only one classification type (Table 1). Thus, according
Table 1. Type of shelters in the city of Valencia according to their origin and their users

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC OR DISTRICT SHELTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Located in the central neighbourhoods; they were aimed mainly towards the resident neighbours and to pedestrians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Built by the JDP of the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Semi-underground; they had an exterior sign saying <strong>REFUGIO</strong> (meaning ‘shelter’).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The construction of a hundred public shelters was anticipated, but low levels of collaboration by the city and the neighbours led to a reduction in this figure to less than half: 41.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examples: Intersections between <strong>Carrer</strong> (street) dels Serrans–Palomino, Carrer Dalt–Ripalda, Carrer de l’Espasa, Plaça del Carmen, Carrer de la Universidad (Plaça del Col·legi del Patriarca), Gran Vía de les Germanies, and Gran Vía de Marqués del Turia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHELTERS IN THE BASEMENTS OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Adapted for use by the JDP of the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examples: the Galerías Avenida building (Avinguda de l’Oest), the Ateneo Popular (with a capacity for 1,500 people), or the train stations (Norte, Aragón, Pont de Fusta, and Jesús).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL SHELTERS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Located in the courtyard or in the school gardens, or in annexed spaces, they were mainly aimed at the educational community and could house between 800 and 1,000 students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Built by the JDP of the city and co-financed (50%) by the city Council of Valencia and by the Ministry of Public Instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examples: Cervantes, Octubre, Lluís Vives, Balmes, Mirasol, Blasco Ibáñez (renamed, Jesús María), and Félix Bárcenas schools, or the <strong>Grupo Escolar</strong> housed in the City Hall (<strong>Ayuntamiento</strong>) building.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORY AND WORKSHOP SHELTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Built within work centres to protect workers. Especially in companies which supplied war materials, provided storage, or produced energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examples: Bombas Gens, Macosa, or the extinct factory in Carrer Marqués de Caro.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNMENT SHELTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Built within institutional buildings to protect public officers and workers belonging to the Republic Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examples: Shelter located in the basement of the Palau de Benicarló, the current headquarters of the Corts Valencianes, which hosted the headquarters of the presidency of the II Republic Government between November 1936 and October 1937.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIVATE SHELTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Built by private initiatives in the basements or backyards of houses or other dwellings, in order to guarantee the safety of the members of the family or the community of neighbours in a given building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These are very diverse structures, but are usually medium or small, because they were normally adapted from spaces already existing in the building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Their location in private properties makes access difficult and often even the owners are not aware of their existence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examples: in Carrer de l’Alguer, 19; Carrer del Comte d’Altea, 54; and Carrer del Dr. Zamenhof, 3–5, among others. Only a few remain from over 100 known to have existed, many of which have been closed up.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Elaborated by the authors based on Peinado, 2015 and Azkárraga and Peinado, 2017.
to their nature or their ownership, they could be considered public or private shelters. If we consider the end user, we can classify them into district or neighbourhood shelters catering to schools, factories, commercial, official and governmental buildings, and private or neighbourhood communities. With respect to the formal and technical categories, we can differentiate between those that have vaulted or lintelled ceilings and those with the shape of a room, a mine, or elements of both. In addition, depending on their location or depth, we can classify them into underground, semi-underground, surface constructions, or street-level.

Another recurring issue in addressing the city’s air-raid shelters is calculating how many were built and how many of these still survive. It is now a difficult task to know exactly how many there were and their location, because, among other things, there are no official inventories cataloguing them in detail. In addition, the different primary information sources from that period, official records and press releases, provide contrasting data. We must add here that the war prevented the proper preservation of the documentation and that subsequent changes in street names and the numbers of buildings may also have hindered their follow-up. The most exhaustive current estimates are, on the one hand, that compiled by Taberner (2016), which, with documentation from the Municipal Archives of Valencia (the Archivo Municipal de Valencia) and field work, indicate that approximately 270 shelters were built; on the other hand, in his doctoral thesis Peinado (2015) presents the most complete list so far, documenting as many as 330 anti-aircraft shelters in the city of Valencia. However, today, the most important issue is not the quantitative analysis of shelters, but their qualitative status. Despite all this, some of these air-raid shelters are still in relatively good condition. However, it should be noted that the passage of time has deteriorated many of them, and the carelessness of administrations over the decades has contributed to allowing many others to disappear or has altered their nature and essence as items which form part of Spanish historical heritage.

**AIR-RAID SHELTERS: HERITAGE AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY THAT SHOULD BE RETRIEVED**

To live without memory is very difficult; indeed, without memories, we are not ourselves. Joël Candau, in his famous work *Antropología de la memoria* (2002, p. 5) states that without memory, the subject is lost, living only in the present, they are bereft of conceptual and cognitive capacities. Their world shatters and their identity fades. But what do we remember and what do we forget? Anthropologist Jose María Valcuende (2007, p. 21) points out that there are three aspects we remember. First, we remember things that, in our context, we require to cover our needs. Second, we remember what is useful for us to be able to interpret what is happening in our surroundings. Finally, we keep memories that help us to define ourselves.

Every society needs a shared reference, because what it remembers or what it forgets sheds light on its organisation, its mechanisms of repression, and its hierarchy, among other things. Therefore, memory is an ideological field of struggle. At every historical moment, the social group that wields power will want to impose its interpretation of reality and, inevitably, it will manipulate memory, either by enhancing certain historical memories or erasing others. This is what Francoism did for four decades to justify the military coup, the war, and the brutal repression that ensued. To accomplish this, he launched a propaganda campaign in which he glorified his military victory through the cartographic design of memory, building the Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen), placing engraved plates in many churches to commemorate the “Martyrs felled by God” for the sake of Spain, as well as the change of toponymy (Escudero, 2011, p. 30).

Today’s problem stems from the time, after Franco’s death, when the Francoist dictatorship was reconverted into a democracy under an enforced “vow of silence” (Espinosa, 2007, p. 46). It was a tactical agreement between certain political forces whereby Franco’s dictatorship enjoyed a historical truce, as if nothing had happened between 1931 and 1977. For 20 years the premise was to “not look back so as
not to open wounds” (Espinosa, 2007, p. 46). But this cycle of collective memory redaction policies came to an end with the start of the new millennium. At this point, civil society sparked a memorial movement which, together with the most left-wing political forces, managed to break this pact and to promote initiatives to recover historical memory.

In this new context, the air-raid shelters from the Civil War resurfaced as heritage sites associated with the politics of collective memory and occupied a preferential place between what Pierre Nova (1984–1993) calls *lieux de mémoire* (places of memory). These are places where memory has been selectively embodied and which, by the will of humanity or the work of time, have remained its most luminous symbols. These are sites in which the collective memory lives on emotionally and that, despite having been forgotten for a long time, they preserve the past and have the capacity to transport collective memories to current generations. Therefore, they are places associated with memory policies (Calzado, 2006, p. 10).

In the city of Valencia, to address the management and dissemination of such collective memorial sites—of air-raid shelters—implies becoming aware of certain factors that conditioned the implementation of any work proposal up until a few months ago. First of all, we should mention the lack of interest in this topic shown by public administrations for decades, which has manifested itself as repeated policies of inaction by the government and Valencian institutions as well as in the Manichaean concept and blocking the initiatives of other parliamentary groups and citizens’ collectives. Not even reports by the *Consell Valencià de Cultura* (CVC —the Valencian Culture Advisory Board)\(^6\), which demanded more administrative protection for shelters as well as the implementation of activities promoting their social interest and enjoyment, were heeded. The years have passed and, with the change of government, it seems that public initiatives are being promoted in the city of Valencia, with the local government now showing interest in Civil War heritage: exhibitions, publications, commemorative acts, opening shelters to the public, and signposting places of special interest (Figure 4). It seems that there is a new perspective on how to interpret memorials linked to the Civil War as heritage sites that should be located, studied, recovered, preserved, disseminated and, above all, dignified. Our past and our history have always been there; we just have to devote time to them, watch over them with care, and want to make them part of our collective memory.

Secondly, the non-implementation of the Spanish state law regarding historical memory, the Ley 52/2007 de Memoria Histórica (the ‘Historical Memory Law’), and the lack of specific legislation on how to deal with our war heritage have also hampered the development of projects in favour of recovering our collective historical memory and studying our heritage from the Second Republic and the Civil War. In retrospect, we can see how the legislative framework regarding the Civil War heritage has been adapting very slowly. Thus, corresponding legislation passed in 1985 (Law 16/1985, *de Patrimonio Histórico Español*—on Spanish Historical Heritage) neither envisaged nor protected it explicitly, although it did mention war-related heritage from other eras (castles, ramparts, or fortifications). Even so, state law did provide for air-raid shelters to be included within archaeological heritage because they are often found underground and archaeological methodology is required to study them (González, 2008, p. 15; Moreno and Muñoz, 2011, p. 185). Besides this, air-raid shelters have not been contemplated in Valencian legislation until now, which had caused these remnants of architecture and war engineering from our most recent past to have remained in total obsccurity (Álvarez, 2010, p. 182). However, this legislative panorama has undergone a series of transformations in recent years that have already been highlighted in the introduction of this article. Several events have

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\(^6\) The relevant CVC reports are: *The preservation of the military historical heritage of the Civil War (1936–1939; December 20, 2004); Report on Civil War shelters; with particular mention of those in the City of Valencia (July 23, 2007); Report on the Civil War shelters in the Gran Vía de Valencia (June 27, 2011); and, Report on air-raid shelters in the Comunidad Valenciana, namely the lands encompassing Castellón, Valencia and Alicante provinces (January 25, 2016).*
occurred which denote a paradigm shift in the treatment of this heritage in the Valencian territory. Particularly remarkable was the 2017 modification of a 1998 law on cultural heritage (Law 4/1998 del Patrimonio Cultural Valenciano—on Valencian Cultural Heritage modified by Law 9/2017), which highlights the heritage value of civil and military constructions from the Civil War as notable examples of military engineering and as privileged spaces conserving the memory of war. In addition to mentioning air-raid shelters, it also highlights the historical and cultural importance of aerodromes, trenches, parapets, powder kegs, armoured elements of resistance (machine-gun nests, sniper sites, casemates, bunkers, or forts), and a long list of constructive elements related to the military architecture of this time, considering them to be worthy of protection. The law states that, with its entry into force, the historical and military archaeological and civilian heritage of the Civil War present in the Valencian Community prior to 1940 will be considered Bienes de Relevancia Local (BRL—Assets of Local Relevance).

This new legal framework also establishes the obligation to draw up an inventory of these assets, differentiating between protected assets and those that should simply be documented, depending on their relative heritage value. The same will happen with the collective memorial sites, which are to be documented according to their historical importance. Even so, without detracting from the importance of these measures, since cataloguing assets is a basic task required for their proper management, this generates a debate surrounding generic statements about assets, and regarding which criteria should be followed to assess ‘relative heritage value’, leading to their classification into those deserving protection as opposed to simply being documented. To date, and before this legislation was passed, in the city of Valencia twelve shelters had already been classified as BRLs (September 2010) in the General Inventory of Valencian Cultural Heritage (Table 2). Sadly, we have found that this mere declaration does not ensure their adequate conservation (Figure 5).

València en la Memòria is a route created by the City Council of Valencia to signpost buildings and monuments of the Valencia of the Second Republic. Photos by Tatiana Sapena (Valencia, June 2017).
Table 2. City of Valencia air-raid shelters classified as BRL (Assets of Local Relevance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHELTERS</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Refugio Serranos–Palomino</td>
<td>Intersection of Carrer (street) dels Serrans, 25 and Carrer de Palomino.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Refugio Alta–Ripalda</td>
<td>Intersection of Carrer de Dalt, 33 and Carrer de Ripalda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Gran Asociación School Refugio</td>
<td>Intersection of Carrer de la Blanqueria, 12 and Carrer del Pare d’Orfens, 3–5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Refugio Espada</td>
<td>Carrer de l’Espasa, 22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Lluís Vives School Refugio</td>
<td>Carrer de Sant Pau, 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Refugios in Av. Germanías and Av. Marqués del Turia</td>
<td>Intersection of Gran Via de les Germanies and Gran Via de Marqués del Turia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jaime Balmes School Refugio</td>
<td>Carrer del Mestre Aguilar, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Refugio Grupo Escolar Blasco Ibáñez (now colegio Jesús María secondary school)</td>
<td>Gran Via de Ferran el Catòlic, 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Refugio Ruaya</td>
<td>Carrer de Ruaya, in front of Carrer de Pepita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Refugio Grupo Escolar Libertad (now Trinitarias secondary school)</td>
<td>Carrer de la Visitació, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Real Monasterio de la Trinidad Refugio</td>
<td>Carrer de la Trinitat, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 El Grao Secondary School Refugio</td>
<td>Carrer d’Escalante, 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Elaborated by the authors with data from the heritage inventory (Inventario General del Patrimonio Cultural Valenciano).

Figure 5

Sign and arrow on the façade of the shelter located at the intersection of Carrer de Dalt, 33 and Carrer de Ripalda. Photographs by Hèctor Juan (Valencia, June 2017).

Façade and sign of the shelter located at Carrer de l’Espasa, 22, in a bad state of conservation despite being a BRL. Photographs by Hèctor Juan (Valencia, June 2017).
Furthermore, besides this growth in legislation regarding heritage, we must also mention the bill passed by the Valencian government regarding the Valencian Autonomous Community Law for Democratic Memory and Coexistence which is currently the subject of parliamentary proceedings.\(^7\) This law entails an extension of the rights recognised by the Spanish state Law 52/2007—the Historical Memory Law—, with the creation of the Instituto Valenciano de la Memoria Democrática, los Derechos Humanos y las Libertades Públicas (the Valencian Institute for Democratic Memory, Human Rights and Public Liberties), responsible for creating, managing, and disseminating the catalogue of places and itineraries constituting the democratic memory of the Comunidad Valenciana.

In this respect, the law for Valencian collective memory (Ley de Memoria Valenciana) defines ‘democratic memorial sites’ as buildings, or places of interest where events of singular relevance occurred, which have a historical or symbolic significance, or have had an impact on the collective memory of the Valencian people’s struggle for their rights and democratic freedom in the period from April 14, 1931 to July 10, 1982 (Title III. Chap. 2, Art. 20). Therefore, we understand that the anti-aircraft shelters, as icons of the rearguard resistance and with a clear link to the daily life of the Valencian population, have a double meaning as places of war and places in our collective memory. Their historical, architectonic, social, and even symbolic value also means shelters can form part of the “itineraries of democratic memory” that the law describes in article 20. Moreno and Muñoz (2011, p. 184) raised the point that the value of the air-raid shelters is not related to artistic or aesthetic preferences, nor do they even have a monumental interest that labels them as works of art; part of their importance lies in the fact that this war heritage does not exclusively speak of war and history, but also of people’s histories and their day-to-day and, therefore, they represent a source and manifestation of heritage, implicitly harbouring their collective memory.

This legislative framework has certainly heralded a new era for the Civil War heritage. However, heritage, in addition to legislation favouring its protection and cataloguing, also needs budgetary provision to take global management projects forward, tasks including documentation, study-analysis, intervention, conservation, and dissemination.

As we have seen, the first two factors we considered for the management and dissemination of war heritage (i.e., the lack of interest shown by the central administration and lack of legislation) seem to have been overcome. Currently, the same cannot be said for the third factor—one which strongly influences to be taken into account, any work undertaken in this field—the politicisation of proposals and activities endeavouring to raise awareness of the value of our collective memory and the heritage of our most recent past. In this respect, there is still much to be done. A good example of this is the debate that generated, in Valencia City Council and in other Spanish cities, by the change of street names. Presenting and explaining what is, and what should be, the historical memory of our recent past in a way that it is understood and accepted as heritage by the majority of citizens is very challenging, and goes beyond speeches associated with political parties. The great challenge is, therefore, to attain sufficient democratic maturity to understand and make understood that historical or collective memory must be put into practice and be a vindication of the whole of democratic society. The recovery of our heritage has to help raise a democratic alternative to Francoist discourse which censored the scientific, rigorous, and global understanding and dissemination of the conflict and the coup d’etat for forty years. It is therefore now our a task to disseminate

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\(^7\) Thus, we follow the path already initiated by other autonomous regions: Law of Catalonia 13/2007, October 31, on Democratic Memorial; Law of Catalonia 10/2009, 30 June, on the location and identification of people who disappeared during the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship, and dignification of mass graves; Foral Law of Navarra 33/2013, 26 November, for the recognition and moral compensation of murdered Navarrese citizens and victims of the repression following the military coup of 1936; Law of the Basque Country 4/2014, 27 November, on the creation of the Instituto de la Memoria, la Convivencia y los Derechos Humanos (Institution for Memory, Coexistence and Human Rights); Law of the Balearic Islands 10/2016, 13 June, for the recovery of missing persons from the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship. Collective memory laws are also underway in other autonomous communities, such as Andalusia and Aragon.
a historical approach that addresses both patrimonial and social perspectives from an inclusive, democratic, and intergenerational approach.

Despite all this, we must also be aware that when we work with Civil War heritage we are also working against certain preconceptions of citizenship and with a scant perception of these elements as a heritage to be safeguarded. Undoubtedly, the aforementioned factors and the same evolution and idiosyncrasy of society and the Valencian and Spanish democracy have also helped to encourage certain prejudices and a negative perception of the Second Republic and the Civil War among the citizenry. These preconceptions obviously affect this heritage, which is mostly perceived as something irrelevant.

It is both intriguing and paradoxical that our air-raid shelters, despite being collective memorial sites, have also been victims of oblivion by much of the citizenship and the government. Regarding those we have mentioned here, they are also urban elements that, despite being within the city, remain in exile, outside the daily routes and the mental maps of the neighbourhood’s dwellers. This happens even though some of them still have the Art Deco style lettering and signs on their façades, a distinctive feature that makes them so recognisable and original. But citizens cannot be blamed for this ignorance since, until now, public authorities have not had any strategies for promoting a comprehensive project to rescue these war heritage assets. People know—or at least have heard—that in the subsoil of Valencia there are Roman remains, and that they can visit Museu de l’Almoina archaeological site. We are also aware of our medieval history, with a wide selection of monuments and museums that recount this historical aspect of the city. We can even contemplate the remains of the late 19th and early 20th century Valencia with its modernist constructions, historical bullring, emblematic train station (Estación del Norte), and a long list of other buildings and places. Still, despite the outstanding role played by Valencia in the Republican rearguard, the visibility of this recent stage of history remains but anecdotal in the city.

The causes of the lack of popularisation and visibility of war heritage and the city’s shelters can probably also be traced back to the post-war period and early Francoism, when the authorities initiated processes to dismantle and fill in many of these structures. Without doubt, Francoist dictate had no intention of allowing remnants of the war to remain visible in the city and, less so, constructions that paid witness to the resistance of the Republican rearguard. Thus, as of the 1950s especially, many of the city’s shelters began to be demolished, albeit often only partially. Thus, many were decapitated, that is to say, the most visible upper parts, at street level, were demolished and their accesses were walled up. They then became hidden underground (Figure 6). 8 The effectiveness of their silencing was such that, decades later, we have rediscovered shelters that had lain tarmacked over and hidden under squares, gardens, or avenues. This is what happened to the shelters at Plaça del Carmen, Plaça del Col·legi del Patriarca, Gran Via de les Germanies, and Gran Via de Marqués del Turia, among others.

After this premeditated Francoist strategy, the shelters continued to lose their place in the city and were, therefore, erased from the collective imagination of its citizens. This was mainly a consequence of the disastrous governmental policies which, instead of favouring their conservation and dissemination, silenced and undermined their essence and heritage value. Proof of this failure is the highly symptomatic fact that the shelters pass unnoticed by most Valencians, who know neither their significance nor their innermost history. In this respect, a negative influence has also been exerted by certain policies aiming to disseminate and define a largely reductionist heritage, focusing on monumentality, antiquity, aesthetics, and Valencian-ness. Criteria that are often not identified with heritage assets, like those we deal with here.

8 The occupation and use of some shelters as substandard dwellings, especially in the port area, known as Poblets Marítims (Azkárraga et al., 2017, p. 61), also provided an excuse to seal up many shelters during the post-war period and during the early years of Francoism (Figure 7).
That is why part of our task as professionals is to promote understanding of the heterogeneity and richness of our heritage, to show citizens the cultural value of the shelters scattered around our cities and towns, as well as other constructions, objects, and features that pay witness to our most recent past. Moreover, far from the definitions of Civil War heritage as something material, comprising movable and immovable, military and civil, Republican and Francoist artefacts (Besoli, 2003, p. 119), we also want to showcase the singularity of this heritage, which still has direct links to primary oral sources. These testimonies are essential to understanding the accounts and life histories of those with a first-hand link to our Civil War heritage, and thus, provide alternative and complimentary narratives to the graphic and written documents.

We are optimistic, and we understand that this new scenario must be the starting point of an ambitious, comprehensive, and coordinated programme that recovers the collective memorial sites of the city and which should be extended to the rest of the Valencian territory. We consider this to be an enriching, accessible, intergenerational, and integrative project that deals with transversal, historical, social, cultural, and patrimonial issues, both locally and globally, through the different typologies and locations of the shelters and other heritage elements of the Civil War.

We need outreach policies and strategies that help raise critical awareness of our heritage and our history. In appreciating the value of shelters—signposting heritage elements and opening them to the public—we must also contemplate complementary
projects and museography (Moreno, 2017). We have only just begun, and there is still a lot to do: we must now go beyond merely opening shelters to the public. The time has come to tackle the challenge of designing museums and interpretation centres that directly deal with the war. On the one hand, we recognise the great potential that war heritage has as a tourist resource, but on the other, we also understand that, because of their historical, social, cultural, and heritage value, shelters should not be mere points on a sightseer’s map, but rather spaces that pose issues and questions to the citizens regarding both the past and the present.

This is why part of our task, as professionals, is to promote the management and the preservation of the heritage represented by the city’s air-raid shelters calls for exhaustive cataloguing by the administration, accompanied by a serious study of their historical contextualisation. All this should be followed by measures to raise awareness and dissemination of this information, including the creation of geo-referenced digital cartography and its online distribution (Moreno and Muñoz, 2011, p. 187). This would generate a virtual space in which all the recovered memorial sites could be catalogued and publicly communicated, including drawing up tour routes or itineraries which could even serve as a central meeting point for gathering information and spreading the word about activities relating to Civil War heritage and the recovery of democratic memory.

Without a doubt, the policy of denial and silence regarding the recovery of our collective historical memory has generated strong prejudices over many decades, hindering the recognition of these elements as part of our heritage. However, it seems that there is renewed interest and concern in reviving places that pay tribute to our collective memory, and in helping them make the return journey from underground oblivion to resurface and recover their visibility, and gain the appreciation of the citizenry.

**Figure 7**

Shelter in the Poblats Marítims (Valencia) reconverted into housing during the post-war period. Archive of José Huguet, Nicolau Primitiu Valencian Library, (~1940s) Published in Azkárraga, et al., 2017, p. 61.
REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Andrea Moreno Martín has a degree in History and in Social and Cultural Anthropology and a PhD in Archaeology from the Universitat de València, where she works as a Cultural Heritage Manager. She is a technical adviser to the Historical Memory Committee of Quart de Poblet and collaborates in teaching and research tasks at the Universitat de València and the Museu Valencià D’Etnologia.

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